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Preface
My thesis combines work on several topics within the elds of macro-nance and macro-
economics, developed in three chapters. The rst two chapters contribute to the literature on
bank risk-taking, sovereign debt crises, and macroeconomic dynamics during nancial and debt
crises. The third chapter focuses on the recent growth of shadow banking and its implications
for market discipline on traditional commercial banks.
In the rst chapter, titled Aggregate Risk and Bank Risk-Taking, I propose a general
equilibrium model in which strategic interactions between banks and depositors may lead to
endogenous bank fragility and a drop in investment and output. With some opacity in bank
balance sheets, depositors form expectations about bank risk-taking and demand a return on
bank deposits according to their risk. This creates strategic complementarities and possibly
multiple equilibria: in response to an increase in funding costs, banks may optimally choose to
pursue risky portfolios that undermine their solvency prospects. In a bad equilibrium, bank
lending is crowded out by risky asset purchases and weak economic fundamentals lead to a
banking crisis.
I show that this model has important implications for economic vulnerability to crises to
policy design. The problem of multiple equilibria arises in countries with high aggregate risk and
an under-capitalized banking sector. In these countries, policy interventions in support of the
banking sector face a trade-o¤ between alleviating banksfunding conditions and strengthening
their risk-taking incentives. Due to this trade-o¤, liquidity provision to banks may backre
and eliminate the good equilibrium when it is not targeted. Targeted interventions have the
capacity to eliminate the bad equilibrium.
In the second chapter, titled Gambling Traps, I analyze macroeconomic dynamics as-
sociated with this framework in a dynamic general equilibrium model. I show that strategic
interactions between banks and depositors may leave countries stuck in gambling trapsafter
adverse shocks. In a gambling trap, high bank funding costs hinder the accumulation of bank
net worth, leading to a prolonged period of nancial fragility and an endogenously persistent
decline in economic activity.
I bring this model to bear on the European sovereign debt crisis, in the course of which
under-capitalized banks in default-risky countries experienced an increase in funding costs and
raised their holdings of domestic government debt. The model is quantied using Portuguese
data and accounts for macroeconomic dynamics in Portugal in 2010-2016. Finally, I show
that subsidized loans to banks, similar to the European Central Banks longer-term renancing
operations (LTRO) lead to a rise in banksholdings of risky domestic government debt and
perpetuate gambling traps.
The third chapter, titled Shadow Banking and Market Discipline on Traditional Banks,
viii
is joint work with Matthieu Darracq-Paries, Christo¤er Kok, and Dawid ·Zochowski. In this
chapter, we propose a general equilibrium banking model in which shadow banking arises
endogenously and undermines market discipline on traditional banks. We show that depositors
ability to re-optimize in response to crises imposes market discipline on traditional banks:
these banks optimally commit to a safe portfolio strategy to prevent early withdrawals. When
commitment is costly, shadow banking emerges as an alternative banking strategy that combines
high risk-taking with early liquidation in times of crisis. We derive an equilibrium in which the
shadow banking sector expands to a size where its liquidation causes a re-sale and exposes
traditional banks to liquidity risk. Higher deposit rates in compensation for liquidity risk also
weaken threats of early withdrawal and traditional banks pursue risky portfolios that may leave
them in default.
This theoretical model accounts for two key empirical facts about the 2007-2009 nancial
crisis in the United States: Shadow banks faced a sudden contraction in funding and the
liquidation of their assets caused a re-sale. Traditional banks did not su¤er from withdrawals,
experienced a sharp rise in their funding costs, and re-allocated their portfolios towards safe
and liquid assets. The model also yields novel and important insights for policy design. We
nd that policy interventions aimed at alleviating re-sales fuel further expansion of shadow
banking. Financial stability can be achieved with a tax on shadow bank prots or collateralized
liquidity support to traditional banks.
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Chapter 1
Aggregate Risk and Bank Risk-Taking
Abstract
I propose a general equilibrium model in which strategic interactions between banks
and depositors may lead to endogenous bank fragility and decline in investment and
output. With some opacity in bank balance sheets, depositors form expectations about
bank risk-taking and demand a return on bank deposits according to their risk. This
creates strategic complementarities and possibly multiple equilibria: in response to an
increase in funding costs, banks may optimally choose to pursue risky portfolios that
undermine their solvency prospects. In a bad equilibrium, bank lending is crowded out by
risky asset purchases and weak fundamentals lead to a banking crisis. Policy interventions
face a trade-o¤ between alleviating banks funding conditions and strengthening risk-
taking incentives. Liquidity provision to banks may eliminate the good equilibrium when
not targeted. Targeted interventions have the capacity to eliminate adverse equilibria.
Keywords: Risk taking; Banking crises; Bank regulation; Financial Constraints
JEL codes: E44, E58, F30, G11, G21, G28
1
1.1 Introduction
Evidence from recent nancial and debt crises shows that in response to higher aggregate risk,
under-capitalized banks increase their exposure to aggregate risky assets and experience a rise
in their funding costs. This leads to rising bank fragility and default risk, and raises two
important questions. First, what are the circumstances and mechanism that drive banks to
become excessively exposed to aggregate risk? Second, what is the role of bank funding costs?
In this chapter, I propose a framework where deposits are assets priced according to their
risk, and banks can optimally choose to pursue risky portfolios (which may lead to default
in equilibrium) under limited liability. This creates strategic complementarities: high required
deposit interest rates in anticipation of risk-taking behaviour raise the costs of funding for banks
and strengthen their incentives to take on more risk. Banks may then endogenously validate
depositor expectations in equilibrium, raising the possibility of multiple equilibria.
I develop my analysis by specifying a small open economy model with households, rms,
entrepreneurs, and a banking sector. Banks collect deposits from households and choose their
portfolios of aggregate-risky assets and loans to rms; households lend to banks on terms that
depend on bank solvency prospects; entrepreneurs sell assets backed by a pool of risky projects;
rms invest.
Modelling the equilibrium adjustment in bank risk-taking strategies in response to funding
conditions has key macroeconomic and policy implications. The kernel intuition is that, when
banks are well capitalized and/or market sentiment is good, the resulting banking equilibrium
can be described as safe. In a safe equilibriumbanks keep their exposure to aggregate risk
low. Since banks are safe, depositors accept low interest rates. With some opacity preventing
depositors from observing the bank portfolio in detail, however, another equilibriummay emerge
depending on the conditions of the economy and the net worth of banks. In this gambling
equilibrium, depositors expect banks to have a high exposure to aggregate risk and hence
become risky themselves. As depositors require a risk premium, banks nd it optimal to gamble
and buy risky assets. The possibility of multiple equilibria depends on bank capitalization: the
problem plagues economies where the banking sector is under-capitalized.
The model naturally provides novel and important insights on the e¤ectiveness of central
banks liquidity interventions in support of nancial intermediaries. A key prerequisite for
successful interventions is that they need to provide some risk-sharing with depositors. I show
that when the repayment of o¢ cial debt takes precedence over deposits, liquidity provision is
completely ine¤ective. This is because depositors anticipate the dilution of their claims to bank
revenues in the event of insolvency, and raise deposit rates accordingly. The second requirement
for a successful intervention is that it must be well-targeted. Non-targeted interventions that
provide liquidity unconditionally face an adverse trade-o¤ between their goals of alleviating
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banksfunding conditions and strengthening their incentives to gamble. When bank net worth
is low, non-targeted liquidity provision may actually eliminate the safe equilibrium. In the
gambling equilibrium, banks use the additional funding to increase their exposure to aggregate
risk until their funding costs return to the pre-intervention level. On the contrary, targeted
interventions that provide liquidity conditional on bank leverage overcome the adverse trade-o¤
and eliminate the gambling equilibrium.
These insights can be generalized to a large set of policy instruments. I show that, on its
own, deposit insurance faces the same trade-o¤ as non-targeted liquidity provision (with risk
sharing). A wide range of macroprudential policy instruments can be used in conjunction with
deposit insurance to overcome the trade-o¤, leading to a similar outcome as targeted liquidity
provision. Specically, this outcome is implementable using regulatory constraints on bank
liabilities or risk-weighted capital regulation.
In greater detail, I model the optimal strategies of banks and households as follows. When
there is uncertainty about future economic fundamentals, bank managers adopt either a safe
or a gambling strategy. The safe strategy consists of investing in a precautionary manner
with the goal of remaining solvent even when fundamentals turn out to be weak. The gambling
strategy consists of pursuing high exposure to risky assets, and leads to insolvency under adverse
fundamentals.
Bank managers have incentives to gamble for two reasons: First, they are protected by
limited liability. If fundamentals turn out to be strong ex-post, risky assets pay a high return
driven by the risk premium; when fundamentals are weak, banks are shielded from the full
consequences of their losses by limited liability. Second, they are subject to aggregate (i.e.
non-diversiable) risk. Bank managers anticipate (quantitatively small) costs that may hit
them in the event of weak fundamentals independent of their holdings of risky assets. I model
these costs as reecting all balance sheet losses that a macroeconomic recession can impose on
banks other than the direct impact of losses on risky assets. By way of example, a downturn
usually leads to a deterioration in the value of illiquid assets and a rise in non-performing loans.
To the extent that deposit insurance is incomplete and/or lacks credibility, households
optimally act on their assessment of bank solvency prospects by demanding higher rates on their
deposits.1 I rst show that the dependence of bank solvency on deposit repayment obligations
creates a kink in the optimal deposit schedule. Above a threshold level of deposits, households
anticipate that banks will become insolvent in the event of weak fundamentals and demand
higher interest payments in compensation. Another determinant of bankssolvency prospects
is their exposure to risky assets. The higher this exposure is, the lower the level of deposits at
1Deposit insurance schemes typically guarantee deposits only up to a limit (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2008). In
real terms, depositor losses can take the form of a suspension of convertibility and a currency devaluation as
well as an explicit bail-in.
3
which banks become insolvent in case of default. Increasing exposure thus translates into an
inward shift of the deposit threshold.
With full transparency of bank balance sheets, the anticipated tightening of the deposit
threshold would deter banks from increasing their exposure to aggregate risk, and by extension,
rule out a gambling strategy. However, banks are typically able to obscure the composition
of their investment in a variety of ways, including reliance on shell corporations and complex
nancial instruments.2 I assume, realistically, that households cannot directly observe portfolio
exposures and have to form expectations about banksstrategies.
I refer to anticipations of a safe strategy as good sentiments, as opposed to bad senti-
mentsassociated with anticipation of gambling. Since the gambling strategy revolves around
higher exposure to aggregate risk, bad sentiments result in a tightening of the deposit thresh-
old. Bank managers strive to satisfy a solvency constraint under the safe strategy. Any shift
to bad sentiments further constrains their ability to raise funds and reduces the value of the
safe strategy relative to gambling. Bad sentiments may then become self-fullling when the
tightening of the deposit threshold makes it optimal for banks to adopt the gambling strategy.
I solve for a rational expectations equilibrium and nd that the characterization of the
equilibrium outcome is contingent on bank net worth. With su¢ ciently high net worth, bank
managers adopt a safe strategy regardless of the location of the deposit threshold and only
positive sentiments are conrmed in equilibrium. In this safe equilibrium, banks reduce risky
asset purchases and deleverage to satisfy their solvency constraints, while bank funding costs
remain at the risk-free rate. Conversely, only a gambling equilibrium may be sustained with
su¢ ciently low net worth. In a gambling equilibrium, banks increase their exposure to risky
assets at the expense of credit to rms and bank funding costs are high. Finally, sentiments
become self-fullling in an intermediate region of net worth. A rise in aggregate risk amplies
the impact of sentiments on bank funding costs and expands this multiplicity region.
Relationship to the literature This chapter is related to the literature on bank risk-
taking. The insight that limited liability and portfolio opacity lead to risk-shifting may be
traced back to Jensen andMeckling (1976) and Kareken andWallace (1978). Krasa and Villamil
(1992) emphasize the importance of aggregate risk by showing that banks take excessive risk
only when they are not able to fully diversify their portfolios. It is the combination of these
three ingredients that leads to the emergence of the gambling equilibrium in this chapter.
A strand of this literature focuses on competition between banks. Keeley (1990), Allen and
Gale (2000) and Hellmann et al. (2000) among many others3 develop models where imperfectly
2The level of deposits is public information. Although banks may also raise funds through less transparent
methods, this has no impact on the repayment prospects of depositors due to their seniority.
3See also Marcus (1984), Suarez (1994) and Matutes and Vives (2000). Carletti (2008) provides an extensive
review of this literature.
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competitive banks make excess prots. Expected future prots then create skin in the game
and temper banks risk-taking incentives. In these studies, greater competition for deposits
raises bank funding costs and reduces prot margins, leading to a rise in bank risk-taking.
Chan et al. (1986), Besanko and Thakor (1993) and Marquez (2002) reach similar conclusions
in environments where excess prots stem from informational rents. DellAriccia et al. (2014)
propose a model where interest rate hikes lead to a rise in bank risk-taking through a similar
mechanism when banks are under-capitalized.
Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) show that introducing moral hazard in loan markets may reverse
these ndings. They propose a model where increased competition among banks reduces interest
rates on loans. With lower loan rates, borrowers invest in less risky projects which in turn
increase asset quality and reduce bank risk. Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) nd that
allowing for imperfect correlation across borrowersdefault probabilities weakens this channel.
This chapter also proposes a model with imperfect competition where a rise in the funding
costs of banks reduces their prot margins and increases risk-taking incentives. Di¤erent to the
literature on bank competition, however, it focuses on depositor expectations about bank risk-
taking as a determinant of bank funding costs. The main contribution of this chapter is to show
that these expectations may become self-fullling: When depositors expect high risk-taking by
banks, they demand a risk premium on deposits. High funding costs in turn strengthen banks
risk-taking incentives. With su¢ ciently low bank net worth and high aggregate risk, depositor
expectations become self-fullling such that there are multiple equilibria.
The multiplicity mechanism considered in this chapter di¤ers from bank-runs à la Diamond
and Dybvig (1983) in that it pertains to banksex-ante risk-taking decisions rather than ex-
post withdrawals. In the gambling equilibrium, banks invest in risky portfolios that leave them
vulnerable to default risk. However, these risks only come to pass when economic fundamen-
tals turn out to be weak. With strong fundamentals, banks remain solvent regardless of the
equilibrium type.
Repullo (2004), Farhi and Tirole (2012) and Acharya et al. (2016) also propose models with
multiplicity in bank risk-taking. In Repullo (2004), banks compete for deposits in a circular
road model and there are multiple equilibria when the degree of competition is su¢ ciently
strong. In Farhi and Tirole (2012) and Acharya et al. (2016), multiplicity stems from time
inconsistency in the governments bailout incentives. In a bad equilibrium, banks invest in a
risky asset in anticipation of government support and the correlation in their exposures makes
it optimal for the government to provide support. In these studies, multiple equilibria arise
due to strategic complementarities across banks. In contrast, this chapter analyzes strategic
complementarities between the optimal strategies of banks and depositors.
Finally, this chapter is related to the literature on the risk-taking implications of policy
interventions in support of the banking sector. Many of the studies discussed above emphasize
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that policy interventions face a trade-o¤ between increasing bank prots under a safe portfolio
strategy and providing additional opportunities for risk shifting. Cordella and Yeyati (2003)
nd that the former e¤ect dominates when interventions are contingent on adverse macroeco-
nomic conditions. Marquez (2017) reach a similar conclusion when a large portion of bank
investors may not observe bank behaviour. In this chapter, the latter e¤ect dominates such
that deposit insurance guarantees and unconditional liquidity provision backre and eliminate
the safe equilibrium. Instead, the gambling equilibrium may be eliminated with targeted inter-
ventions which provide liquidity conditional on bank leverage.
Layout The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 1.2 describes the
model environment. Section 1.3 presents the equilibrium solution. Section 1.4 conducts policy
analysis. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Model environment
I consider a stylized model of small open nancial economy with four agents: households,
banks, entrepreneurs and rms. Events unfold over two time periods (see Figure 1.1 for a
graphical timeline). In the rst period, banks collect deposits from households and use these
funds, along with their own net worth, for asset purchases and working capital lending to rms.
Entrepreneurs issue assets backed by their investment in a pool of risky projects. Firms produce
the consumption good.
In the second period, economic fundamentals turn out to be weak with (exogenous) prob-
ability P . Weak fundamentals lead to a haircut on risky assets and reduce the productivity
of rms. If banks are left with insu¢ cient funds to pay the promised return to their deposi-
tors, they become insolvent under limited liability and a haircut proportionate to their funding
shortfall is imposed on deposits.4
Bankssolvency prospects in the event of weak fundamentals are determined by the strat-
egy their managers adopt in the rst period. The safe strategy consists of investing in a
precautionary manner that leaves them solvent under weak fundamentals, whereas the gam-
bling strategyleads to insolvency. Bank managers nd it optimal to follow the strategy that
maximizes their expected payo¤.
A key friction in the model is the limited transparency of bank balance sheets. Specically,
households observe the amount of deposits collected by banks but not their exposure to risky
assets, which can be obscured through the use of shell corporations and/or complex nancial
4The absence of safe assets among banksinvestment opportunities serves only to simplify the exposition.
Their inclusion would be completely inconsequential in this set up as purchasing a safe asset is either equivalent
to or less protable than a reduction in deposits by the same amount.
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Figure 1.1: Timeline
instruments. This leads to a two-way relationship between the optimal strategies of bank
managers and households. When households anticipate that banks follow a gambling strategy,
their optimal deposit schedule changes in a manner that increases banksincentives to gamble.
Household expectations about bank risk-taking may then become self-fullling.
Finally, before I explain these activities in more detail, it is convenient to describe some
notational conventions. Table 1.1 provides a list of variables and parameters. Deposits, risky
assets, loans and safe assets are respectively labelled as (d; b; l; d) and take the form of discount
bonds with prices
 
q; qb; ql; q

.5 The recovery rates of (d; b; l) under weak fundamentals are 
; b; l

. An underbar denotes variables at the state with weak fundamentals such that A is
productivity when fundamentals turn out to be weak. Aggregate quantities, such as aggregate
loans L, are in the upper case while lower case variables pertain to an individual bank.
1.2.1 Entrepreneurs
In the rst period, entrepreneurs invest in a large pool of high-risk projects and issue assets b
backed by their returns. Diversication across projects ensures that asset payo¤s are contingent
only on the aggregate state such that they pay a recovery rate b 2 (0; 1) when fundamentals
turn out to be weak.6
Assets are internationally traded and their marginal buyers are deep pocketed foreign in-
5This helps simplify the exposition without any actual impact on the model mechanisms.
6Note that these assets may be interpreted as any asset class with high aggregate risk. For example, they
could take the interpretation of mortgage-backed securities in the context of the 2007-09 nancial crisis in the
United States, sovereign bonds issued by periphery countries during the Eurocrisis, or any asset denominated
in domestic currency in a currency crisis.
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Table 1.1: Notation
Variables
Label Description
d Deposits
b Aggregate-risky assets
l Loans to rms
d Safe assets
q; ql; qb; q Asset prices
; l; b Recovery rates
H Labour supply
w Wages
K Working capital
Y Output
n Bank net worth
 Bank prots
v Bank expected payo¤
 Exposure to aggregate risk
c Consumption
l Loans market mark-up
d Deposit market mark-up
Parameters
Label Description
P Prob. of weak fundamentals
 Market share of banks
A Productivity
 Cobb-Douglas elasticity
 Discount factor
E Household endowment
vestors. As such, they are priced at their expected return
qb =
 
1  P + Pb q (1.1)
where 1=q is the risk-free rate.7
1.2.2 Firms
Firms are perfectly competitive. In order to produce the consumption good Y , they hire labour
H from households at a wage w and borrow working capital
K = qlL (1.2)
7I implicitly assume that the availability of risky projects is large relative to the size of the domestic banking
sector. In a monetary union setting, 1=q can be interpreted as the interest rate set by the common central
bank.
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from the domestic banking sector. In the interest of a clear exposition, loans to rms take
the form of discount bonds L sold at a price ql. Under a standard Cobb-Douglas production
function, the representative rms prot maximization problem is
max
K;L;H;H
(1  P ) AKH1    L  wH+ P AKH1    lL  wH
subject to (1.2), where A is productivity and l is the recovery rate of loans. Crucially,
 
ql; L;K

are not state contingent as rms borrow in advance. When fundamentals are weak, loans become
non-performing due to the productivity decline A < A and banks claim the rms revenues net
of salary payments such that8
l =
AKH1    wH
L
Combining this with the rst order conditions of the rms problem yields the expressions
w = (1  )AK
w = (1  )AK
ql =

1
A
 1

L
1 
 (1.3)
l =
A
A
where labour supply is perfectly inelastic and normalized to H = H = 1. Of particular
importance are the last two expressions, which respectively establish an upward-sloping loan
supply schedule and pin down the recovery rate.
1.2.3 Households
There is a unit continuum of risk neutral households with an initial endowment E. They save
by purchasing safe assets D at a price q or deposits D from domestic banks at a price q.9 ;10
8This is the reduced-form outcome of a re-negotiation game between rms and banks after loans become
non-performing. As rms are perfectly competitive and banks have market power, the latter extracts all of the
remaining revenues after salary payments. Implicitly, this relies on the absence of information asymmetries,
which can be motivated by relationship banking. This also makes it prohibitively costly for households and
foreign entities to lend directly to rms. The domestic banking sector thus acts as a nancial intermediary that
channels funds to rms. Note that the outcome here is equivalent to the issuance of state-contingent debt by
rms.
9The assumption of risk neutrality only serves to attain a tractable expression for the deposit demand
schedule. The results presented below retain their validity under risk aversion, which is introduced in a similar
model in Chapter 2. Similarly, permitting households to purchase risky assets has no e¤ect on the outcome.
10D can be interpreted as deposits in a safe foreign bank or simply as a safe real asset. As there is a unit
continuum of homogenous households, individual householdsdeposits are identical to the aggregate quantities.
I abuse notation by using the aggregate terms (D;D) to describe the households problem.
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The representative households utility maximization problem can be described as follows
max
c1;c2;c2;D;D
 u (c1) +  [(1  P )u (c2) + Pu (c2)]
subject to the period budget constraints
c1 + qD + q
D = E
c2 = D +D
 + w
c2 = D +D
 + w
where  is the rate at which households discount future consumption and  is the recovery rate
of domestic bank deposits under weak fundamentals. This yields the rst order conditions
q =  (1.4)
q = (1  P + P) q (1.5)
which indicate that domestic deposits are priced at their expected return relative to the safe
asset. Observe that householdsvaluation of domestic deposits increases in recovery rate .
I provide an expression for  in the next section before deriving the optimal deposit demand
schedule of households in Section 1.2.5.
1.2.4 Banks
The domestic banking sector is imperfectly competitive in the manner of Cournot. Each bank
is risk neutral with a market share  2 (0; 1]. The representative bank nances its risky asset
purchases and lending to rms with deposits collected from households as well as its own net
worth n  0. Its budget constraint can be written as
n+ qd = qbb+ qll (1.6)
where l = L, d = D represent lending and deposits at individual bank level. Prots are
contingent on economic fundamentals as follows
 = max f0; l + b  dg (1.7)
 = max

0; ll + bb  d	 (1.8)
where  represents prots in the event of weak fundamentals, and the maximum operators
reect limited liability. Banks always make a strictly positive prot under strong fundamentals
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( > 0) but may become reliant on limited liability after fundamentals turn out to be weak.
This leads to insolvency, with losses passed on to depositors through a haircut on deposits. The
recovery rate of deposits reects the banks shortfall of funds11
 = min

1;
ll + bb
d

(1.9)
with  < 1 indicating that limited liability binds.
The representative bank chooses its deposits d, asset purchases b and loans l in order to
maximize its expected payo¤
v = (1  P )  + P
subject to the budget constraint. Note that choosing (b; l) is equivalent to selecting the share of
funds  2 [0; 1] spent on risky asset purchases, which I refer to as banksexposure to aggregate
risk. Using (1.6), (b; l) can be dened in terms of  as
b = 

n+ qd
qb

(1.10)
l = (1  )

n+ qd
ql

(1.11)
It is convenient for the remainder of the text to express the recovery rate  in terms of
aggregate risk exposure 
 =

1 for d  d ()
 
b
qb
+ (1  ) l
ql
  
n
d
+ q

for d > d ()
(1.12)
d () =

 
b
qb
+ (1  ) l
ql

n
1  q

 
b
qb
+ (1  ) l
ql
 (1.13)
where d () represents the threshold of deposits above which the bank becomes insolvent under
weak fundamentals.12 Observe that d () and  are positively related to bank net worth n and
the rate of return  
b
qb
+ (1  ) l
ql
on bank funds.
Recall from the previous section that the price of deposits q increases in . Under imperfect
competition, banks internalize the e¤ects of their actions on  and hence q. As such, it is
necessary to determine the households optimal deposit demand schedule in the next section
before evaluating bank strategies in Section 1.2.6.
11There is no deposit insurance or bailot guarantees in the baseline model. These are evaluated as policy
interventions in Section 1.4.
12This can also be interpreted as a leverage threshold d () =n. The claim that  < 1 for d > d () is valid
under the parameter restrictions discussed in the next section.
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1.2.5 Deposit demand schedule
Combining (1.5) with (1.12) yields the households optimal deposit demand schedule contingent
on 
q (; d) =
q for d  d ()
q
1 P+P

 
b
qb
+(1 ) l
ql

n
d
1 qP

 
b
qb
+(1 ) l
ql
 for d > d () (1.14)
where d () is dened by (1.13). The deposit demand schedule is downward sloping and nega-
tively related to  under the parameter restrictions
 (1  P )
 (1  P ) +  (1  ) >
A
A
>
b
 +  (1  ) (1.15)
These restrictions ensure that following a realization of weak economic fundamentals, the
rate of return from lending to rms falls short of the promised return on deposits but exceeds
that of risky assets. When the rst inequality is satised, the bank becomes insolvent under
weak fundamentals given d > d () and the deposit demand schedule is downward sloping in
this region. Therefore, I refer to d > d () as the riskyregion of the deposit demand schedule
and d  d () as the safe region. In the safe region, deposits are deemed to be risk-free
with  = 1 by households and priced on par with safe assets q = q. Conversely, in the risky
region, households price deposits at a discount q < q in anticipation of a haircut ( < 1) when
fundamentals turn out to be weak. At the limit d!1, the recovery rate tends to the rate of
return on bank funds and the value of deposits approaches the lower bound
lim
d!1
q (; d) = q
1  P
1  qP

 
b
qb
+ (1  ) l
ql

The second inequality in (1.15) establishes a negative relationship between the exposure to
aggregate risk  and the rate of return on bank funds. This ensures that the deposit threshold
d () shifts inwards in response to a rise in , while the risky region of the deposit demand
schedule pivots downward. Figure 1.2 shows the e¤ect of a rise in aggregate risk exposure from
an arbitrary level s to g > s on the deposit demand schedule.
When bank balance sheets are completely transparent, bank managers internalize the neg-
ative relationship between exposure to aggregate risk and their funding conditions. Lemma 1.1
shows that this imposes market discipline and deters banks from gambling on risky assets.
Lemma 1.1 When households can observe both (d; ), limited liability has no impact on banks
optimal strategy.
Proof. Provided in Appendix A3.1.
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Figure 1.2: Deposit demand schedule
Along with the parameter restrictions, a necessary assumption to attain the results described
below is some opacity in bank balance sheets such that households can observe the amount of
deposits d collected by banks but not the aggregate risk exposure . As a result, banks cannot
commit to a certain level of exposure.13
I elaborate further on the formation of household expectations on  in Section 1.3.2. This
discussion builds upon optimal bank strategies, however, which necessitates their explanation in
advance. In the meantime, both the deposit demand schedule and the bank strategies described
in the next section should be taken to be contingent on household expectations about exposure
to aggregate risk, which I label as ~. Lacking commitment, banks take ~ as given and do not
internalize the impact of their exposure on the deposit demand schedule q (~; d) facing them.
1.2.6 Bank strategies
Limited liability creates a discontinuity in the representative banks optimal strategy such that
it can be evaluated as a choice between two distinct strategies. Under a safe strategy(labelled
as s), the bank satises a solvency constraint
d  ll + bb (1.16)
which ensures that it does not rely on limited liability when fundamentals turn out to be weak.
The gambling strategy(labelled as g), on the other hand, results in the banks insolvency
13The same outcome can be attained with a timing friction whereby banks collect deposits rst and then
determine their exposure .
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and the imposition of a haircut on deposits under weak fundamentals.
In the rst period, the representative bank adopts the strategy that maximizes its expected
payo¤ such that the safe strategy is preferred when
vs  vg
where (vs; vg) are respectively the expected payo¤s associated with safe and gambling strategies.
Gambling strategy When the bank follows the gambling strategy, it solves the problem
vg = max
d;2[0;1]
(1  P ) (l + b  d) (1.17)
s.t.
n+ qd = qbb+ qll
where (1.10) and (1.11) map the choice of  into (b; l). Since limited liability binds under weak
fundamentals, the bank only internalizes the payo¤ in the state with strong fundamentals. It
also internalizes the deposit demand and loan supply schedules
q  q (~; d) (1.18)
ql =

1
A
 1

(l + (1  )L) 1  (1.19)
given by (1.14) and (1.3) due to imperfect competition.14
The rst order conditions can then be written as
qb = (1  d (~; d)) q (1.20)
ql = (1  l) qb (1.21)
where d (~; d) and l are the mark-ups the bank enjoys in the deposit and loan markets due
14(1.19) di¤ers slightly from (1.3) as it is from the perspective of an individual bank. L represents aggregate
bank lending which is taken as given by the representative bank.
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to its market power. They are dened as15
d (~; d)   
@q (~; d)
@d
d
q
=
0 for d  d (~)
P

~ 
b
qb
+(1 ~) l
ql

n
d
1 P+P

~ 
b
qb
+(1 ~) l
ql

n
d
for d > d (~)
(1.22)
l 
 (1  )
 +  (1  ) (1.23)
Observe that the recovery rates
 
b; l

do not feature in the rst order conditions, since
the bank does not internalize its payo¤ under weak fundamentals. I elaborate further on the
consequences of this while considering the gambling equilibrium in Section 1.3.1.
Safe strategy Under the safe strategy, the banks problem di¤ers from its gambling
counterpart in two respects. First, as the bank does not rely on limited liability, the objective
function internalizes the payo¤ in both states of nature such that
vs = max
d;2[0;1]
(1  P )  + P
= max
d;2[0;1]
(1  P ) (l + b) + P  ll + bb  d
Second, this is subject to an occasionally binding solvency constraint given by (1.16) in addition
to the budget constraint. The rst order conditions for the safe strategy can then be written
as
 
ll + bb  d = 0 ,   0 , d  ll + bb (1.24)
qb 
 
1  P + Pb+ b
1 + 
(1  d (~; d)) q (1.25)
ql =
 
1  P + Pl+ l
1 + 
(1  l) (1  d (~; d)) q (1.26)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier for the solvency constraint and (1.24) is the corresponding
complementary slackness condition. Compared to the gambling case, the bank has a lower
valuation for both b and l since it internalizes the low payo¤ from these assets in the state
with weak economic fundamentals. When l > b, however, greater value is placed on loans
compared to risky assets relative to the gambling case. Both of these e¤ects are amplied when
the solvency constraint is binding such that  > 0.
The weak inequality in (1.25) reects the possibility that the bank may prefer not to purchase
15Observe that there is no deposit market mark-up in the safe region of the deposit demand schedule. This
is because banks face a horizontal deposit demand schedule in this region as their deposits become perfectly
substitutable with safe assets.
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any risky assets ( = 0), since their price is xed at qb =
 
1  P + Pb q as explained in
Section 1.2.1.16 Lemma 1.2 describes the conditions under which (1.25) holds with equality.
Lemma 1.2 When  = 0 and q = q, condition (1.25) holds with equality and reduces to
qb =
 
1  P + Pb q (1.27)
and there is an interior solution for b within the range
b 2

0;
q d (~) + n  qll
qb

(1.28)
Otherwise, there is a strict inequality and a corner solution
qb >
 
1  P + Pb+ b
1 + 
(1  d (~; d)) q
b = 0
Proof. Provided in Appendix A3.2.
This indicates that the bank only purchases a positive amount of risky assets b > 0 when
the solvency constraint is slack with  = 0 and bank deposits are at the safe region of the
deposit demand schedule such that q = q. In this case, (1.27) shows that the banks valuation
of risky assets is at their expected payo¤, which is equivalent to their market price given by
(1.1). The bank is thus indi¤erent to the amount of its risky asset purchases within the range
(1.28). On the other hand, when the solvency constraint binds ( > 0) and/or bank deposits
are considered to be risky (q < q), the bank does not purchase any risky assets.
In the next section, I characterize two candidate equilibria and determine the conditions
under which they are self-conrming.
1.3 Equilibrium
I solve for a symmetric rational expectations equilibrium which requires that all optimality con-
ditions and constraints of banks, rms and households are satised, and household expectations
on aggregate risk exposure ~ are conrmed in the equilibrium.17 Section 1.3.1 characterizes the
16Implicitly, this is a complementary slackness condition for an occassionally binding non-negativity constraint
b  0. This constraint never binds under the gambling strategy due to the higher valuation of risky assets. An
equivalent constraint for lending (l  0) is also slack at all times since ql declines in response to a fall in l.
17I abstain from mixed equilibria, as this would complicate the solution signicantly without yielding any
interesting insights in addition to those provided by analyzing symmetric equilibria. Note also that the candidate
equilibria described here, and the conditions under which they are valid, would remain valid even when mixed
equilibria are taken into account.
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candidate equilibria. Section 1.3.2 describes how households formulate their expectations ~.
Section 1.3.3 provides the equilibrium conditions as well as an intuitive demonstration of the
mechanism behind multiple equilibria. Finally, Section 1.3.4 formally characterizes the equilib-
rium regions.
1.3.1 Candidate equilibria
Under rational expectations, two candidate equilibria emerge: a gambling equilibriumwhere
household expectations of high exposure to aggregate risk in the banking sector are conrmed
by the adoption of a gambling strategy by banks, and a safe equilibriumwhere the opposite is
true. With a slight abuse of notation, I use the labels gand sto refer to variables pertaining
to the gambling and safe equilibria.
Gambling equilibrium Under the gambling equilibrium, banks follow the rst order
conditions (1.20) and (1.21). The aggregate risk exposure g, which must be consistent with
household expectations ~, is determined by combining (1.20) with the deposit demand schedule
(1.14). This yields
g ! 1 (1.29)
qg ! qb
where the main takeaway is the co-movement between the value of deposits qg and risky asset
prices qb. Note that the corner solution in g is due to the risk neutrality of households.
18 In
Appendix A1, I show that risk aversion leads to an interior solution g 2 (0; 1), qg 2
 
qb; q

while preserving the co-movement property.
The second condition (1.21) pins down the price and quantity of loans purchased by the
representative bank as
qlg = (1  l) qb (1.30)
lg =  (A)
1
1  ql

1 
g (1.31)
where aggregate loans are given by Lg = lg=. Since the bank only internalizes asset payo¤s
in the state with strong fundamentals, a rise in the probability P of weak fundamentals (which
reduces qb) leads to a decline in bank lending. This reects the crowding out of bank lending
18Under risk neutrality, bank deposits are priced at their expected value and the curvature of the deposit
demand schedule is such that the mark-up d (~; d) tends to zero as deposits increase. Therefore, under a
gambling strategy, banks nd it protable to issue more deposits and use the funds to purchase risky assets
until their anticipated exposure approaches unity.
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Figure 1.3: Gambling equilbrium
Note: The deposit supply curve is attained by combining (1.19)-
(1.22). Deposit demand stems from the combination of (1.14) and
(1.29).
by risky asset purchases.
Finally, the expected payo¤ of banks under the gambling equilibrium is given by
vg = (1  P )llg +
n
q
(1.32)
where the rst term reects the mark-up from lending and the second term is the expected
return on banksinitial net worth.
Figure 1.3 provides a graphical depiction of the gambling equilibrium, where the red line
represents the banks optimal deposit supply schedule under a gambling strategy and Eg marks
the equilibrium allocation.19
Safe Equilibrium Under the safe equilibrium, the deposit threshold d (s) coincides with
the solvency constraint (1.16) such that banks always remain within the safe region of the
19Observe that the rate of change in the deposit supply schedule changes direction. This occurs at qg =
qlg= [(1  l) (1  d (~; d))]. Until this point, the bank invests only in lending to rms. By virtue of diminishing
returns to scale in the production function, ql increases at an increasing rate and so does the deposit supply
schedule. Beyond this point, however, the bank invests additional funds in risky assets and the deposit supply
schedule is guided by (1.20). The relationship between d (~; d) and d then gives the schedule a positive, but
decreasing rate of change that tends to zero at qg ! qb.
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deposit demand schedule with qs = q. The rst order conditions can then be written as
qb 
 
1  P + Pb+ b
1 + 
q (1.33)
ql =
 
1  P + Pl+ l
1 + 
(1  l) q (1.34)
It follows from Lemma 1.2 that there are two possible cases of the safe equilibrium, one
where the solvency constraint is slack and another where it binds. Lemma 1.3 characterizes the
safe equilibrium under both of these cases.
Lemma 1.3 There are two cases of the safe equilibrium
Case 1 When n  nc 
 
qls   ql

ls, the solvency constraint is slack ( = 0) and (1.33) holds
with equality. The safe equilibrium is then characterized by20
qls =
 
1  P + Pl (1  l) q (1.35)
ls =  (A)
1
1  ql

1 
s (1.36)
bs 2
"
0;
n   qls   ql ls
qb   qb
#
(1.37)
ds =
qbbs + q
lls   n
q
s =
qbbs
qds + n
(1.38)
vs =
 
1  P + Pllls + nq (1.39)
Case 2 When n < nc, the solvency constraint binds ( > 0) and the safe equilibrium is char-
acterized by
qlls =

1

 1 


ls
A
 1

  n (1.40)
qls =

1
A
 1


ls

 1 

bs = s = 0 (1.41)
ds = 
lls
vs = (1  P )
 
1  l ls (1.42)
20In the deniton for nc,
 
qls; ls

correspond to (1.35), (1.36)
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Figure 1.4: Safe equilbrium
Note: The deposit supply curve is attained by combining (1.3) with (1.34) and (1.34). Deposit
demand stems from the combination of (1.14) and (1.38).
where the parameter restrictions (1.15) are su¢ cient to show that
@ls
@n
> 0 8 n < nc
Proof. Provided in Appendix A3.3.
Figure 1.4 represents the two cases graphically. In the rst case, banks value assets according
to their expected return since they do not face a binding constraint or expect to rely on limited
liability. The equilibrium price of loans is then given by (1.35). As explained in section 1.2.6,
banks are indi¤erent to the amount of their risky asset purchases within a range given by (1.37),
because their valuation of these assets coincides with their market price. Consistent with this,
there is also a range of admittable equilibrium values for (ds; s). In Figure 1.4, this is depicted
by the overlapping region Es between the deposit demand and supply curves. In order to pin
down these variables in equilibrium, I select the upper bound of (1.37) as the equilibrium value
for bs. This amounts to eliminating a range of safe equilibria with lower (bs; s) values without
any impact on the characteristics of the equilibrium outcome.21
In the second case, the binding solvency constraint creates a wedge between the demand
and supply of deposits. Therefore, banks do not nd it optimal to purchase any risky assets
and the equilibrium quantity of loans is implicitly dened by (1.40). A rise in net worth n
relaxes the solvency constraint, leading to a rise in the price and quantity of loans.
Finally, it is worth discussing bank lending in the context of safe and gambling equilibria.
21The parameter regions under which the safe equilibrium with the selected bs value exists fully encompasses
that of safe equilibria with lower bs values. In other words, whenever the safe equilibria with lower bs values
exist, so does the selected equilibrium, which is identical to them in all other aspects.
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Proposition 1.1 outlines the conditions under which a gambling equilibrium is associated with
lower bank lending.
Proposition 1.1 Bank lending is lower in a gambling equilibrium under the conditions
l > b
n >

1

 1 


lg
A
 1

  qllg
Proof. Provided in Appendix A3.5.
The rst condition pertains to banksrisk-taking incentives. In a gambling equilibrium, an
adverse change in economic fundamentals drives the banking sector into insolvency. Because
of limited liability, banks then cease to internalize their revenues in the state with weak funda-
mentals. When the recovery rate of loans exceeds that of risky assets, this leads to the crowding
out of bank lending by risky asset purchases.
In spite of this, bank lending is higher under the gambling equilibrium when net worth
falls short of the level required to satisfy the second condition. In this case, a tight solvency
constraint forces banks to reduce their lending below the gambling level in order to ensure
their solvency under weak fundamentals. Note that as the recovery rate l of loans increases,
the second condition is satised at a wider range of net worth, while crowding out e¤ects get
stronger.
1.3.2 Sentiments
Recall from Section 1.2.5 that banksaggregate risk exposure  is unobservable. Nevertheless, it
is a key determinant of their solvency prospects and hence the optimal deposit demand schedule
q (; d). In this section, I describe how households formulate their expectations ~ about banks
exposures to aggregate risk. This is equivalent to forming an expectation about bank strategies
since (1.29), (1.38) and (1.41) establish a one-to-one mapping between the two conditional on
the observables (n; d).
Figure 1.2 shows the deposit demand schedules associated with the expectation of safe
(~ = s) and gambling (~ = g) strategies. Observe that households may infer the bank
strategy from the level of deposits d when it lies outside the range d 2 ( d  g ; d (s)]. When
d  d  g, banks remain solvent under weak fundamentals even when their exposure is at a
level associated with the gambling strategy. As such, banks cannot possibly follow a gambling
strategy when their deposits remain within this region. Similarly, even the low exposure s
associated with the safe strategy leads to insolvency when deposits exceed d (s) such that
d > d (s) is not consistent with a safe strategy.
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Figure 1.5: Sentiments
In contrast, within the non-veriableregion d 2 ( d  g ; d (s)], it is not possible to de-
duce the bank strategy from observables. Expectations about the aggregate risk exposure ~
are instead determined by household sentiments such that good sentimentsrefer to the ex-
pectation of a safe strategy and bad sentimentsrefer to that of a gambling strategy. Figure
1.5 displays the deposit demand schedule under each type of sentiments. As I solve for a
rational expectations equilibrium, sentiments can only exist when they are self-conrming in
equilibrium.
1.3.3 Equilibrium conditions
Under the rational expectations equilibrium framework described in section 1.3.1, the safe equi-
librium exists when the representative bank nds it optimal to follow a safe strategy provided
that there are good sentiments and other banks also follow a safe strategy. This leads to the
equilibrium condition
vs  vgjs (1.43)
where vs is the representative banks expected payo¤ in the safe equilibrium given in Lemma
1.3 and vgjs is the expected payo¤ from a deviation to the gambling strategy. I refer to vgjs
as a deviation payo¤ since it describes the expected payo¤ from adopting a gambling strategy
when sentiments and other banksstrategies are consistent with a safe equilibrium.
Similarly, the gambling equilibrium exists under the equilibrium condition
vg  vsjg (1.44)
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Figure 1.6: Example with multiple equilibria
where vg is the expected payo¤ under the gambling equilibrium given by (1.32) and vsjg is the
expected payo¤ from a deviation to the safe strategy. I elaborate further on these deviations
below.
There are three possible equilibrium outcomes. When (1.43) is satised and (1.44) is not,
banks follow a safe strategy regardless of household sentiments and there is a unique safe
equilibrium. In this case, bad sentiments are not self-conrming and thus may not exist. In
contrast, when (1.44) is satised and (1.43) is violated, there is a unique gambling equilibrium
and only bad sentiments exist. Finally, when both conditions are satised, banks follow a safe
strategy under good sentiments and gamble under bad sentiments such that there are multiple
equilibria.
I use Figure 1.6 as an informal example to provide further intuition about the mechanism
behind multiple equilibria. In the interest of a clear exposition, I focus on a case where the
solvency constraint remains slack regardless of household sentiments.22 Under good sentiments,
the representative bank faces the deposit demand schedule depicted by the dotted line, where
the deposit threshold d (s) is consistent with a safe strategy. This permits the bank to raise
su¢ cient deposits to satisfy its optimality condition for lending (1.35) without reducing the
price of its deposits below the risk-free level q under a safe strategy. It then nds it optimal
to adopt a safe strategy such that there is a safe equilibrium Es and good sentiments are
conrmed.
22This mechanism becomes even stronger when the solvency constraint binds, since the downward pivot in
the deposit demand schedule under bad sentiments leads to a tightening of the solvency constraint as shown in
the third panel of Figure 1.7.
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When there is a shift to bad sentiments, the expectation of a high aggregate risk exposure
g > s leads to an inward shift of the deposit threshold to d
 
g

< d (s). The deposit demand
schedule then pivots downward in the non-veriable region d 2 ( d  g ; d (s)]. Because of this
deterioration in the banks borrowing conditions, the quantity and price of deposits fall to
Esjg under the safe strategy. This leads to a decline in the expected payo¤ associated with
this strategy. If the bank nds it optimal to deviate to a gambling strategy that leads to the
outcome Eg, bad sentiments are also conrmed and there are multiple equilibria.
Below, I briey describe the deviations to gambling and safe strategies before characterizing
the parameter boundaries for the three equilibrium regions (with a unique safe equilibrium, a
unique gambling equilibrium, and multiplicity) in Section 1.3.4.
Deviation to the gambling strategy Consider a deviation to the gambling strategy
when sentiments and other banks strategies correspond to the safe equilibrium in Section
1.3.1. Under such a deviation, the banks strategy is guided by the rst order conditions (1.20)
and (1.21), yielding valuations for deposits and loans that are consistent with a gambling
equilibrium.
However, the quantity of loans purchased by the deviating bank
lgjs =
 
qlg
 
1  (A)
1
1    1  

ls (1.45)
di¤ers from its gambling equilibrium counterpart, which is given by (1.31). This is because
the remaining banks each purchase an amount ls consistent with the safe equilibrium, thus
driving up loan prices. The negative relationship between lgjs and ls follows directly from the
upward-sloping loan supply schedule. As other banks provide more loans, the scope for lending
by the deviating bank diminishes. This also reduces the expected payo¤ from deviation which
is increasing in bank lending as in the gambling equilibrium
vgjs = (1  P )llgjs +
n
q
(1.46)
Lemma 1.4 builds upon this intuition to show that the safe equilibrium is always satised when
the solvency constraint is slack.
Lemma 1.4 The parameter restrictions given by (1.15) are su¢ cient to show that
vs > vgjs 8 n  nc
Proof. Provided in Appendix A3.4.
Recall from Lemma 1.3 that ls is increasing in net worth n when the solvency constraint
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Figure 1.7: Deviation to the safe Strategy
Note: Deposit demand is attained by combining (1.14) with (1.38) under good sentiments and (1.29) under
bad sentiments. The deposit supply curve stems from the combination of (1.3), (1.25), (1.26) and (1.47). The
solvency constraint is given by (1.48).
binds. It is thus possible for (1.43) to be violated at a level of net worth below nc such that there
is a unique gambling equilibrium. I elaborate further on this in Section 1.3.4 after describing
deviations to the safe strategy.
Deviation to the safe strategy Under a deviation to the safe strategy, the bank follows
the rst order conditions (1.24)-(1.26) but faces a deposit demand schedule
q
 
g; d

=

q for d  d  g
qb + P
b
1 P
n
d
for d > d
 
g
 (1.47)
d
 
g

=
b
qb   bqn
consistent with bad sentiments. As the banks actual aggregate risk exposure diverges from
household expectations, the solvency constraint no longer corresponds to the deposit threshold
d
 
g

. This opens up the possibility that the bank may move to the risky region of the deposit
demand schedule despite satisfying the solvency constraint.
There are thus three possible cases of the deviation to the safe strategy which are valid at
di¤erent regions of bank net worth n. In the interest of brevity, I relegate the characterization
of these cases to Appendix A2 and instead provide a brief description of each case with the
aid of Figure 1.7. In the rst case, the deviating bank has a slack solvency constraint and
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remains in the safe region of the deposit threshold dsjg  d
 
g

. This case is nearly identical
to Case 1 of the safe equilibrium, except for a rise in the boundary level of net worth required
for this case to be valid to nrjg > nc due to the inwards shift of the deposit threshold under
bad sentiments.23
In the second case, the shift to bad sentiments leaves the optimal level of deposits in the
risky region of the deposit demand schedule, while the actual solvency constraint remains
slack. The decline in the value of deposits to qsjg < q leads to a fall in bank lending and
expected payo¤. Finally, in the third case, the solvency constraint binds, creating a wedge
between deposit demand and deposit supply and further reducing lending and expected payo¤.
Note that the solvency constraint, which is given by
 
qlsjg   q
 
g; dsjg

l

lsjg = n (1.48)
tightens in response to a decline in the price of deposits.
1.3.4 Regions of equilibria
There are three possible equilibrium outcomes to the model. First, there is a unique gambling
equilibrium when banks follow a gambling strategy regardless of household sentiments. Second,
there are multiple equilibria if banks adopt a safe strategy under good sentiments and a gambling
strategy under bad sentiments such that both good and bad sentiments are self-fullling. Third,
there is a unique safe equilibrium when banks follow a safe strategy regardless of household
sentiments. I denote the regions of parameters where these outcomes are prevalent as G, M
and S respectively.
Proposition 1.2 expresses the equilibrium conditions (1.43), (1.44) as parameter boundaries
for these regions.
Proposition 1.2 Under the parameter restrictions given by (1.15), the mapping of equilibrium
regions across net worth n is given by
E (n) =
8>>><>>>:
G if n  n
M if n < n < n
S if n > n
(1.49)
23See Appendix A2 for a denition for nrjg.
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where n < nc is implicity dened by the expression
n =

1

 1 

0@ 1
A
q (1  P )l
 
qlg
 
1  (A)
1
1  + n
q (1  P )
h
1  l + l 1 
i
1A 1 (1.50)
 l q
 (1  P )l
 
qlg
 
1  (A)
1
1  + n
(1  P )
h 
1  l+ l 1  i
and n is given by
n  (1  P ) q

P
h
(1  P ) + Pl (1  )   1  P + Pl 11  i  (1  l) qb 1  (A) 11  l
(1.51)
under the su¢ cient conditions  2 (0; 1
2
],  2 (0; 1
2
].
Proof. Provided in Appendix A3.6.
Note that (1.49) indicates a monotonic ordering of equilibria across bank net worth n. Since
n < nc, there is no overlap betweenM and the case of the safe equilibrium with a slack solvency
constraint. Without an upper bound to bank net worth n, this is su¢ cient to show that S is
non-empty. Proposition 1.3 describes the conditions under which fG;Mg are also non-empty.
Proposition 1.3 Under the parameter restrictions given by (1.15), the non-emptiness of re-
gions fG;Mg depends on where l stands with respect to the boundary l, which is implicitly
dened by the expression
(1  ) + 1  
l
l
=
 
(1  l)
 
1  P + Pb
l
! 
1 
(1.52)
There are two possible cases.
Case 1 If l  l, G is empty andM is always non-empty.
Case 2 If l < l, G is non-empty and a su¢ cient condition forM to be non-empty is
b
 + (1  ) > 1  P + P
b (1.53)
Proof. Provided in Appendix A3.7.
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1.4 Policy analysis
This section evaluates policy interventions aimed at strengthening the banking sector and re-
invigorating bank lending. It is clear from Section 1.3.4 that both of these aims can be achieved
with a capital injection to the banking sector that directly increases bank net worth n. However,
this requires a signicant transfer of resources at a time of uncertainty about future economic
fundamentals.
Instead, I focus on unconventional interventions that can be implemented by the central
bank and macroprudential policy measures. Section 1.4.1 considers (non-targeted) liquidity
provision to the banking sector by the central bank. Section 1.4.2 proposes an alternative
measure, targeted liquidity provision, where the central bank provides liquidity conditional on
bank leverage. Finally, Section 1.4.3 shows that the ndings from Sections 1.4.1 and 1.4.2 can
be generalized to provide insights for deposit insurance and a range of macroprudential policies.
1.4.1 Liquidity provision
I incorporate liquidity provision into the model by allowing each bank to issue debt dc  dc to
the central bank at a risk-free price q.24 With access to central bank liquidity, the representative
banks budget constraint and prots become
n+ qd+ qdc = qbb+ qll
 = max f0; l + b  d  dcg
 = max

0; ll + bb  d  dc	
Crucially, the e¤ects of central bank liquidity hinge on whether it leads to a transfer of bank
insolvency risk from depositors to the central bank.
Liquidity provision with no risk transfer Consider rst the case with no risk transfer
such that liabilities to the central bank have greater seniority than deposits. In other words,
debt repayments to the central bank take priority over deposits in the event that the bank
becomes insolvent. This ensures that the central bank is not exposed to any potential losses at
the expense of diluting depositorsclaim to bank revenues.25
24I abstain from collateral requirements on debt issued to the central bank. In practice, collateral requirements
do not preclude the form of gambling considered here as long as risky bonds are eligible as collateral. Placing
a haircut on risky assets pledged as collateral is equivalent to a reduction in dc, and the intervention becomes
completely ine¤ective when risky assets are ineligible as a collateral (i.e. a haircut of 100% leads to dc = 0).
25This is true unless the liquidity provided by the central bank exceeds total bank revenues under weak
fundamentals. The restriction dc  b
1 b d is su¢ cient to preclude this and satised under plausible values for
dc
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The dilution of deposits proves to be crucial in undermining the policy intervention. It
creates a negative relationship between the amount of central bank liquidity dc held by the
bank and the recovery rate of deposits . This is reected in the deposit demand schedule,
which is now given by
qc (~; d; dc) =
8><>:
q for d+ dc  d (~)
q
1 P+P

~ 
b
qb
+(1 ~) l
ql

n+qdc
d

  dc
d

1 qP

~ 
b
qb
+(1 ~) l
ql
 for d+ dc > d (~) (1.54)
where the deposit threshold d (~) remains unchanged. When the parameter restrictions in
(1.15) are satised, a rise in central bank liquidity dc leads to an inward shift in the deposit
demand schedule. Using (1.14) and (1.54), it is easy to show that the banks ability to raise
funds is independent of dc such that
qc (~; d; dc) d+ dc = q (~; d) d 8 dc  dc
where q (~; d) is the deposit demand schedule in the absence of liquidity provision. This indicates
that the deterioration in bank borrowing conditions due to dilution exactly o¤sets the gains
from central bank liquidity. Consequently, liquidity provision is completely ine¤ective without
a risk transfer to the central bank.
Liquidity provision with risk transfer Now consider the case where the repayment
of deposits takes priority over obligations to the central bank. This constitutes an implicit
transfer of bank insolvency risk from depositors to the central bank as the recovery rate of
deposits increases at the expense of central bank losses. The deposit demand schedule is then
given by the expressions
qc (~; d; dc) =
8><>:
q for d  dc (~; dc)
q
1 P+P

~ 
b
qb
+(1 ~) l
ql

n+qdc
d

1 qP

~ 
b
qb
+(1 ~) l
ql
 for d > dc (~; dc)
9>=>; , (1.55)
dc (~; dc) =

~ 
b
qb
+ (1  ~) l
ql

(n+ qdc)
1  q

~ 
b
qb
+ (1  ~) l
ql

Rather than being diluted, the expected value of deposits increases in central bank liquidity dc,
causing an outwards shift in the deposit demand schedule as shown in Figure 1.8.
Note that the rst order conditions (1.20) and (1.21) for the gambling strategy remain
unchanged. Therefore, the bank does not change its lending to rms in response to liquidity
provision. Instead, it takes advantage of the outward shift in its deposit demand schedule to
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Figure 1.8: Liquidity provision with risk transfer
Note: The deposit demand schedule is attained by combining (1.55) with
(1.29). The deposit supply curve stems from the combination of (1.3), (1.25),
(1.26) and (1.47). Only the case with a slack solvency constraint is included.
For the remaining cases see Figure 1.7.
increase its deposits and risky asset purchases until its borrowing costs return to their level
prior to the intervention. Therefore, the recovery rate of deposits  also remains at its pre-
intervention level such that depositors face the same amount of insolvency risk. In other words,
the risk transfer simply provides the bank with an opportunity to increase the extent of its
gamble on aggregate risk at the expense of the central bank. Accordingly, the expected payo¤
associated with a deviation to gambling increases.
Proposition 1.4 indicates that this intervention backres by eliminating the safe equilibrium.
Proposition 1.4 The gambling equilibrium is unique for all n when
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When dc  ~dc, the gambling equilibrium is unique for n  n where n is implicity dened by the
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Proof. Provided in Appendix A3.8.
The rst part of the proposition shows that when banks have access to central bank liquidity
in excess of an upper bound ~dc, they nd it optimal to gamble even when the solvency constraint
is slack. Gambling then becomes the unique equilibrium regardless of bank net worth. The
second part shows that even for dc  ~dc, the intervention shifts up the boundary of net worth
n below which there is a unique gambling equilibrium.
This negative result stems from the inability of non-targeted interventions to distinguish
between banking strategies, which in turn leads to a trade-o¤ between alleviating funding
conditions under the safe strategy and strengthening incentives to gamble. In the next section,
I propose a targeted intervention that overcomes this trade-o¤.
1.4.2 Targeted liquidity provision
Under targeted liquidity provision, the central bank o¤ers a liquidity schedule dc (d; n) condi-
tional on deposits and bank net worth. By o¤ering a liquidity schedule
dc (n; d) =

l
qls
  b
qb

qlsls +
b
qb
n
1  b
qb
q
  d (1.56)
which overlaps with the solvency constraint under good sentiments, the central bank can com-
pletely insulate the banking sector from shifts in depositor sentiments.
By design, the schedule has no impact on banksfunding conditions under good sentiments.
When there is a shift to bad sentiments, however, it provides banks with low cost liquidity in a
manner that articially re-creates the funding conditions under good sentiments. It then follows
directly from the equilibrium conditions (1.43), (1.44) that bad sentiments cease to be self-
fullling throughout the multiplicity region. The intervention remains strictly o¤-equilibrium
when it is successful, since banks are indi¤erent between central bank and deposit funding in
the safe equilibrium.
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The conditionalities on (n; d) are crucial for the success of the intervention. By placing an
upper bound on participating banksleverage, these conditionalities ensure that banks do not
nd it optimal to take up central bank liquidity under the gambling strategy. This overcomes
the trade-o¤ faced by non-targeted liquidity provision, allowing the intervention to improve
banksfunding conditions under the safe strategy without increasing incentives to gamble.
Note that the results from Section 1.4.1 with regard to the irrelevance of liquidity provision
without a risk transfer remain valid. Therefore, at least in principle, the targeted intervention
requires that the central bank becomes exposed to bank insolvency risk.26 In practice, however,
the central bank never faces losses under targeted liquidity provision. This is not just due to the
fact that successful interventions are never implemented in equilibrium. Even if the liquidity
schedule is o¤ered in the region with a unique gambling equilibrium such that the intervention
fails, the conditionalities ensure that banks do not take up central bank liquidity in a gambling
equilibrium.
The role of the conditionalities is thus twofold. First, they drive a wedge between the safe
and gambling strategies and allow the central bank to make the former more attractive, thereby
eliminating multiplicity in favour of the safe equilibrium. Second, they ensure that the central
bank is not subject to losses even when the intervention is unsuccessful.
Finally, note that the central bank does not need to observe the aggregate risk exposure 
in order to implement this intervention. This raises the question as to why the central bank
is capable of carrying out this intervention while the households cannot. The answer lies in
the ability of the central bank to internalize the equilibrium-switching e¤ects of its behaviour,
and thus commit to the liquidity schedule in (1.56). In contrast, for atomistic households that
take sentiments as given, (1.56) is strictly sub-optimal to the deposit demand schedule. In
other words, targeted liquidity provision resolves a coordination problem between banks and
depositors.
1.4.3 Deposit insurance and macroprudential regulation
In this section, I generalize the ndings from Sections 1.4.1 and 1.4.2 to a wider set of policy
instruments. To begin with, consider deposit insurance in the form of a limited amount of funds
F= dedicated to increasing the recovery rate  of deposits, which can then be written as
 = min
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26This does not necessarily need to take the form of an explicit arrangement where depositors have greater
seniority. When the central bank has priority in debt repayments, providing the liquidity schedule above under
bad sentiments completely crowds out deposit funding. Without deposits to act as a bu¤er, bank insolvency
results in losses for the central bank.
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This leads to the following deposit demand schedule
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which indicates that deposit insurance leads to an outward shift deposit demand. Proposition
1.5 shows that, on its own, deposit insurance backres in the same manner as non-targeted
liquidity provision (with risk transfer).
Proposition 1.5 For any arbitrary "  0
qF (~; d; ") d = qc (~; d; ") d+ q"
Proof. Provided in Appendix A3.9.
As before, the negative result stems from the trade-o¤ between alleviating funding condi-
tions and strengthening incentives to gamble. This trade-o¤ can be overcome with the use of
macroprudential regulation. Specically, the combination of deposit insurance with a regula-
tory constraint on bank liabilities can lead to a similar outcome to targeted liquidity provision.
This is achieved by dedicating su¢ cient funds to deposit insurance to o¤set the e¤ects of a shift
to bad sentiments on the deposit demand schedule
F =

l
qls
  
b
qb

qlsls
and imposing a regulatory constraint that overlaps with the solvency constraint in the safe
equilibrium27
d 
F + 
b
qb
n
1  b
qb
q
Finally, note that the same outcome can be achieved with alternative forms of macropruden-
tial regulation. For example, the liability constraint above is interchangeable with a constraint
on asset holdings or capital requirements in a richer environment with equity issuance, provided
that there is a positive risk-weight attached to aggregate risky assets.
27If participation in the deposit insurance and macroprudential regulation scheme is non-voluntary, the failure
of the policy may lead to the use of deposit insurance funds in equilibrium. In the region with a unique gambling
equilibrium, banks respond to a non-voluntary scheme by following a gambling strategy despite satisfying the
regulatory constraint.
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1.5 Conclusion
This chapter proposes a general equilibrium model with optimizing banks and depositors to
analyse economic vulnerability nancial and debt crises, and draw insights for policy design. An
important nding emerges as a consequence: Opacity in bank balance sheets leads to strategic
complementarities between banks and depositors as depositors demand a return on deposits
according to their expectations on bank risk-taking, and banks determine their risk-taking
strategies according to their funding costs. This raises the possibility of multiple equilibria,
where a safe equilibrium is characterized by low risk-taking and funding costs, and a gambling
equilibrium is associated with bank insolvency risk and high funding costs.
The model also provides a framework for policy analysis. As a novel insight, it indicates that
a key prerequisite for successful liquidity interventions by central banks is that they provide
some risk-sharing with depositors. Otherwise, liquidity interventions are completely ine¤ective
as depositors raise bank funding costs in anticipation of the dilution of their claims to bank rev-
enues. A second insight pertains to the targeting of interventions. Non-targeted interventions
that provide liquidity (and risk sharing) unconditionally may eliminate the safe equilibrium.
This is because they face a trade-o¤ between alleviating funding constraints and strengthening
incentives to gamble. It is possible to overcome this trade-o¤ with a targeted intervention that
provides liquidity conditional on bank leverage.
Finally, note that the mechanisms considered in this chapter are relevant under two condi-
tions: First, there must be aggregate risk without su¢ ciently strict regulation to prevent banks
from becoming exposed to it. Second, government guarantees on the banking sector must be
incomplete or incompletely credible. These conditions are often satised in times of nancial
turmoil, episodes of sovereign default, and when currency pegs come under pressure.
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Chapter 2
Gambling Traps
Abstract
I propose a dynamic general equilibrium model where strategic interactions between
banks and depositors may lead to "gambling traps" associated with endogenous bank
fragility and slow recovery from crises. In a gambling trap, depositor expectations of high
bank risk-taking become self-fullling and high bank funding costs hinder the accumula-
tion of bank net worth, leading to a persistent drop in investment and output. I bring
the model to bear on the European sovereign debt crisis, in the course of which under-
capitalized banks in default-risky countries experienced an increase in funding costs and
raised their holdings of domestic government debt. The model is quantied using Por-
tuguese data and accounts for macroeconomic dynamics in Portugal in 2010-2016. Sub-
sidized loans to banks, similar to the ECBs longer-term renancing operations (LTRO),
strengthen incentives to gamble and may perpetuate gambling traps.
Keywords: Bank risk-taking; Financial intermediation; Sovereign debt crisis
JEL codes: E44, E58, F34, G01, G21, H63
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2.1 Introduction
Recent nancial and debt crises are characterized by sluggish recoveries and fragility in the
banking sector leading to high bank funding costs. This challenges current theoretical models
that typically abstract from bank funding costs, assuming that banks have access to deposits at
the risk-free rate (see e.g. Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014; Gertler and Karadi, 2011; Gertler
and Kiyotaki, 2010).
In this chapter, I incorporate the framework proposed in Chapter 1 into a dynamic general
equilibrium model in order to analyze macroeconomic dynamics and vulnerability to crises in
the light of strategic interactions between banks and depositors. I build upon the insight that
depositor expectations on bank risk-taking may become self-fullling in economies with high
aggregate risk and an under-capitalized banking sector. Most importantly, I show that these
economies are vulnerable to gambling trapscharacterized by a prolonged period of nancial
fragility and endogenously slow recovery from crises.
I bring this theoretical model to bear on the European sovereign debt crisis, its transmission
to economic activity and policy debates on interventions in support of the banking sector. In
doing so, I bring forward two key empirical facts to motivate my model. In countries hit by
the sovereign debt crisis, under-capitalized banks increased their exposure to sovereign risk by
investing heavily in their own governments debt. In these countries, there is also signicant
co-movement between yield spreads on sovereign bonds and deposit interest rates.
I develop my analysis by specifying a dynamic small open economy model with households,
rms, and a banking sector. Banks collect deposits from households and choose their portfolios
of sovereign bonds and loans to rms; households lend to banks on terms that depend on bank
solvency prospects; rms invest. The government issues default-risky bonds.
As in the rst chapter, strategic complementarities between banks and depositors lead to
the possibility of multiple equilibria. When bank net worth is high and/or market sentiments
are good, there is a safe equilibriumwhere banks keep their exposure to government debt
low and depositors accept low interest rates. With low bank net worth and badmarket
sentiments, a gambling equilibriumemerges. In this equilibrium, depositors expect banks to
have a high exposure to risky government debt and require a risk premium. In response to high
funding costs, banks nd it optimal to gamble on risky sovereign debt at the expense of credit
to rms.
The key intuition in this chapter is that high funding costs in the gambling equilibrium hin-
der the accumulation of bank net worth. This has important consequences for macroeconomic
adjustment to shocks, since the economy may become stuck in a gambling trap with stagnating
bank net worth and repeated realizations of the gambling equilibrium. In a gambling trap,
banks respond to sovereign risk shocks by increasing their exposure to domestic government
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debt rather than deleveraging, leading to a persistent drop in output and nancial fragility.
Persistence here is endogenous, and absent in the safe equilibrium, where banks deleverage and
all the adjustment (in credit and output) is front-loaded and short-lived.
I bring this model to data by calibrating it to Portugal over 2010-2016 and simulating it
under a series of sovereign risk shocks that emulate Portuguese sovereign bond yields. The
simulation indicates that the Portuguese economy is vulnerable to multiple equilibria, and
shows that a sequence of bad sentiments (i.e. a gambling trap) can account for dynamics of
key macroeconomic and nancial variables during the sovereign debt crisis.
The model also provides novel insights for policy design. In a policy experiment, I consider
an intervention similar to the ECBs longer-term renancing operations (LTRO) where the
central bank temporarily (and unconditionally) provides cheap liquidity to the banking sector.
I show that this intervention strengthens incentives to gamble such that the economy remains
stuck in a gambling trap for its duration.
Relationship to the literature This chapter is related to the literature on macroeco-
nomic dynamics under nancial frictions. Specically, it relates to a strand of literature that
analyzes nancial and macroeconomic adjustment to shocks when banks are balance sheet con-
strained. In this literature, banks channel funds from households to productive investment
opportunities and face an occassionally binding constraint on their leverage.28 For example, in
Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011), the balance sheet constraint arises
as a commitment mechanism to prevent bank managers from diverting funds to themselves,
while in Meh and Moran (2010) it incentivizes banks to monitor their borrowers.
When the balance sheet constraint tightens and/or bank net worth declines, banks are
forced to deleverage and reduce intermediation. This leads to a decline in investment and
output, but also creates excess returns in intermediation that re-build bank net worth, paving
the way to a recovery. He and Krishnamurthy (2014) focus on anticipation e¤ects on bank
behaviour associated with the possibility that the constraint may become binding in the future.
Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) consider a similar transmission mechanism in a highly non-
linear environment with re-sales.
A common feature of studies in this strand of literature is that the leverage constraint
rules out banking default in equilibrium, thereby ensuring that bank have access to funds at
the risk-free rate. In other words, all of the nancial adjustment is pushed to the quantity
of intermediation rather than costs thereof (i.e. funding costs). This stands in contrast to
evidence from recent crises such as the nancial crisis of 2007-09 and the European debt crisis,
where bank funding costs increased in response to a perceived rise in bank fragility.
The main contribution of this chapter is to uncover an alternative mechanism of adjustment
28See Brunnermeier et al. (2013) for a comprehensive survey of this literature.
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to crises. When banks pursue a safe strategy, they satisfy an occassionally binding solvency
constraint and macroeconomic adjustment to crises is similar to the above literature. The
solvency constraint itself is similar to the balance sheet constraint described above, but arises
solely due to imperfect transparency in banksportfolios. Banks may also choose to pursue a
gambling strategywhich entails forming a risky portfolio and may lead to default in equi-
librium. Under this strategy, banks respond to adverse shocks by increasing their risk-taking
and bank funding costs rise in response. I show that both of these strategies may arise in equi-
librium, and the type of equilibrium depends on bank net worth and potentially self-fullling
market sentiments about bank risk-taking.
Analysing macroeconomic dynamics under these equilibria yields two important insights.
First, there are multiple adjustment paths since the prevalent equilibrium at a given time period
determines future net worth and hence the possible equilibrium types in future periods. Most
importantly, I show that net worth recovers slowly in the gambling equilibrium such that the
decline in output following a negative shock becomes endogenously persistent. Second, policy
interventions have equilibrium-switching e¤ects which are signicant precisely because of the
considerable di¤erences in adjustment paths to crises under the two equilibria.
This chapter is also related to the literature on banking and sovereign debt. The strong
positive relationship between sovereign risk and private borrowing costs is well documented (see
e.g. Acharya et al., 2014b; Popov and Van Horen, 2015) and incorporated in reduced form by
several studies including Neumeyer and Perri (2005), Uribe and Yue (2006), and Corsetti et al.
(2013). This chapter builds upon a growing literature that provides microfoundations for the
aforementioned relationship by exploring the links between sovereign default and the domestic
banking sector. The existing literature can be divided into two main strands according to the
channel of transmission.
In the rst strand, which includes Basu (2010), Gennaioli et al. (2014), Sosa Padilla (2015),
and Perez (2015), agency frictions constrain banks ability to leverage.29 Sovereign default
tightens this constraint by weakening bank balance sheets, forcing banks to deleverage and
reduce nancial intermediation. Bolton and Jeanne (2011) and Bocola (2016) show that the
ex-ante anticipation of sovereign default is su¢ cient to generate these e¤ects, leading to a decline
in sovereign bond purchases as well as intermediation. Like Bocola (2016), I treat sovereign
default risk as driven by some exogenous latent factor. Abstracting from the governments
default decision allows me to focus sharply on the properties of the novel mechanism my model
is about.
In the second strand, depositors in domestic banks are shielded from potential losses in the
29Sosa Padilla (2015) depicts bank liabilities as a constant ow. This leads to a similar transmission mechanism
as the studies with agency frictions since a haircut on sovereign bonds directly reduces the funds available for
intermediation. Brutti (2011) and Perez (2015) consider the e¤ects of sovereign default on banksability to
store liquidity. Sandleris (2014) considers the signalling e¤ects of sovereign default.
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event of sovereign default due to a variety of reasons, such as a bailout of the banking sector
in Brunnermeier et al. (2016) and Farhi and Tirole (2017), deposit insurance in Livshits and
Schoors (2009) and selective sovereign default in Broner et al. (2014). This undermines market
discipline such that banks respond to a rise in sovereign risk by increasing their domestic debt
purchases in order to take advantage of high yields.
By replacing the respective assumptions in these strands with limited liability, opacity of
bank balance sheets and balance sheet costs of domestic sovereign default, I develop a framework
with two possible equilibrium outcomes; a safe equilibrium which gives rise to a transmission
mechanism similar to the rst strand, and a gambling equilibrium that resembles the second
strand. A closely related study is that of Acharya et al. (2014a). They also consider a framework
where banks face insolvency risk, but focus on the governments bailout decision rather than
strategic interactions between banks and depositors.
This chapter is also related to a recent strand of research that considers the relationship
between sovereign risk and banking fragility. Cooper and Nikolov (2013) analyse the interaction
between self-fullling debt crises as in Calvo (1988) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983) bank runs,
whereas Leonello (2016) considers similar interactions in a global games framework. Two layers
of strategic complementarities are overlaid in these studies; one across sovereign debt-holders
and another across depositors. This chapter instead focuses on strategic complementarities
between the optimal responses of banks and depositors.
This chapter also draws from a rich literature on the repatriation of sovereign debt in open
economies. Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012) document this in the context of the European
sovereign debt crisis.30 Three alternative hypotheses have come to the fore as a potential
explanation. First, creditor discrimination theories suggest that sovereign risk drives a wedge
between the valuation of sovereign debt by domestic and foreign agents due to anticipated
discrimination in favour of the former during a default event (Broner et al., 2014). Second,
moral suasion theories suggest that governments in need of funding incentivize or directly coerce
domestic banks to purchase their debt (Chari et al., 2016). The third hypothesis corresponds to
the gambling mechanism considered here: under-capitalized banks nd default-risky domestic
sovereign debt attractive for risk-shifting purposes, since its payo¤ is positively correlated with
their solvency prospects.
Brutti and Sauré (2016) nd evidence in favour of creditor discrimination, while Acharya and
Ste¤en (2015), Battistini et al. (2014) and Altavilla et al. (2016) lend support to both moral
suasion and gambling hypotheses. De Marco and Macchiavelli (2016), Becker and Ivashina
(2014) and Ongena et al. (2016) provide additional evidence for moral suasion. Acharya and
Ste¤en (2015) nd evidence for gambling by showing that banks with high leverage and risk-
weighted assets and low Tier 1 capital have more exposure to risky sovereign debt, especially in
30See also Fact 1 in the next section for further details.
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countries hit by the debt crisis.31 It is important to note that these channels are not mutually
exclusive. In fact, a weak form of moral suasion, whereby the government purposefully neglects
to regulate against risky domestic sovereign bond purchases, is conducive to gambling. Uhlig
(2014), Farhi and Tirole (2017) and Crosignani (2015) discuss the optimality of this from the
domestic governments perspective.32
Finally, this chapter is related to two recent studies on central bank liquidity provision in
the context of the European sovereign debt crisis. Drechsler et al. (2016) show that lender
of last resort loans were mainly taken by under-capitalized banks and used for purchases of
risky sovereign debt. Crosignani et al. (2016) show that the longer-term renancing operations
(LTRO) adopted by the European Central Bank (ECB) induced Portuguese banks to increase
their holdings of risky domestic sovereign bonds. In the gambling equilibrium of this model,
(unconditional) liquidity provision leads to a similar outcome.
Layout The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 presents the
key stylized facts about the European sovereign debt crisis. Section 2.3 describes the model
environment. Section 2.4 describes the propagation of sovereign risk shocks and examines the
t of the model to Portuguese data. Section 2.5 conducts policy analysis. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Facts
In this section, I present four key stylized facts about the European sovereign debt crisis and
the ensuing sovereign-bank nexus. I focus on ve countries that were hit by the crisis, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain (periphery), and contrast them with Germany (core), as a
benchmark.
Fact 1. In the periphery, the share of domestic sovereign debt held by the national banking
system has sharply increased.
Figure 2.1 shows that the yield spreads between sovereign bonds issued by the periphery
countries and Germany (as a benchmark for safe assets) increase sharply after 2009 and peak
in 2012. Thereafter, the spreads decrease but remain higher than their pre-crisis levels. Con-
currently, there is an increase in the share of domestic government debt held by banks resident
in these countries. In contrast, there is a decrease in the share of German sovereign debt held
by German banks.
31See also Fact 2 in the next section.
32In the context of the Euro area, gambling is faciliated by the zero risk-weight attached to sovereign bonds
issued by European Union member states in capital regulation (Bank for International Settlements, 2013).
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Figure 2.1: Sovereign bond holdings and yield spreads
Note: Sovereign bond yields refer to bonds with 10 year maturity. Spreads are from German sovereign bond
yields. Portuguese data on bond holdings is only available until 2012 and on an annual basis. All other data is
quarterly. Source: OECD (MEI) and Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012).
Fact 2. Under-capitalized banks in the periphery have increased their exposure to domestic
sovereign debt, while the exposures of well-capitalized banks in the periphery and German
banks have remained nearly constant.
The rst panel of Figure 2.2 shows that the average domestic sovereign exposure of under-
capitalized banks in the periphery has nearly doubled over 2010-2016, while that of capitalized
banks remained near constant. This indicates a negative relationship between bank capitaliza-
tion and the change in domestic sovereign debt exposures over the debt crisis.33 The second
panel shows that, in contrast to the periphery, domestic sovereign bond exposures of German
banks with low and high capitalization do not follow a measurably di¤erent pattern over the
crisis. This is also true for their exposure to bonds issued by peripheral countries as shown in
the last panel. Thus, there is no apparent relationship between bank capitalization and changes
in sovereign exposures for banks based in Germany.
33For an empirical analysis, see Acharya and Ste¤en (2015). They reach the same conclusion with a regression
that controls for bank and country characteristics.
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Figure 2.2: Bank capitalization and sovereign exposures
Note: Sovereign bond exposure refers to the share of sovereign bonds within total assets. No data is available
for Greek banks. Low capitalization refers to banks with a Tier 1 Capital ratio below the rst quartile in 2009.
High capitalization refers to those above the third quartile. Source: Bloomberg and the European Banking
Authority.
Together, these two ndings lend support to the gambling hypothesis which suggests that
under-capitalized banks based in default-risky countries have a specic incentive to purchase
their own governments debt. This is due to the combination of limited liability with the an-
ticipation of balance sheet costs independent to their sovereign bond holdings in the case of
their own governments default. The latter aspect makes domestic sovereign bonds particularly
suitable for risk shifting, since they yield a high return in the states of nature where banks have
better solvency prospects.34
Contrast this with a mechanism that suggests the increase in domestic sovereign bond
purchases is driven solely by limited liability. Under the regulatory framework present in the
Euro area, sovereign bonds issued by all European Union member states carry zero risk-weight
in capital regulation (Bank for International Settlements, 2013). Therefore, if limited liability
was the sole driving factor, under-capitalized German banks would also have an incentive to
purchase periphery sovereign debt. This would in turn lead to a negative relationship between
bank capitalization and periphery exposure in Germany, which is not observed in Figure 2.2.
In a similar vein, creditor discrimination e¤ects where the expectation of selective default leads
to the repatriation of risky sovereign debt, would lead to an increase in domestic sovereign
exposure of periphery banks regardless of their capitalization. This is also not observed in
34In the case of sovereign default, gambling banks do not internalize the complete extent of the haircut on
domestic sovereign bonds since they are protected by limited liability.
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Figure 2.3: Bank lending
Note: Sovereign bond holdings are attained using data from EU-wide stress tests and transparency exercises.
There is no data available for Greek banks. Domestic bank credit to private non-nancial sector refers to
nancial resources provided to the private non-nancial sector by domestic banks that establish a claim for
repayment. Source: World Bank and the European Banking Authority.
Figure 2.2.35
Fact 3. In the periphery, banks reduced their lending to the private non-nancial sector while
increasing their domestic sovereign bond holdings. At the same time, there was a rise in
private borrowing costs.
Figure 2.3 shows that the volume of domestic sovereign bonds held by the national banking
sector has increased by varying degrees in the periphery, ranging from about 30% in Spain to
35The patterns in Figure 2.2 are also compatible with the moral suasion hypothesis under the condition that
risky governments can exert greater pressure on under-capitalized banks to purchase domestic sovereign debt.
Note that the gambling and moral suasion hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. In fact, a weak form
of moral suasion where the government neglects to regulate the domestic sovereign exposure of local banks is
conducive to gambling. The optimality of this from the risky governments perspective is analysed by Crosignani
(2015), Farhi and Tirole (2017) and Uhlig (2014).
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Figure 2.4: Loan interest rates
Note: Loan interest rates refer to loans of all amounts by domestic banks to non-nancial corporations (new
business). Source: ECB.
nearly double its initial amount in Ireland and Portugal. At the same time, credit to the private
sector by domestic banks decreased by up to 30% in each periphery country except for Italy
where it stagnated. Figure 2.4 shows that interest rates on loans to non-nancial corporations
also increased at the peak of the debt crisis in 2011-2012, especially in Portugal and Greece.
In Germany, on the other hand, banks reduced their holdings of both domestic and periphery
sovereign bonds, and slightly increased their lending to the private sector. There was also a
signicant improvement in borrowing conditions faced by private non-nancial corporations,
with a decline of over 200 basis points in loan interest rates between 2010-2016.
A mechanism that can generate patterns similar to those present in Figures 2.3 and 2.4 is
the crowding out of bank lending by domestic sovereign bond purchases.36
36For further empirical evidence on the e¤ects of the sovereign debt crisis on credit to the private sector, see
Acharya et al. (2014b), Becker and Ivashina (2014), De Marco (2017) and Popov and Van Horen (2015).
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Figure 2.5: Bank funding costs
Note: The left axis represents deposit interest rates and the right axis represents bank CDS and sovereign bond
yield spreads. Both axes are in basis points. Deposit interest rates refer to time deposits of all agreed maturities
and amounts (new business). Bank CDS spreads refer to the implied CDS spread measure in Bloomberg. There
is no available deposit interest rate data for Greece. Source: Bloomberg, ECB, OECD.
Fact 4. There is substantial co-movement between sovereign bond yield spreads and bank fund-
ing costs in the periphery.
Figure 2.5 plots bank credit default swap (CDS) spreads and deposit interest rates against
sovereign bond yield spreads and Table 2.1 reports the corresponding correlation coe¢ cients.
The CDS spreads co-move signicantly with sovereign spreads in the periphery, consistent with
the notion of a sovereign-bank nexus where the solvency prospects of the government and the
banking sector are intertwined.37 To a lesser extent, deposit interest rates also move with yield
spreads, especially during the peak of the crisis in 2011-2012. A potential explanation for this is
that depositors expect a decline in the real value of their deposits in the event that the banking
sector and government are both in default.
37Acharya et al. (2014a) show that changes in sovereign CDS explain changes in bank CDS even after con-
trolling for aggregate and bank-level determinants of credit spreads.
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Table 2.1: Correlation with sovereign bond yield spreads over 2010-2015
Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
Bank CDS spreads 0:85 0:93 0:93 0:85 0:93
Deposit interest rates   0:84 0:84 0:74 0:37
Figure 2.6: Recursive timeline
In the next sections, I show that gambling on domestic sovereign debt can arise as an
equilibrium outcome when banks are under-capitalized. In this gambling equilibrium, bank
lending is crowded out by domestic sovereign bond purchases and bank funding costs co-move
with domestic sovereign bond yields, consistent with the stylized facts described here.
2.3 Model environment
I consider a small open economy populated with three private agents: households, banks and
rms, and a government issuing default-risky debt. In each period, banks collect deposits from
households and use these funds, along with their own net worth, for domestic sovereign bond
purchases and working capital lending to rms. Firms use working capital and labour rented
from households to produce the consumption good.
Figure 2.6 shows the recursive timeline. The vector S collects the values of aggregate state
variables (to be dened explicitly later on) in the current period and S0 denotes the state vector
for the next period. Sovereign default is incorporated into the model as an absorbing state. In
each period, the government defaults with probability P (S). Once the government defaults,
there is no more sovereign default risk in future periods and the model economy moves to a
steady state S.
Sovereign default reduces the productivity of rms. This reects the costs of domestic
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sovereign default on bank balance sheets, which hit them independently of their sovereign bond
holdings.38 As a result, banks receive a low return from their lending to rms as well as their
domestic sovereign bond holdings.
When banks have su¢ cient funds to pay the promised return to their depositors, they
remain solvent and accumulate a portion of their prots as net worth to use in the next period.
Otherwise, they become insolvent under limited liability and a haircut proportionate to their
funding shortfall is imposed on deposits.
The remainder of the section is organized as follows: First, I describe the process for sovereign
risk, and the optimal strategies of rms, households and banks. Then I discuss the formulation
of household sentiments, dene the equilibrium concept and characterize the steady state after
sovereign default. Finally, I provide a sketch of the algorithm used for the numerical solution.
2.3.1 Government
The government issues discount bonds B at a price qb (S). Sovereign bonds are internationally
traded and their marginal buyers are deep pocketed foreign investors. As such, they are priced
at their expected return
qb (S) =
 
1  P (S) + P (S) b q (2.1)
where b 2 (0; 1) is their recovery rate and q is the price of an international safe asset d with
perfectly elastic supply. In a monetary union, 1=q can be interpreted as the interest rate set
by the common central bank.
The law of motion for government debt is given by the governments budget constraint
qb (S)B0 = B +G (S)  T (S)
where T (S) is lump-sum taxation on households and G (S) is government spending. Since B
has no e¤ect on the non-government sector under this specication, the only restriction I place
on the primary surplus G (S) T (S) is that it follows a scal rule that precludes Ponzi games.
The sovereign default probability P (S) is determined by a stochastic scal limit. Let  (S)
denote the scal stress faced by the government. At the beginning of each period, an i.i.d.
shock " that follows a standard logistic distribution determines the governments resolve to
avoid default. Sovereign default occurs when "   (S). The default probability is then given
by the logistic function
P (S) =
exp ( (S))
1 + exp ( (S))
(2.2)
38For other studies which rely on output costs of default, see e.g. Cole and Kehoe (2000), Arellano (2008)
and Aguiar et al. (2015).
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The stock of government debt B, output Y and the sovereign bond yield 1=qb (S) may easily
be incorporated into the scal stress function  (S) as determinants of sovereign risk. For the
dynamic solution, however, I adopt a simple specication  (S) =  where  follows the AR(1)
process
0 = ss +  (   ss) + "0; "0  N (0; 1) (2.3)
and "0 is a sovereign risk shock.
My reasons for adopting this specication are threefold. First, Borensztein and Panizza
(2009) and Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2009) nd that sovereign defaults are often accompanied with
banking crises while Yeyati and Panizza (2011) attribute a large portion of the output costs of
default to anticipation e¤ects that precede the default event itself. Motivated by this empirical
evidence, I focus on the nancial interactions that take place under sovereign default risk and
abstain from an explicit treatment of the processes that drive governments to default on their
debt, which may include a range of economic and political factors.39
Second, by adopting this specication I abstain from the feedback loops between sovereign
default risk and domestic fundamentals such as the stock of debt and sovereign bond yields.
Although these feedback loops play a potentially important role in the transmission of sovereign
risk, they have been studied extensively in recent literature (see e.g. Corsetti et al., 2013).
Abstaining from them permits me to isolate the propagation channel of sovereign risk through
bank-depositor interactions.
Third, recent empirical studies show that a substantial portion of the movements in sovereign
risk premia during the recent sovereign debt crisis were unrelated to country fundamentals (see
e.g. Bahaj, 2014; De Grauwe and Ji, 2012). In line with these ndings, the sovereign risk
shock (2.3) can be interpreted as reecting non-fundamental factors such as contagion and
self-fullling sentiments in sovereign bond markets.
2.3.2 Firms
Firms borrow working capital in advance of the sovereign default realization by issuing loans
L(S) to banks at a price ql (S). Working capital depreciates fully such that its evolution is
given by
K (S) = ql (S)L (S) (2.4)
To produce the consumption good Y , rms combine working capital K and labour H hired
from households with a standard Cobb-Douglas production technology. The representative
39See also Broner et al. (2014), Bocola (2016) and Brunnermeier et al. (2016) for other studies which analyse
the nancial e¤ects of sovereign default without explicitly modelling the causes thereof.
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rms rst order conditions are then given by
w (S) = (1  )K (S) (2.5)
w (S) = (1  )AK (S) (2.6)
ql (S) =

1
A
 1

L (S)
1 
 (2.7)
l =
A
A
(2.8)
where
 
A;w (S) ; l

are respectively productivity, wage, and the recovery rate of loans. An
underbar denotes the state with sovereign default and the labour supply is perfectly inelastic
and normalized to 1.
For future reference, note also that imperfectly competitive banks perceive (2.7) as
ql (l;S) =

1
A
 1

(l + (1  )L (S)) 1  (2.9)
which internalizes the impact of their individual lending l on the price of loans, where  is the
market share of an individual bank such that l = L (S) in a symmetric equilibrium.
2.3.3 Households
Households have risk averse preferences with their ow utility u (c) given by a standard CRRA
specication. The representative households problem can be written as
vh (D;D; S) = max
c;D0;D0
8<: u (c) +  (1  P (S))ES

vh (D0; D0; S0)

+P (S) vh (D0; D0; S0)
9=;
subject to
c+ qD0 + qD0 = D +D   T (S) + w (S) (2.10)
S0 =   (S)
where q is the price of (domestic) bank deposits D0, D0 represents safe assets,   (:) is the law
of motion for the aggregate state variables, and vh (:) represents the households continuation
value under sovereign default. Lemma 2.1 provides an expression for vh (:).
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Lemma 2.1 The continuation value for households in the steady state S is
vh (D0; D0; S) =
1
1  u (c) ,
c = (1  q)

D0 +D0 +
1  

A
A
L (S)

+ qw   T
where w is given by
w = (1  )AK
Proof. Provided in Appendix B2.1.
Observe that consumption c in the steady state is positively related to household wealth
after sovereign default, which is increasing in the recovery rate  of deposits. Using the above
expressions, the rst order conditions for risk-free assets D and domestic bank deposits D can
be written as
q = 
(1  P (S))ES [uc (c0)] + P (S)uc (c)
uc (c)
q = 
(1  P (S))ES [uc (c0)] + P (S) uc (c)
uc (c)
where uc (:) is marginal utility.
The recovery rate anticipated by households depends on household expectations about the
banks domestic sovereign bond exposure ~ (n;S) such that
 = min

1;

~ (n;S)
b
qb (S)
+ (1  ~ (n;S)) 
l
ql (S)
 n
d0
+ q

where d0 is deposits at bank level. The deposit demand schedule is attained by combining this
expression with the households rst order conditions such that
q (d0; n;S) =
8><>:
q for d0  d (n;S)
q
1 P (S)+P (S) uc(c)
ES[uc(c0)]

~(n;S) 
b
qb(S)
+(1 ~(n;S)) l
ql(S)

n
d0
1 qP (S) uc(c)
ES[uc(c0)]

~(n;S) 
b
qb(S)
+(1 ~(n;S)) l
ql(S)
 for d0 > d (n;S)
9>=>; ,
(2.11)
with the deposit threshold d (n;S) dened as
d (n;S) =

~ (n;S) 
b
qb(S)
+ (1  ~ (n;S)) l
ql(S)

n
1  q

~ (n;S) 
b
qb(S)
+ (1  ~ (n;S)) l
ql(S)

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Finally, for future reference, I denote by d (d
0; n; S) the mark-up banks enjoy in the deposit
market
d (d
0; n;S)   @q (d
0; n;S)
@d0
d0
q (d0; n;S)
=
8><>:
0 for d0  d (n;S)
P (S)
uc(c)
ES[uc(c0)]

~(n;S) 
b
qb(S)
+(1 ~(n;S)) l
ql(S)

n
d0
1 P (S)+P (S) uc(c)
ES[uc(c0)]

~(n;S) 
b
qb(S)
+(1 ~(n;S)) l
ql(S)

n
d0
for d0 > d (n;S)
9>=>;
which is increasing in the curvature of the deposit demand schedule, and hence the marginal
utility wedge uc(c)ES[uc(c0)] .
2.3.4 Banks
Each bank is managed by a unit continuum of risk-neutral bankers. From a representative
banks perspective, the timeline of events within a period is as follows. At the beginning of
each period, the bank observes the realization of S and collects deposits d0 from households at
a price q (d0; n;S). It uses these deposits, along with its accumulated net worth n to purchase
domestic sovereign bonds b and loans l from rms at prices qb (S) and ql (l;S), thereby selecting
its sovereign exposure .40
Next, the bank learns whether the government is in default. The payo¤ from (b; l) and
hence the banks prots are contingent on the sovereign default realization
 = l + b  d0 (2.12)
 = max
 
ll + bb  d0; 0 (2.13)
such that the bank may be rendered insolvent by sovereign default. Bankers have limited
liability, so when the bank becomes insolvent, all of its bankers exit the economy with zero
payo¤. When the bank is solvent, on the other hand, a randomly determined but constant
portion (1   ) of its bankers exit and consume their share of the prots.41 The remaining
40As in Chapter 1,  is related to (b; l) through the expressions b = 

n+q(d0;n;S)d0
qb(S)

, l =
(1  )

n+q(d0;n;S)d
ql(l;S)

41The number of banks, and the bankers that manage them are constant over time. Insolvent banks are
replaced with a new bank that has zero net worth. Bankers that exit from solvent banks are replaced with new
bankers which do not contribute to net worth.
51
prots are accumulated as net worth in the next period, according to the law of motion
n0 =  (   !) (2.14)
n0 =  (   !) (2.15)
where ! represents overhead costs.42
Limited liability creates a discontinuity in the representative banks policy function such
that its decision problem can be written as a choice between two alternative strategies, a safe
strategywhere the bank satises an occasionally binding solvency constraint
d0  ll + bb (2.16)
and limited liability never binds, and a gambling strategywhich leaves the bank reliant on
limited liability in the event of sovereign default. I denote these with the subscripts s and g.
The representative banks problem can then be written as
vb (n; S) = max

vbs (n; S) ; v
b
g (n; S)
	
, (2.17)
vbs (n; S) = max
d0;2[0;1]
8<: (1  P (S))
 
(1   )  +  ES

vb (n0; S0)

+P (S)
 
(1   )  +  vb (n0; S)
9=; ,
vbg (n; S) = max
d0;2[0;1]

(1  P (S))  (1   )  +  ES vb (n0; S0)	
subject to (2.12)-(2.15) and
qb (S) b+ ql (l;S) l = q (d0; n;S) d0 + n (2.18)
S0 =   (S)
for both strategies, as well as the solvency constraint (2.16) for the safe strategy.   (S) is
the law of motion for aggregate state variables, (2.18) represents the banks budget constraint
and vb (:) is the banks continuation value under sovereign default. Lemma 2.2 provides an
expression for vb (:).
Lemma 2.2 The continuation value for solvent banks in the steady state S is
vb (n0;S) =  (2.19)
42The consumption of portion (1   ) of prots and overhead costs ! serve to prevent the accumulation of
innite net worth by banks in the steady state after sovereign default. The former aspect is standard in dynamic
nancial models while the latter is necessitated by the excess prots banks make due to imperfect competition.
Overhead costs are waived when  < ! so as to ensure that they never drive the bank into insolvency or a¤ect
the recovery rate  on deposits.
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Proof. Provided in Appendix B2.2.
The banks rst order conditions under the safe strategy are
 
ll + bb  d0 (n;S) = 0 ,  (n;S)  0 , d0  ll + bb (2.20)
qb (S) 
(1  P (S))

1   +  @ES[v
b(n0;S0)]
@

+ (P (S) +  (n;S)) b
1 +  (n;S)
(1  d (d0; n;S)) q (d0; n;S)
(2.21)
ql (l;S)
1  l
=
(1  P (S))

1   +  @ES[v
b(n0;S0)]
@

+ (P (S) +  (n;S)) l
1 +  (n;S)
(1  d (d0; n;S)) q (d0; n;S)
(2.22)
where (l; d (d
0; n;S)) are the mark-ups in the loan and deposit markets and  (n;S) is the
Lagrange multiplier associated with the solvency constraint. The interpretation of these con-
ditions is similar to their counterparts (1.24)-(1.26) in Chapter 1. The two sets of FOCs di¤er
only due to the term
@ES[vb(n0;S0)]
@
which is the expected value of a marginal increase in prots
in the state without sovereign default. In a two-period setting, this term is xed at unity by
the banks risk neutrality. In a dynamic environment, on the other hand, it depends on the
marginal value of net worth in future state realizations S0 via (2.14). Proposition 2.1 shows
that the FOCs in the rst chapter constitute a special case of the dynamic FOCs.
Proposition 2.1 Let g be the subset of state realizations where the bank follows a gambling
strategy. If for all possible future aggregate state realizations S0, either (n0; S0) 2 g or (n0; S0) =2
g and  (n0;S0) = 0, q (d0; n0;S0) = q, then
@ES

vb (n0;S0)

@
= 1
Otherwise
@ES

vb (n0;S0)

@
> 1
Proof. Provided in Appendix B2.3.
The proposition states that the bank attaches a higher value to future net worth if there is
a positive probability of visiting a future state realization where it follows a safe strategy with
a binding solvency constraint and/or its deposits are perceived to be risky. This increase in the
value attached to  relative to  increases the risk-taking incentives of the bank, leading to a
rise in (b; d0) under the safe strategy when the solvency constraint is slack, as well as stronger
incentives to adopt the gambling strategy.
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In contrast, the FOCs under the gambling strategy are identical to their counterparts in
Section 1.2.6.
qb (S) = (1  d (d0; n;S)) q (d0; n;S) (2.23)
ql (l;S) = (1  l) qb (S) (2.24)
This is due to the banks reliance on limited liability under sovereign default. Because of this,
the bank only internalizes its prots  in the absence of sovereign default. Since the relative
valuation of (; ) does not matter, the term
@ES[vb(n0;S0)]
@
drops out of the gambling FOCs. In
other words, when a bank follows the gambling strategy, its optimal set of actions are those
that maximize  regardless of its time horizon.
2.3.5 Sentiments and sunspots
In this section, I describe how households formulate their expectations ~ (n;S) about a banks
domestic sovereign bond exposure. Conditional on (n;S), the banks rst order conditions
(2.20)-(2.24) provide a unique mapping between the strategy followed by a bank and its sov-
ereign exposure.
Using (2.17), the optimality condition for the bank to adopt a gambling strategy can be
written as
vbg (n; S)  vbs (n; S) (2.25)
When this condition is satised, the banks optimal exposure g is given by (2.23), (2.24).
Otherwise, the bank adopts a safe strategy and its exposure s is pinned down by (2.20)-(2.22).
Sentiments may become self-fullling due to the dependence of both sides of the inequality in
(2.25) on ~ (n;S).
The state space for (n;S) can be segmented into three non-intersecting subsets according to
the interaction between (2.25) and ~ (n;S). Let G denote a subset where (2.25) is satised for
~ (n;S) =

g; s
	
, S denote a second subset where (2.25) is violated for ~ (n;S) = g; s	 and
M denote a third subset where (2.25) is satised for ~ (n;S) = g and violated for ~ (n;S) = s.
In the rst two subsets fG;Sg,  is uniquely determined regardless of ~ (n;S) while household
sentiments become self-fullling when (n;S) 2M.
I resolve the multiplicity inM with the use of sunspots. Specically, let  be a random vari-
able drawn from a uniform distribution on the unit interval at the beginning of each period and
 2 [0; 1] a constant threshold. When  >  household expectations coordinate on ~ (n;S) = s
consistent with the safe strategy. I refer to this as good sentiments. When   , on the other
hand, expectations coordinate on ~ (n;S) = g in line with the gambling strategy and there
are bad sentiments. To provide a formal denition for ~ (n;S),M is further segmented into
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two subsetsM+ andM  which respectively denote good and bad sentiments such that
~ (n;S) =
8<: g if (n;S) 2 fG;M gs if (n;S) 2 fS;M+g
Since  is uniformly distributed on a unit interval, the probability of good and bad sentiments
in the next period are simply given by
 
1   and  respectively. Note that it is straightforward
to introduce a more sophisticated specication for sunspots by replacing  with an AR(1)
shock process or a function of fundamentals such as the recovery rate  of domestic deposits
or government debt B. I opt for this simple specication as it permits me to isolate the role
of sovereign risk and other relevant fundamentals in making household sentiments self-fullling
in the rst place. The subset M which provides a mapping of states with multiplicity is
endogenously determined by the optimal strategies of households and banks, which in turn
depend on these fundamentals.43
2.3.6 Steady state after sovereign default
When the government defaults, sovereign bond holders receive a recovery rate b < 1. Produc-
tivity also declines to A < A which leads to a reduction in wages and a partial payment from
loans. If the banks followed a gambling strategy before sovereign default, they become insolvent
such that households receive a recovery rate  from their deposits and the banking sector is
replaced with a new set of banks with zero net worth. Otherwise, deposits are repaid fully and
bank net worth is determined by (2.15).
In the following period, the economy immediately moves to a steady state S where pro-
ductivity recovers back to A and there is no further sovereign default risk.44 In the absence
of bank insolvency risk, domestic deposits become perfectly substitutable with risk-free assets
43Global games constitutes an alternative approach to sunspots in resolving multiple equilibria that creates
an endogenous relationship between economic fundamentals and equilibrium selection. This approach, however,
is not implementable in the context of the multiplicity considered in this chapter since the strategic comple-
mentarity is between banks and households, and takes place through a market mechanism that is capable
of aggregating diverse beliefs. To see this, consider the introduction of a private signal to households about
~ (n;S). Provided households are not extremely risk averse, the solvency calculus of a household is not a¤ected
by the signal received by other households. Banks then nd it optimal to borrow solely from the household
with the lowest ~ (n;S) signal, which determines the price q (d0; n;S) in deposit markets. The model collapses
to a sunspot solution where the lowest ~ (n;S) signal becomes the de facto sunspot.
44The immediate recovery in productivity only serves to simplify the exposition. This can be replaced with
any continuation path for productivity as long as there is perfect foresight about it.
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such that q = q.45 The steady state price and quantity of loans is then given by
qk = (1  l) q (2.26)
L = (A)
1
1 
 
qk
 
1  (2.27)
The following parameterization for ( ; !; q) is necessary to ensure this
 = q = 
! = lL
The parameterization for ( ; !) ensures that bank net worth remains constant while equating
the risk-free asset price to the household discount factor drives households to completely smooth
their consumption after sovereign default.46
2.3.7 Equilibrium
Let S = [N; ; ;{] be the aggregate state sector, where N = n= is aggregate bank net worth
in equilibrium and {  D + D + w (S)   T (S) is disposable household wealth. A recursive
rational expectations equilibrium is given by value functions for households and banks

vh; vb
	
and policy functions for households fc;D0; D0g and for banks f; d0g such that, given prices
fw;w; qg and price schedules ql; q	: (i) householdsand banksvalue and policy functions
solve their optimization problems; (ii) the market for domestic deposits clears, D0 = d0= (iii)
the market for loans clears L (S) = l=; (iv) the government budget constraint is satised; (v)
  (:) and fG;M;Sg are consistent with agentsoptimal strategies.47
2.3.8 Numerical solution
The solution for the recursive equilibrium is attained using global numerical methods. In this
section, I sketch the main steps in the algorithm and relegate the remaining details to Appendix
B4.
Note that the decentralized, imperfectly competitive nature of banks requires the inclusion
of individual bank net worth n along with S as a state variable. Specically, although banks are
45There is no need take a stance on when and whether the government returns to sovereign bond markets as
long as there is no further default risk. If the government is able to issue bonds, they are priced at qb = q and
banks are indi¤erent to holding them.
46Solving the households problem when q di¤ers from the discount factor  is trivial but leads to a balanced
growth path for consumption rather than a steady state value. I abstain from this since it leads to additional
complication without yielding any insights of interest.
47In the small open economy setting, the markets for goods and sovereign bonds are cleared through trade
with foreign agents. Therefore, there is no need to explicitly include the clearing conditions for these markets
in the equilibrium denition.
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symmetric with net worth n = N on the equilibrium path, determining their optimal strategy
as per Section 2.3.4 requires considering o¤-equilibrium strategies (deviations) which lead to a
di¤erent path of n for the specic bank than the remainder of the banking sector. The banks
value function vb (n; S) and the equilibrium regions fG;M;Sg are thus dened over (n;S).
Let X (S) = f; d0; c;D0; D0g collect the policy functions of banks and households in the
symmetric equilibrium with n = N , and E = fG;M;Sg denote the equilibrium regions. The
solution algorithm can then be sketched as follows
1. Begin with a set of guesses for fE ;  (S) ; X (S)g.
2. Formulate future expectations according to fE ;  (S) ; X (S)g. Then, use the deposit de-
mand schedule in Section 2.3.3, rst order conditions in Section 2.3.4, and the market
clearing conditions in Section 2.3.7 to update f  (S) ; X (S)g. Iterate until the solution
for f  (S) ; X (S)g converges.
3. Guess the banks value function vb (n; S).
4. Use the rst order conditions in Sections (2.3.4) and (2.25) with expectations formulated
according to fE ;  (S) ; X (S)g to update vb (n; S). Iterate until the solution for vb (n; S)
converges.
5. Update E according to the solution to step 4. Repeat from step 2 until convergence.
I follow three distinct approaches to alleviate the curse of dimensionality that arises from
solving the model globally. First, I use a piecewise cubic Hermite spline to interpolate f  (S) ; X (S) ;
vb (n; S)g between the pre-dened grid points. Second, I abstain from the households wealth
accumulation process by letting lump-sum taxes T (S) adjust to ensure that
{  D +D + w (S)  T (S) = E
as long as the government remains solvent, where E is a xed wealth parameter. This does not
a¤ect householdsincentives to save since they take T (S) as given, but eliminates { from the
state vector, reducing the number of state variables to 4.
Third, I take advantage of a series of characteristics of the banks rst order conditions
to reduce the computational burden in steps 2 and 4 signicantly. Specically, the FOCs
(2.20) and (2.22) indicate that the optimal choices fs; d0sg under a safe strategy are (i) inde-
pendent of

  (S) ; X (S) ; vb (n;S)
	
when ~ (n;S) = s (ii) independent of

  (S) ; vb (n;S)
	
when  (n;S) > 0. Similarly, the FOCs (2.23) and (2.24) indicate that the optimal choices
g; d
0
g
	
under a gambling strategy are independent of

  (S) ; vb (n;S)
	
. The relevant proofs
are provided in Appendix B4.
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2.4 Numerical results
This section provides numerical results from the dynamic model under a calibration that targets
Portugal. It proceeds in four steps. Section 2.4.1 describes the calibration. Section 2.4.2
discusses the relationship between sovereign risk and the equilibrium regions. Section 2.4.3
demonstrates the propagation of sovereign risk shocks with the use of impulse response functions
to a sovereign risk shock. Finally, Section 2.4.4 brings the model to data by comparing its t
to the Portuguese economy over 2010-2016.
2.4.1 Calibration
The calibration targets Portugal over the crisis period of 2010-2016 with each period represent-
ing a quarter. Table 2.2 reports the calibrated parameters.
The recovery rate of sovereign bonds is set to b = 0:6 according to Cruces and Trebesch
(2013). The calibration for the scal stress parameters (ss; ; 
2
) matches q
b (S) =q to the
yield spread between Portuguese and German bonds (which act as a benchmark for the safe
rate).48 Specically, I use (2.1) and (2.2) to back out a time series of scal stress realizations
^t from the spread data under the calibrated recovery rate. The calibration for (ss; ; 
2
) is
then attained by tting the AR(1) process given by (2.3) to ^t.49
In the household sector, the discount factor is calibrated to  = 0:991=4 and the wealth
parameter targets data on household net worth from OECD. The calibration for the coe¢ cient
of risk aversion  = 3 lies within the range given by recent empirical estimates (Thimme, 2016).
Regarding rms, I set the output elasticity of capital to the standard Cobb-Douglas value
of  = 1=3. In the absence of sovereign default, productivity is normalized to A = 1 such that
A is equivalent to the recovery rate of loans l. The calibration for A targets the recovery rate
since sovereign default propagates through balance sheet costs to banks rather than the direct
e¤ects of productivity decline. Accordingly, I calibrate l = 0:90 in line with recent estimates
on the e¤ects of sovereign default on rm protability (Hébert and Schreger, 2016).50
The bank market share parameter  is calibrated to match the mark-up l in the loans
market to the average interest margin on domestic bank lending to non-nancial corporations
48I use bonds with a remaining maturity of 3 months due to the quarterly calibration of the model. While the
standard benchmark for measuring sovereign default risk is the yield/CDS spreads on 10 year bonds, it is not
possible to extract quarter-on-quarter default probabilities from these measures without imposing additional
restrictions on the yield curve.
49See Appendix B3 for further details.
50This implies a relatively high output cost of default compared to the previous literature. It is worth noting,
however, that the calibration for l can be reconciled with lower output costs with the introduction of bankruptcy
costs or real frictions that limit the ability of rms to decrease salary costs following sovereign default. Note
also that, under the baseline calibration, the parameter restrictions in (1.15) are satised for a wide range of
recovery rates l 2 [0:59; 0:99]. The qualitative results presented in Chapter 1, including the non-emptiness of
the multiple equilibria region, remain valid at all points within this range.
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Table 2.2: Calibration
Parameter Value Description Source
b 0:60 Sov. bond recovery rate Cruces and Trebesch (2013)
ss  5:14 Fiscal stress (mean) Bloomberg
 0:74 Fiscal stress (persistence) Bloomberg
2 0:93 Fiscal stress (variance) Bloomberg
 0:991=4 Discount factor -
E 0:07E-9 Household wealth OECD
 3:00 Coe¢ cient of risk aversion Thimme (2016)
 0:33 Cobb-Douglas parameter -
A 1:00 Productivity (no sov. default) -
A 0:90 Productivity (sov. default) Hébert and Schreger (2016)
 0:005 Bank market share ECB Statistical Data Warehouse
 0:50 Probability of bad sentiments -
during the pre-crisis period of 2003-2007.51 Finally, I calibrate the sunspot threshold to  = 0:5
such that good and bad sentiments are equally likely.
2.4.2 Sovereign risk and equilibrium regions
I begin analysing the numerical results by examining the implications of sovereign risk for the
equilibrium regions. Figure 2.7 provides a mapping of the prevalent equilibrium type across a
range of sovereign default probabilities P (S) and aggregate bank net worth N . As with the
two period model in Section 1.2, the three equilibrium regions are ordered monotonically across
net worth: First, the gambling equilibrium is unique when net worth falls short of a boundary
N (S). Second, there is an intermediate multiplicity region N (S)  N  N (S). Finally, the
safe equilibrium is unique when net worth exceeds N (S).
These boundaries are contingent on sovereign default risk. When sovereign bonds are com-
pletely safe, only a safe equilibrium is possible.52 The emergence of sovereign risk, however,
51The relationship between the mark-up and the steady state price of loans is given by (2.26). I match this
with pre-crisis interest rates in order to isolate the excess return due to market power.
52This stems from the lack of other types of aggregate risk within the model environment. It can, however, be
interpreted as the reduced form outcome of a richer environment with capital regulation based on risk-weighted
assets. In this environment, capital requirements faced by a bank depend on the risk-weight attached to its
portfolio. For assets with non-sovereign risk, positive risk weights align the banks incentives towards following
a safe strategy. If sovereign bonds have zero risk-weight, Sovereign bonds, on the other hand, have a zero risk-
weight, then gambling is only possible in the presence of sovereign default risk. The preferential treatment for
sovereign bonds described here approximately reects the regulatory framework in the Euro area (Bank for
International Settlements, 2013).
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creates a large region with a unique gambling equilibrium. Further increases in sovereign risk
have a non-linear e¤ect on banks incentives to gamble. As sovereign risk rises, N (S) rst
increases, and then decreases while N (S) decreases throughout, leading to a widening of the
multiplicity region.
To understand these ndings, consider the implications of sovereign risk for bank payo¤s
under each strategy. When a bank follows the gambling strategy, a rise in sovereign risk has two
opposing e¤ects on its prots. First, it increases sovereign bond yields which raises prots from
gambling. Second, it leads to a rise in bank funding costs which reduces prots. At low levels
of sovereign risk, the former e¤ect dominates such that a rise in P (S) strengthens incentives
to gamble. As bank funding costs are determined by risk averse households, however, the
latter e¤ect becomes stronger as sovereign risk increases. N (S) peaks at the point where the
latter e¤ect becomes dominant and the value associated with adopting the gambling strategy
is negatively related to P (S) beyond this point.
The impact of sovereign risk on the safe strategy payo¤ is contingent on household senti-
ments. Recall that the banks solvency constraint coincides with its deposit threshold under
good sentiments. This ensures that the bank borrows at the risk-free rate regardless of the
sovereign default probability. As a result, the safe strategy payo¤ is largely independent of
P (S) when there are good sentiments.53 Under bad sentiments, the deposit threshold becomes
tighter than the solvency constraint due to the expectation of a high sovereign exposure. Despite
following a safe strategy, banks optimally breach the deposit threshold such that households
anticipate their insolvency under sovereign default. This leads to a positive relationship be-
tween bank funding costs and P (S). The safe strategy payo¤ thus decreases in sovereign risk
under bad sentiments.
This mechanism explains the widening of the multiplicity region as sovereign risk increases.
A rise in P (S) leads to a greater reduction in incentives to follow a safe strategy under bad
sentiments than it does under good sentiments. This leads to the expansion of the region of
net worth where both types of sentiments are self-fullling.
The pattern followed by the boundaries
 
N (S) ; N (S)

can also be explained by comparing
the safe and gambling strategy payo¤s. N (S) traces the levels of net worth where banks are
indi¤erent between the two strategies under bad sentiments. Since the payo¤ from gambling
rst increases then falls in P (S), while that of the safe strategy falls monotonically, N (S)
declines sharply as sovereign risk increases. In contrast, N (S) traces the points of indi¤erence
under good sentiments, where the safe strategy payo¤ is independent of P (S). Therefore, it
has the same non-monotonic shape as the gambling payo¤.
53To be precise, the payo¤ is independent of P (S) when the solvency constraint is binding, which is the case
at the boundary of net worth N (S). When the solvency constraint is slack, the expected payo¤ falls slightly as
P (S) increases due to a decline in bank lending.
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Figure 2.7: Equilibrium Mapping
2.4.3 Propagation of sovereign risk shocks
The next step is to evaluate the propagation of sovereign risk shocks. Figure 2.8 plots the
response of key variables to an increase in scal stress by 1.5 standard deviations. The top left
panel indicates that the shock increases the probability of sovereign default by the next quarter
from 0:6% to 2:3%.54
The second panel shows the evolution of aggregate bank net worth and the equilibrium re-
gions. The multiplicity region is depicted by the shaded area. Within this region, the prevalent
equilibrium type is determined by household sentiments. Good sentiments (i.e. a high sunspot
realization) lead to a safe equilibrium and bad sentiments result in a gambling equilibrium.
The equilibrium is unique outside the multiplicity region with a safe equilibrium above it and a
gambling equilibrium below. For expositions sake, I select an initial level of net worth that lies
in the multiplicity region and consider two specic scenarios. In the rst scenario, sentiments
come out to be good in each successive period such that there is always a safe equilibrium in
the multiplicity region. In the second scenario, successive bad sentiments lead to a gambling
equilibrium within the same region.
In the scenario with good sentiments, bank net worth increases rapidly and brings about an
early exit from the multiplicity region. With bad sentiments, on the other hand, the economy
remains trappedin the multiplicity region for a prolonged length of time. Since net worth is
54Recall that the economy immediately moves to the steady state following sovereign default. The impulse re-
sponses in Figure 2.8 correspond to a timeline where, in each successive period, it is revealed that the government
remains solvent.
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Figure 2.8: Impulse responses to a sovereign risk shock
Note: All interest rates are annualized.
retained from bank prots, the implication is that prots are lower in the gambling equilibrium
compared to the safe equilibrium. This nding is surprising since, in the absence of a sovereign
default event, Figure 2.8 corresponds to a timeline where a gamble on domestic sovereign bonds
is successful. In other words, despite collecting a high yield from their risky bond purchases,
banks make lower prots under the gambling equilibrium than the safe equilibrium.55
The explanation lies in the impulse responses for bank funding costs and lending. The
panels in the second row of Figure 2.8 show that the gambling equilibrium entails high leverage
and exposure to domestic sovereign bonds. This creates the prospect of insolvency in the case
of sovereign default, which in turn increases bank funding costs to the detriment of prots.
In contrast, under the safe equilibrium, banks satisfy a solvency constraint that ensures their
solvency following sovereign default. This leads to low leverage and sovereign bond exposure
such that bank funding costs remain at the risk-free rate. Moreover, the solvency constraint
binds in the multiplicity region such that banks reduce their lending to rms. The top right
panel shows the rise in loan interest rates caused by this. Together with relatively low funding
costs, the excess returns created by the rise in loan interest rates explains the rapid rise in net
worth under good sentiments.
It is instructive to decompose the increase in loan interest rates, which is proportionate to
55Recall that banks take household sentiments as given when deciding on their optimal strategies.
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Figure 2.9: Decomposition of bank lending
Note: All values are annualized. Bank lending and output are in percentage points.
the decline in bank lending and output. Figure 2.9 shows impulse responses for loan interest
rates, aggregate bank lending and output under the same sovereign risk shock as Figure 2.8. In
addition to the two scenarios above, it plots a third scenario with high initial net worth such
that the safe equilibrium is unique and the solvency constraint is slack.
Compared to the (risk-free) steady state, the interest rates on loans increase and bank
lending declines even in the high net worth case. This constitutes an e¢ cient decline in
bank lending in view of the risk that loans become non-performing under sovereign default. In
the scenario with good sentiments (and low initial net worth), bank lending initially declines
signicantly below the e¢ cient level due to the deleveraging process described above, but
returns back to the e¢ cient level from the second period onwards as net worth increases.
When there are bad sentiments, on the other hand, bank lending is crowded out by domestic
sovereign bond purchases. This leads to a relatively mild, but still signicant decline below
the e¢ cient level compared to the good sentiments case, with crowding out e¤ects accounting
for roughly 75% of the total decline in bank lending (and output). The decline is persistent,
however, due to the slow increase in bank net worth.
Overall, the scenarios with good and bad sentiments highlight two alternative paths of
adjustment to a sovereign risk shock when the banking sector is under-capitalized. Under
the safe equilibrium, the nancial soundness of the banking sector is preserved by aggressive
deleveraging and there is a sharp but short-lived recession. As banks remain solvent even in the
event of sovereign default, bank funding costs remain at the risk-free rate. In contrast, under
bad sentiments, the economy becomes stuck in a gambling trapcharacterized by a banking
sector with high domestic sovereign bond exposure and persistent crowding out of bank lending.
There is also considerable nancial fragility due to the sovereign-bank nexus. If the government
defaults at any point before the exit from the multiplicity region, this causes a banking crisis.
As such, bank funding costs become highly correlated with sovereign bond yields.
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2.4.4 Comparison with Portuguese data
This section compares the models t to Portuguese data. The comparative exercise is con-
ducted by simulating the model economy under a series of sovereign risk shocks "0d that exactly
match qb (S) 1 to quarterly Portuguese sovereign bond yields over 2010Q1-2016Q1. I also cal-
ibrate initial bank net worth to match the Tier 1 capital of the Portuguese banking sector in
2009, while the remainder of the parameters are calibrated as in Section 2.4.1.
Figure 2.10 contrasts the simulated series under good and bad sentiments (which are taken to
be persistent as in the previous section) with data on the Portuguese economy. The rst panel
displays the sovereign default probabilities implied by the match with Portuguese sovereign
bond yields. The probability of government default by the next quarter peaks at 2:78% in the
nal quarter of 2011.
The second panel shows the simulated series for bank net worth and the multiplicity region
which evolves according to changes in sovereign default probabilities as explained in Section
2.4.2. The simulation places the Portuguese economy in the region with a unique gambling
equilibrium in 2010Q1, after which it enters the multiplicity region. Thereafter, bank net
worth follows di¤erent paths under good and bad sentiments. As in the previous section,
good sentiments result in a safe equilibrium and a rapid increase in net worth that moves the
economy into the region with a unique safe equilibrium. Bad sentiments, on the other hand,
lead to a gambling equilibrium with stagnating net worth such that the economy remains in
the multiplicity region.
The model has partial success in emulating changes in loan interest rates. The third panel
shows that the simulated series under bad sentiments captures the initial increase in loan
interest rates but overshoots at the peak of the sovereign debt crisis in 2011-2012, and slightly
undershoots thereafter. The simulated series under good sentiments suggests a large increase
in interest rates in 2011, which is not reected in the data. This is due to the binding solvency
constraint prior to the exit from the multiplicity region, which leads to a signicant decline in
bank lending as in the previous section.
The models main success is in replicating the evolution of bank funding costs. As shown
in the fourth panel, the simulated series under bad sentiments provides a very close match to
deposit interest rates in Portugal. Both of these series correlate highly with sovereign default
probabilities. Under good sentiments, on the other hand, interest rates remain at the risk-free
rate from 2010Q2 onwards. The fth panel compares the simulated series for bank leverage
with the leverage ratio of the Portuguese banking sector.56 The simulated series under bad
sentiments somewhat overshoots its counterpart in data, but captures the slow decline in bank
56Although the latter containts non-depository liabilities which are not directly present in the model, the
nature of deposits as a choice variable captures the optimal leverage decision of banks.
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Figure 2.10: Comparison with Portuguese data
Note: All interest rates are annualized. Sovereign default probabilities are extracted from the yield spread
between Portuguese and German bonds with 3 month maturity remaining as described in section 2.4.1. The
domestic sovereign bond exposure series is constructed using data from stress tests and transparency exercises
conducted between 2009-2016 as well as individual bank balance sheets. See Appendix B3 for further details
about data. Source: OECD, ECB, EBA.
leverage over the crisis period.
Finally, the last panel contrasts the share of funds spent on domestic sovereign bond pur-
chases. The series under bad sentiments reects the gradual increase in the exposure to domestic
sovereign debt, but indicates a higher exposure than is observed in the data. A potential expla-
nation for this is that the data accounts only for direct exposure via sovereign bond holdings,
whereas a banks actual exposure to domestic sovereign risk also involves indirect exposure
through holdings of assets with correlated risk, such as government bonds of other risky Euro-
pean countries and securities issued by banks with a high exposure to these. The simulation
under good sentiments indicates a large drop in exposure which is not present in the data.
Overall, the gambling equilibrium, which is consistent with bad sentiments, has more success
in replicating Portuguese data than the scenario with good sentiments.
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2.5 Policy analysis
In this section, I conduct a policy experiment based on an extension of the dynamic model
in Section 2.3. Specically, I extend the dynamic model to include liquidity provision (with
risk transfer) as a pre-determined state variable dc.57 For T periods, this variable follows a
pre-determined path

dct
	T
t=0
before returning to zero permanently.58
I opt for this set up for two reasons. First, in the absence of debt with long-term matu-
rity, giving banks the option to rollover their debt for T periods approximates the maturity
structure of the LTROs.59 Second, this set up allows for the solution of the extended model
by iterating backwards from the end date T . This makes the additional computational burden
from including the policy intervention negligible.60
Figure 2.11 plots the impulse responses to the same sovereign risk shock as in Section 2.4.3.61
The rst panel shows that the multiplicity region shifts upwards and expands signicantly due
to the policy intervention. As a result of this, the economy remains in the multiplicity region
even after the deleveraging process under good sentiments. Under bad sentiments, on the other
hand, net worth increases slightly faster relative to the baseline case due to the increase in
gambling prots. The lower boundary of the multiplicity region also shifts up, however, and
entry into the region with a unique gambling equilibrium is only narrowly avoided.
The remaining panels highlight the changes in the gambling equilibrium under the policy
intervention.62 Banks respond to liquidity provision by increasing their sovereign exposure
until their funding costs return to their pre-intervention level. The top right panel shows that
leverage initially increases due to the rise in borrowing by banks (both from the central bank
and depositors) but falls below the baseline level over time as net worth increases more rapidly.
Overall, it appears that when liquidity provision transfers insolvency risk from depositors
57The changes in the deposit demand schedule and the banks problem are similar to the two period model.
I relegate the relevant expressions to Appendix B1 in the interest of brevity.
58The equilibrium allocation in the steady state after sovereign default is independent of dc. Therefore, there
is no need to take a stance on the evolution of dct following sovereign default.
59The LTROs had a 3 year maturity with an early repayment option after 1 year (European Central Bank,
2011). In the context of the model, exercising the early repayment option is equivalent to choosing dct = 0
for the remaining periods. Although this does not exactly correspond to the single window for repayment in
LTROs, it emerges as a result that banks either strictly prefer to take the maximum amount of funding in each
period or are indi¤erent to the amount of central bank liquidity they receive. Therefore, the frequency and
timing of the early repayment option has no impact on the numerical results.
60When the policy expires at T + 1, the extended model becomes identical to the baseline model. Therefore,
future expectations at T for
ET+1; T+1 (S) ; XT+1 (S) ; vbT+1 (n;S)	 can be attained by taking expectations
according to the solution to the baseline model. The solution to the model at period T is then attained by using
the steps in section 2.3.8. Instead of iterating until convergence, the solution
ET ; T (S) ; XT (S) ; vbT (n;S)	 is
used to take expectations for T   1. This process is repeated until t = 0.
61I calibrate T = 12 in line with LTROs and set dct = d
c < ~dc. The remaining parameters follow the baseline
calibration in Section 2.4.1.
62The impulse responses under good sentiments, and those for loan interest rates are excluded as they remain
identical to the baseline case in Figure 2.8.
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Figure 2.11: Liquidity provision
Note: All interest rates are annualized.
to the central bank, it backres not only by eliminating the safe equilibrium at low levels of net
worth, but also by expanding multiplicity to higher levels of net worth such that the economy
remains stuck in the gambling equilibrium for the duration of the intervention.
2.6 Conclusion
I have incorporated the framework proposed in Chapter 1 into a dynamic general equilibrium
model. This has yielded an important insight: in equilibria with high bank risk-taking, the
rise in funding costs in anticipation of bank default risk hinders the recovery of bank net
worth. Consequently, countries with an under-capitalized banking sector may become stuck
in a gambling trap characterized by bank fragility and an endogenously persistent drop in
investment and output in response to negative shocks.
I have applied this model in the context of the European sovereign debt crisis, showing
that its implications are consistent with the stylized facts of the crisis. I have also shown that
the model can account for macroeconomic dynamics observed in Portugal in 2010-2016 in a
quantitative exercise. In a policy experiment, I showed that liquidity provision similar to the
European Central Banks LTROs may backre. These interventions strengthen incentives to
67
gamble and may extend the length of time an economy remains in a gambling trap.
Finally, it is important to stress that the transmission mechanisms considered in this model
can be interpreted in a broader context than a sovereign debt crisis. Incentives to gamble are
strong whenever an assets payo¤ is highly correlated to a banks own insolvency risk. This
would be the case, for example, with aggregate risky assets or illiquid assets that banks have a
large pre-existing exposure to. Gambling traps may then arise when creditors are not covered by
government guarantees, especially with insu¢ ciently strict regulation to prevent excessive risk-
taking. Nevertheless, these mechanisms are particularly strong during sovereign debt crises due
to the triple coincidence of high correlation between sovereign default risk and aggregate risk,
zero risk-weight in regulation for domestic sovereign bonds, and concerns about the credibility
of government guarantees during a sovereign default episode.
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Chapter 3
Shadow Banking and Market
Discipline on Traditional Banks
Abstract
We present a general equilibrium banking model in which shadow banking arises en-
dogenously and undermines market discipline on traditional commercial banks. Deposi-
torsability to re-optimize in response to crises imposes market discipline on traditional
banks: these banks optimally commit to a safe portfolio strategy to prevent early with-
drawals. With costly commitment, shadow banking emerges as an alternative banking
strategy that combines high risk-taking with early liquidation in times of crisis. We bring
the model to bear on the 2007-09 nancial crisis in the United States, during which shadow
banks experienced a sudden dry-up of funding and liquidated their assets. We derive an
equilibrium in which the shadow banking sector expands to a size where its liquidation
causes a re-sale and exposes traditional banks to liquidity risk. Higher deposit rates in
compensation for liquidity risk also weaken threats of early withdrawal and traditional
banks pursue risky portfolios that may leave them in default. Policy interventions aimed
at alleviating re-sales fuel further expansion of shadow banking. Financial stability can
be achieved with a tax on shadow bank prots or collateralized liquidity support to tra-
ditional banks.
Keywords: Shadow banking; Financial crisis; Market discipline; Fire-sales
JEL codes: E44, E58, G01, G21, G23, G28
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3.1 Introduction
Recent decades have seen rapid growth in nancial intermediation by non-bank entities based
on a business model that combines highly-leveraged, short-term funding with risky long-term
investments such as sub-prime mortgage lending. In the 2007-09 nancial crisis, these shadow
banksexperienced a sudden dry-up in their funding and liquidated their assets.63 The ensuing
turmoil quickly spread to traditional commercial banks, which reduced their credit to the private
sector. This has led to the deepest recession since the Great Depression, raising two important
questions. First, what circumstances and mechanism lead to the emergence of shadow banking?
Second, how does shadow banking a¤ect the portfolio and funding strategies of traditional
banks?
In this chapter, we propose a framework where depositors may withdraw their deposits
early in reaction to crises. These early withdrawalsconstitute an optimal response to adverse
changes in bankssolvency prospects and become a source of market discipline:64 traditional
banks optimally commit to a safe portfolio strategy to prevent early withdrawals. When com-
mitment is costly, shadow banking emerges as an alternative banking strategy that combines a
risky portfolio strategy with early withdrawals in times of crisis. To the best of our knowledge,
this chapter presents the rst model where shadow and traditional banks coexist and interact
without regulatory arbitrage or direct contractual linkages.
We bring this theoretical model to bear on the 2007-09 nancial crisis, its transmission
to the traditional banking sector, and policy debates on shadow banking and interventions in
support of banks. In doing so, we account for two key empirical facts: Shadow banks faced a
sudden contraction in funding and the liquidation of their assets caused a re-sale. Traditional
banks did not su¤er from withdrawals, experienced a sharp rise in their funding costs, and
re-allocated their portfolios towards safe and liquid assets.
We develop our analysis by specifying a closed economy model with households, entrepre-
neurs, outside investors, and a banking sector. Banks collect deposits from households and
choose their portfolios of safe, risky, and liquid assets; households lend to banks on terms that
depend on their solvency prospects; entrepreneurs originate assets. Following news signals that
revise expected asset returns, households decide whether to withdraw their deposits early and
banks trade assets with outside investors in a secondary market with cash-in-the-market pricing
(Allen and Gale, 1994, 2005).
A key element in the model is the equilibrium relationship between secondary market prices
63See Adrian and Ashcraft (2012) and Pozsar et al. (2013) for detailed descriptions of shadow banking activ-
ities.
64Early withdrawals are distinct from self-fullling bank-runs à la Diamond and Dybvig (1983). For an early
withdrawal to take place, depositors must nd it optimal to withdraw their funds even when no other depositor
does so.
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and bank strategies. During early withdrawals, shadow banks liquidate their assets in the
secondary market to repay their depositors. Fire-sale externalities then create strategic substi-
tutabilities in banksdecision to pursue a shadow banking strategy: As the shadow banking sec-
tor grows larger, its liquidation causes a deeper re-sale, reducing the payo¤ from shadow bank-
ing relative to traditional banking, and bringing about an interior equilibrium where shadow
and traditional banks coexist.
Analyzing the e¤ects of re-sales on market discipline yields important insights for vulnera-
bility to nancial crises. The key intuition is that low deposit rates strengthen early withdrawal
incentives as depositors stand to lose less in terms of interest foregone. Therefore, market dis-
cipline on traditional banks is strong whenever deposit rates are low. This is precisely the case
when there are no re-sales: Interest rates on deposits are low due to the lack of liquidity risk65
and market discipline drives traditional banks to commit to a safe portfolio strategy. With the
prospect of a re-sale, on the other hand, depositors demand higher rates in compensation for
liquidity risk. This weakens early withdrawal incentives and allows traditional banks to pursue
risky portfolios that may leave them in default. In equilibrium, the shadow banking sector ex-
pands to a size where its liquidation causes a re-sale and undermines market discipline through
this mechanism.
The model provides novel and important insights for policy design. We show that the
outcome from policy interventions may di¤er substantially when adjustments in the size of the
shadow banking sector are taken into account. For example, asset purchases in the secondary
market are e¤ective in alleviating re-sales at a given shadow bank sector size. However,
the ex-ante anticipation of asset purchases fuels further growth of the sector and renders the
intervention completely ine¤ective. This troubles policymakers with time inconsistency issues:
once the re-sale is underway, they nd it tempting to intervene.
Collateralized liquidity support to traditional banks also causes an expansion in shadow
banking, but successfully ringfences the traditional banking sector from liquidity risk, thus
restoring market discipline. Eliminating liquidity risk through deposit insurance guarantees
prevents early withdrawals and necessitates the replacement of market discipline with regulatory
constraints. Taxation of shadow bank prots and transfers to traditional banks are conducive
to nancial stability. These interventions deter banks from pursuing a shadow banking strategy
and can be used to prevent the shadow banking sector from reaching a size where it causes a
re-sale.
65What is important here is that illiquidity leads to expected losses for depositors. We achieve this by allowing
for the possibility of self-fullling bank-runs on illiquid banks. Another way to ensure this is to introduce
idiosyncratic liquidity needs into bank assets. For example, a portion of bank assets may be backed by projects
that fail without the input of additional funds.
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Relationship to the literature The rapid growth of shadow banking in recent decades is
well documented (see e.g. Claessens et al., 2012; Pozsar et al., 2013). This chapter builds upon
a growing literature that provides micro-foundations for the existence and growth of shadow
banking. Gennaioli et al. (2013) emphasize the ability of shadow banks to generate safe assets
through securitization. They show that shadow banks become excessively exposed to systemic
risk when low probability tail events are neglected by investors. In a similar vein, Moreira
and Savov (2017) focus on liquidity transformation whereby shadow banks create money-like
assets that become illiquid in times of high uncertainty. Harris et al. (2014), Plantin (2015),
and Ordoñez (2017) highlight the role of regulatory arbitrage as a primary cause of shadow
banking. In these studies, regulatory constraints restrict intermediation by traditional banks
and create opportunities for unregulated shadow banks.
Our contribution to this literature is to show that shadow banking may arise as an equi-
librium outcome without any advantages in intermediation technologies or opportunities for
regulatory arbitrage. We assume, realistically, that commitment is costly and show that ex-
ante identical banks endogenously cluster into traditional and shadow banking strategies, where
the former optimally pay a lump-sum cost to commit to a safe portfolio strategy. In this con-
text, commitment costs reect any costly action undertaken by banks to resolve asymmetric
information issues with their depositors, such as providing detailed balance sheet reports, es-
chewing opaque intermediation processes like securitization, or issuing costly equity with voting
rights.
This chapter is also related to a recent strand of literature that analyses interactions between
traditional and shadow banks. Gornicka (2016) considers traditional banksincentives to gain
o¤-balance sheet exposure by extending implicit guarantees to shadow banks. Hanson et al.
(2015) present a framework where shadow and traditional banks have access to a common pool
of liquidity. They show that traditional banks have a comparative advantage in holding illiquid
assets with low fundamental risk when they are protected by deposit insurance guarantees. In
a similar environment, Luck and Schempp (2016) nd that shadow banking grows excessively
large from a social viewpoint due to pecuniary externalities similar to the re-sale externalities
considered here.
We contribute to this literature by deriving an equilibrium where shadow and traditional
banks coexist and interact without regulatory arbitrage or (implicit) contractual linkages. By
doing this, we provide novel insights about how shadow banking a¤ects market discipline on
traditional banks. We also establish a free market benchmark to compare bank regulation and
other policy interventions with.
Our modelling choices draw heavily from observations on the 2007-2009 nancial crisis.
Acharya et al. (2013) document the collapse in the market for asset-backed commercial papers
at the onset of the crisis while Gorton and Metrick (2012) and Krishnamurty et al. (2014)
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show a similar contraction in repo markets. Together, these two markets accounted for the
vast majority of funding for shadow banks. Covitz et al. (2013) nd that the dry-up in funding
for shadow banks was associated with a rise in macro-nancial risks such as uncertainty about
sub-prime mortgages values. In this chapter, the denitive characteristic of the shadow banking
strategy is its vulnerability to early withdrawals which closely resemble these events. Consistent
with Covitz et al. (2013), early withdrawals are triggered by a negative revision in expected
asset payo¤s.
We propose that re-sales caused by the liquidation of shadow banks play a key role in
the spread of nancial instability to traditional banks. Shleifer and Vishny (2011) provide an
extensive review of the literature on re-sales while Krishnamurthy (2010), Merrill et al. (2012),
and Mitchell and Pulvino (2012) provide empirical evidence for re-sales during the nancial
crisis. Our mechanism is similar to Diamond and Rajan (2005) in that (shadow) bank failures
cause contagion by aggravating liquidity shortages in the rest of the nancial sector.
Finally, like Diamond and Rajan (2011), we nd that illiquidity leads to greater risk-taking
by traditional banks. In Diamond and Rajan (2011), this is a consequence of risk-shifting
whereas our nding arises due to interactions between deposit rates and market discipline that
stem from threats of early withdrawal by depositors. Crucially, our mechanism can generate
solvency risk66 where none previously existed, whereas the risk-shifting mechanism exacerbates
pre-existing risks.
Layout We proceed as follows: Section 2.2 presents motivating evidence from the 2007-09
nancial crisis. Section 3.3 describes the core mechanisms of the model in a simple framework
without liquidity risk. Section 3.4 presents the complete model with liquidity risk. Section 3.5
provides the numerical results. Section 3.6 conducts policy analysis. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Motivating evidence
In this section, we present four key stylized facts about shadow banking and the 2007-09
nancial crisis in the United States.
Fact 1. The shadow banking sector expanded rapidly until its collapse in 2007. The traditional
banking sector grew at a slower rate but did not su¤er from a collapse.
Figure 3.1 shows that shadow bank assets expanded from 125% of GDP in 2002 to over 180%
at its peak in 2007. This rapid growth came to an end with a collapse during the nancial
66We distinguish between solvency riskwhich is the risk of fundamental insolvency after holding assets to
maturity, and liquidity riskwhich refers to the prospect of bankruptcy due to withdrawals before assets reach
maturity.
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Figure 3.1: Shadow and traditional bank assets
Note: Financial assets when available, otherwise total assets. Traditional banks refer
to all deposit-taking corporations. Shadow banks refer to all nancial corporations that
are not classied as central banks, banks, insurance corporations, pension funds, public
nancial institutions, or nancial auxiliaries.
Source: Financial Stability Board (2017) and the World Bank
crisis. In 2015, shadow bank assets amounted to 145% of GDP. The traditional banking sector
also expanded but at a relatively modest pace with its assets increasing from 88% of GDP in
2002 to 118% in 2015. Although there was no contraction in traditional banking during the
crisis, the shadow banking sector remained larger throughout the period 2002-2015.
In our model, the size of the shadow banking sector is endogenously determined through free
entry and may rise for two reasons: an increase in the liquidity available in secondary markets
and a rise in the cost of commitment. Recent nancial innovations such as securitization may
have increased both the commitment cost and the thickness of secondary markets. In Section
3.6, we also analyze the role of policy interventions in the expansion of shadow banking. We
show that expectations that policymakers will lean against a re-sale increase the equilibrium
size of the shadow banking sector in the same manner as the deepening of secondary markets.67
Fact 2. At the onset of the nancial crisis, shadow banks experienced a sudden dry-up of
funding and liquidated their assets.
At their peak of $1.2 trillion in July 2007, asset-backed commercial papers (ABCP) were
the largest money market instrument in the United States and constituted the main source
of funding for shadow banks. Following rising mortgage default rates and the suspension of
withdrawals by a number of funds, the market for ABCP contracted by $350 billion in the
67This may be implemented directly through asset purchases or indirectly by bailing out nancial institutions
which would have contributed to the excess supply of assets.
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Figure 3.2: ABCP markets and shadow bank assets
Note: Shaded areas indicate US recessions. Shadow banks refer to money market mutual funds, security
brokers and dealers, and issuers of asset-backed securities. Mortgage-backed securities refer to agency-
and GSE-backed securities.
Source: Financial Accounts of the United States
second half of 2007 and a further $400 billion by the end of 2009 (see Panel A of Figure 3.2).
Faced with this sudden contraction in funding, shadow banks liquidated their asset holdings.
Panels B and C show that shadow banks sold $1.5 trillions of debt securities between 2008Q3
and 2010Q1, approximately half of which were mortgage-backed securities.68
In our model,shadow banks are vulnerable to early withdrawals which closely resemble
these events. Early withdrawals take place following an adverse change in macro-nancial
fundamentals: a bad news signal that leads to a downward revision in expected asset returns.
These withdrawals constitute an optimal response by creditors to bad news rather than self-
fullling bank-runs in the fashion of Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
During a withdrawal, shadow banks are forced to liquidate their assets in the secondary
market. To the extent that this generates an adjustment in secondary market prices, there are
consequences for traditional banks even in the absence of implicit guarantees or any other form
of direct exposure between the traditional and shadow banking sectors.
Fact 3. Spreads between private debt securities and Treasury bonds increased sharply during
the crisis. Securities with higher perceived risk experienced greater increases in spreads.
Figure 3.3 shows the evolution of yield spreads between corporate bonds (grouped according
to their credit rating) and Treasury bonds of comparable maturity. It is notable that spreads
68It is notable that shadow banks holdings of debt securities peaked in 2008Q3 nearly a year after the
contraction in ABCP. One explanation is that shadow banks nearing bankruptcy prioritized the sale of liquid
assets while increasing their exposure to higher yield mortgage-backed securities in a gamble for resurrection.
See e.g. Ari (2017) for a model where banks facing adverse funding conditions and high aggregate risk nd it
optimal to behave in this manner.
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Figure 3.3: Spreads on corporate bonds
Note: Shaded areas indicate US recessions. AAA (BBB) refers to the spread between Moodys Seasoned
Aaa (Baa) Corporate Bond and Treasury bonds with 10-year maturity (constant). CCC or below refers
to the option-adjusted spread between the Bank of America Merrill Lynch US Corporate C Index and a
spot Treasury curve.
Source: Moodys Investor Services, Bank of America Merrill Lynch
peaked in the last quarter of 2008, coinciding with the liquidation of shadow bank assets.
Although there was a sharp rise in spreads for every rating category, the increase was greater
for lower-rated corporate bonds.
Our model generates changes in secondary market prices that are consistent with these
movements in spreads. When there is cash-in-the-market pricing, the liquidation of shadow
bank portfolios causes a re-sale and (illiquid) assets trade at a signicant discount. Portfolio
re-allocation by traditional banks from risky to safe and liquid assets also contributes to the
re-sale. We provide evidence for and further discuss portfolio re-allocation under Fact 4.
Fact 4. Traditional banks re-allocated their portfolios toward safe and liquid assets and were
able to increase their liabilities. At the same time, they faced a rise in their funding costs.
Panel A of Figure 3.4 shows that traditional banks increased their liabilities during the
crisis. Although the increase in liabilities was driven by Federal Reserve funding and a rise
in deposits protected by deposit insurance guarantees, there was also no decline in large time
deposits. Since large time deposits are neither checkable, nor insured, the implication is that
traditional banks were perceived to be safe enough to preclude withdrawals even in the absence
of government guarantees.
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Figure 3.4: Traditional banks during the crisis
Note: Shaded areas indicate US recessions. Traditional banks refers to "large domestically chartered
commercial banks" which are dened as the top 25 domestically chartered commercial banks, ranked
by domestic assets. Cash assets and govenment securities include vaullt cash, cash items in process of
collection, balances due from depository institutions and Federal Reserve Banks, and liabilities of the U.S.
government, U.S. government agencies and U.S. government-sponsored enterprises. The TED spread is
calculated as the spread between LIBOR based on US dollars and Treasury Bills. Certicate of deposit
and commercial paper spreads are between the secondary market rates of these securities and the E¤ective
Federal Funds Rate. All spreads refer to 3 month maturities.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Changes in traditional bank portfolios shown in Panel B lend further support to this in-
terpretation. During the crisis, traditional banks re-allocated their portfolios from bank credit
(which is risky and illiquid) to cash assets and government securities (which are liquid and
safe). Mortgage-backed securities that were at the epicenter of the nancial crisis accounted
for only 12% of total assets and this did not change signicantly over the crisis.
It is important to note, however, that while traditional banks did not experience a dry-up
in funding, there was a signicant increase in their funding costs. Panel C shows that the
TED spread (for interbank loans) increased to 200 basis points in December 2007 and 335 basis
points in October 2008. The spreads on certicates of deposits and commercial papers also
increased signicantly.
In the following sections, we show that the interaction between market discipline and liq-
uidity risk may account for these observations. In our framework, market discipline stems
from the threat of early withdrawal by depositors. To avoid an early withdrawal, traditional
banks commit to a minimum recovery rate on deposits which we refer to as a no-withdrawal
constraintand respond to bad news by re-allocating their portfolios towards safe assets.
The re-sale discussed under Fact 3 interacts with this mechanism through two distinct
transmission channels. First, since risky assets are discounted to a greater extent than safe
assets, it reduces traditional banks capacity for portfolio re-allocation. To satisfy the no-
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withdrawal constraint, traditional banks are then forced to reduce their risky asset holdings ex-
ante. This creates an excess return that increases the expected payo¤associated with traditional
banking. As the extent of the re-sale is proportionate to the size of the shadow banking sector,
equilibrium is achieved through this mechanism. In the next section, we analyze this mechanism
and the properties of the equilibrium in a simple model without liquidity risk.
Second, the re-sale leaves traditional banks illiquid. This drives a wedge between solvency
and liquidity, leaving traditional banks vulnerable to self-fullling bank-runs as per Diamond
and Dybvig (1983). In Sections 3.4 and 3.5, we extend the simple model to allow for liquidity risk
(i.e. the possibility of bank-runs) and show that this undermines market discipline on traditional
banks: Depositors demand higher interest rates to compensate for liquidity (bank-run) risk,
generating a rise in deposit rates similar to Panel C. Higher deposit rates in turn weaken the
threat of early withdrawal, bringing about a relaxation in the no-withdrawal constraint and
greater risk-taking by traditional banks. In equilibrium, the shadow banking sector causes
nancial instability through this mechanism.
3.3 A simple model
We consider a nancial economy populated by four agents: households, banks, entrepreneurs,
and outside investors. Events unfold over three time periods (see Figure 3.5 for a graphical
timeline). In the rst period, banks collect deposits from households and invest in (safe and
liquid) cash and (risky and illiquid) assets originated by entrepreneurs.69
The second period begins with a public news signal that leads to a revision of expected asset
returns. With probability q, the signal harbors bad news leading to a decline in expected
asset returns. After observing the signal, households decide whether to withdraw their deposits
early and banks trade assets with outside investors in a secondary market.
In the third period, assets yield a high or low payo¤ contingent on economic fundamen-
tals. Following bad news in the second period, fundamentals may turn out to be weak with
(conditional) probability p, leading to a low payo¤ from assets. Depending on their investment
strategy, banks may then be left with insu¢ cient funds to pay the promised return to their de-
positors. In this case, they become insolvent under limited liability and a haircut proportionate
to their funding shortfall is imposed on deposits.70
The key friction in the model is costly commitment. Specically, we assume that banks
cannot credibly commit to a safe investment strategy unless they pay a commitment cost
69In Section 3.4, we also introduce a safe but illiquid asset.
70Fundamentals turn out to be strong with certainty after good news (which takes place with probability
(1  q)) and with (conditional) probability (1  p) after bad news. In this case, assets yield a high payo¤ and
banks are solvent.
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Figure 3.5: Timeline
 > 0.71 Due to this friction, ex-ante identical banks optimally cluster into two distinct groups
according to their investment strategies. An endogenous share  2 [0; 1] of banks do not pay
the commitment cost and follow a shadow banking strategy that entails high risk-taking.
Following bad news, households optimally withdraw their deposits from shadow banks due
to concerns about their solvency prospects. Shadow bank assets are then liquidated in the
secondary market at an endogenous re-sale discount and depositors receive the liquidation
value. The remaining banks pay the cost  to credibly commit to a portfolio that is safe
enough to prevent an early withdrawal. We refer to this as a traditional bankingstrategy.
It is important to note that early withdrawals are distinct from self-fullling (Diamond-
Dybvig) bank-runs, as they are an optimal response to a change in bankssolvency prospects
rather than a consequence of strategic complementarities across households. In other words,
an early withdrawal takes place when households nd it optimal to withdraw their deposits
71We do not explicitly model the underlying principal-agent problem between banks and their depositors but
provide two motivating examples. First, bank balance sheets may not be fully transparent. The commitment
cost would then reect any costly action taken by banks to increase transparency such as abiding by reporting
requirements or foregoing opaque intermediation processes such as securitization. Second, limited enforcement
of contracts may allows banks to revise their investment strategies after collecting deposits. The commitment
cost could then be in the form of issuing costly equity with voting rights.
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regardless of the extent of withdrawals by other households.
Before explaining these activities in detail, we briey describe some notational conventions.
Table 3.1 provides a list of variables and parameters. We denote variables that pertain to
a shadow (traditional) banking strategy with a superscript SB(TB). Deposits, cash and
(risky) assets are respectively labelled as (D;M; I). To distinguish between deposits per bank
and per household, we denote the latter as d in lower case. The e¤ective return from deposits is
contingent on solvency and the time of withdrawal. Upon maturity in the third period, deposits
pay an interest rate R when the bank is solvent and a recovery rate V otherwise. When they
are withdrawn early, deposits pay a liquidation value . Asset prices in the rst and second
period are labelled as (P1; P2). In period 3, assets yield a payo¤ h when fundamentals are
strong and l otherwise. We simplify notation by normalizing the risk-free rate to R = 1 and
the unconditional expectation of asset payo¤s to unity such that72
(1  qp)h + qpl = 1 (3.1)
3.3.1 Agents and their optimal strategies
3.3.1.1 Entrepreneurs
In the rst period, each bank has access to a separate but ex-ante identical island of entrepre-
neurs which use capital K to produce assets I1 with a Cobb-Douglas production technology
I1 = AK
 (3.2)
where A > 0 is a productivity parameter and  2 (0; 1) is the standard Cobb-Douglas elasticity.
The representative entrepreneurs problem can be written as
max
I1;K
P1I1  K
subject to the production technology (3.2) where P1 is the asset price.73 This yields a rst
order condition that can be interpreted as an upward-sloping asset supply schedule
P1 =
1
A
1

I
1 

1 (3.3)
Due to relationship lending frictions, banks may only purchase assets from entrepreneurs
72Note that assets may still have a return above unity since (P1; P2) are endogenous.
73We normalize the rental rate of capital to unity.
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Table 3.1: Notation
Variables
Label Description
D Deposits (per bank)
d Deposits (per household)
I Assets
M Cash
R Interest rate on deposits
K Capital
P1; P2 Asset priceseI Excess supply in secondary marketeK Outside project
 Fire-sale discount
 Liquidation value
V Recovery rate
 Bank prots
 Share of shadow banks
C Consumption
Parameters
Label Description
q Prob. of bad news
p Prob. of weak fundamentals
h; l Asset payo¤s
A Productivity
 Cobb-Douglas elasticity
R Risk-free rate
E Household endowmenteE Outside investor endowment
 Commitment cost
in their own island.74 ;75 This also constitutes a barrier to entry that gives banks market power
over entrepreneurs, allowing them to extract a mark-up
@P1
@I1
I1
P1
=  > 0
In the interest of tractability, we do not explicitly model the bargaining process between banks
and entrepreneurs but restrict the mark-up to
    (1  q) (h   1)
1  (1  q)h (3.4)
This restriction only serves to simplify the banks problem in Section 3.3.1.4 and we show in
Appendix C4.2 that it can be relaxed without altering the properties of the equilibrium solution.
74Implicitly, we assume that entrepreneurs may costlessly produce a pseudo-asset that pays zero return and
banks may only monitor entrepreneurs in their own island. The same friction also bars households from investing
directly in assets.
75We also assume that banks may only trade assets in the second period. Therefore, the asset price P1 is
specic to each bank and is best interpreted as the cost of origination rather than the price of a tradable asset.
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3.3.1.2 Secondary market and outside investors
In the second period, banks and outside investors trade assets in a secondary market. First,
we consider the case after good news. Since assets yield a high payo¤ h with certainty after
good news, there are no early withdrawals. Secondary markets then clear without a re-sale at
a price h. Whilst trade may take place, the pricing of assets at their expected payo¤ ensures
that it is completely inconsequential to the equilibrium allocation. Therefore, we abuse notation
slightly by using the subscript 2 to denote variables after bad news throughout the chapter.
Following bad news, the liquidation of shadow banks and portfolio re-allocation by tradi-
tional banks leads to an excess supply of assets
eI = ISB1 + (1  )  ITB1   ITB2  > 0
where  is the share of shadow banks within the banking sector, ISB1 is shadow bank assets,
and the second term represents the net sale of assets by traditional banks. Outside investors
with a lower valuation for assets then become the marginal buyers and the secondary market
price is given by
P2 =  [(1  p)h + pl]
where the re-sale discount  2 [0; 1] adjusts to clear markets and the term in brackets is the
expected payo¤ conditional on bad news.
Our set up for outside investors is based on Stein (2012). Outside investors begin the
second period with an endowment eE and allocate their funds between asset purchases in the
secondary market and an outside project eK that yields a safe payo¤ g  eK where g0 (:) > 0,
g00 (:) < 0. Their rst order condition equates the expected return between the two investment
opportunities and yields an implicit expression for the market-clearing re-sale discount.
 =
1
g0
 eE    [(1  p)h + pl] eI (3.5)
Without loss of generality, we can write this as  = f
eI where f (:) is a continuous and
decreasing function.
We restrict the re-sale discount to values within the range  2  ;  by imposing the
following restrictions on f (:) (and hence on eE and g (:))
 < f
 
(A)
1
1 

(1  q) h
1 + 
+ ql
 
1 
!
<  (3.6)
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where
  l
(1  p)h + pl  0
  min
"
1;
(1  q) h
1+
+ ql
(1  p)h + pl
#
> 
The upper bound of this restriction ensures that the re-sale deepens as the shadow banking
sector grows, and is necessary for bringing about an interior equilibrium where shadow and
traditional banks coexist.76 The lower bound, on the other hand, only serves to simplify our
exposition by eliminating the possibility of an (interior) equilibrium case with slightly di¤erent
properties to the one we describe in Section 3.3.2. We discuss the consequences of relaxing the
lower bound restriction in Appendix C5.
3.3.1.3 Households
There is a unit continuum of risk neutral households which derive utility only from nal period
consumption, making their utility maximization problem equivalent to maximizing expected
consumption77
E [C] = (1  q)Cgh + q (1  p)Cbh + qpCbl (3.7)
where (Cgh; Cbh; Cbl) are respectively consumption under good news and bad news with high
and low payo¤ from assets. In the rst period, households allocate their endowment E between
deposits in traditional and shadow banks
 
dTB; dSB

and cash M1 which transfers funds to the
next period at zero net return. The rst period budget constraint is
dSB + dTB +M1 = E (3.8)
When the second period begins with good news, there are no withdrawals and households
simply retain their cash holdings M1. In the third period, consumption is then given by
Cgh = M1 + d
TBRTB + dSBRSB (3.9)
where
 
RTB; RSB

represent the deposit interest rates at traditional and shadow banks.
Following bad news, on the other hand, households observe the decline in expected asset
returns and decide whether to withdraw their deposits early. Before we consider this decision,
we solve the households optimization problem in the rst period taking it as given that only
76See Section 3.3.2 for a formal denition.
77These assumptions only serve to simplify the exposition. Our ndings remain the same under risk aversion
and period-by-period discounting.
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shadow banks face an early withdrawal. The second period budget constraint under bad news
can then be written as
M2 = M1 + 
SBdSB (3.10)
where SB is the liquidation value of shadow bank portfolios. In the third period, traditional
banks may be rendered insolvent by a low payo¤ from assets. Therefore, consumption is
contingent on asset payo¤s
Cbh = M2 + d
TBRTB (3.11)
Cbl = M2 + V d
TBRTB (3.12)
with V representing the recovery rate of traditional bank deposits.78
The representative household chooses

dTB; dSB;M1;M2
	
to maximize its expected con-
sumption (3.7) subject to (3.8)-(3.12). The rst order conditions yield the following expressions
for interest rates
RTB = 1 +
qp (1  V )
1  qp (1  V ) (3.13)
RSB = 1 +
q
1  q
 
1  SB (3.14)
Observe that the interest rate on traditional bank deposits decreases with a rise in the recovery
rate V , while that of shadow banks decreases with a higher liquidation value SB. Traditional
banks may borrow at the risk-free rate RTB = 1 when they guarantee a complete repayment of
deposits V = 1 while shadow banks must be completely liquid with SB = 1.
Early withdrawal decision and market discipline
Following bad news, it is optimal for households to withdraw their deposits when doing so
increases their expected consumption (1  p) cbh + pcbl conditional on bad news. Proposition
3.1 describes the outcome of the early withdrawal decision.
Proposition 3.1 For all  > , it is optimal for households to withdraw their deposits from
shadow banks after bad news. Traditional banks may avoid an early withdrawal by committing
to a minimum recovery rate
V  V  1
p

1
RTB
  (1  p)

(3.15)
78The liquidation value SB and recovery rate V are endogenous and depend on the investment strategy of
traditional and shadow banks. We elaborate further on this in Section 3.3.1.4.
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In equilibrium, the recovery rate and interest rates on traditional bank deposits are given by
V = RTB = 1 (3.16)
Proof. Provided in Appendix C1
Note that (3.15) establishes a no-withdrawal constraint for traditional banks. This con-
straint is the key di¤erence between shadow and traditional banking strategies, and generates
similar behaviour to the observations discussed under Fact 4. To satisfy this constraint, tradi-
tional banks react to bad news by re-allocating their portfolio from risky to safe assets.
The proposition also shows that the no-withdrawal constraint imposes market discipline on
traditional banks, eliminating insolvency risk and reducing their funding costs to the risk-free
rate. This is the outcome of a virtuous cycle between deposit rates RTB and the minimum
recovery rate V . As traditional banks guarantee a minimum recovery rate, households demand
less compensation for insolvency risk and deposit rates decrease as per (3.13). Lower deposit
rates in turn strengthen the threat of early withdrawal as households stand to lose less in terms
of interest foregone. Therefore, the minimum recovery rate V increases until all solvency risk
is eliminated in equilibrium.
It is important to note that this result is contingent on the lack of liquidity risk. In Section
3.4, we show that even a small risk of a (Diamond-Dybvig) bank run on traditional banks
reverses this virtuous cycle, leading to a rise in insolvency risk and funding costs.
3.3.1.4 Banks
There is a unit continuum of ex-ante identical, risk neutral banks. In the rst period, banks
collect deposits D from households and purchase assets I1 from entrepreneurs at price P1 as
well as holding cash M1. Their rst period budget constraint can then be written as
P1I1 +M1 = D (3.17)
In the second period, banks trade assets in the secondary market. As discussed in Section
3.3.1.2, following good news, assets are priced at their expected payo¤ in the secondary market
and trade is inconsequential. Bank prots (in the third period) are given by
gh = hI1 +M1  DR
Following bad news, banks that are subject to an early withdrawal have a liquidation value
 = min

1;
P2I2 +M2
D

(3.18)
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and those that are not face the second period budget constraint
P2I2 +M2 = P2I1 +M1 (3.19)
Observe that a re-sale reduces the liquidation value as well as the maximum cash M2 banks
may attain through portfolio re-allocation. When assets yield a high payo¤ h in the third
period, banks make a prot
bh = hI2 +M2  DR
while limited liability binds under a low asset payo¤ l.79 Under limited liability, banks make
zero prots and deposits pay a recovery rate
V = min

1;
lI2 +M2
DR

(3.20)
which is proportional to the shortfall of funds.
The commitment cost  > 0 creates a discontinuity in the optimization problem of banks
such that it can be evaluated as a choice between two distinct investment strategies. Under
a shadow banking strategy (labelled as SB), banks do not pay the commitment cost and
anticipate an early withdrawal after bad news. Under a traditional banking strategy (labelled
as TB), banks pay the cost  and commit to satisfying the no-withdrawal constraint (3.15).
We nd it convenient to to write the no-withdrawal constraint in terms of the choice variables
by combining (3.15) and (3.20).80
lI
TB
2 +M
TB
2  V DTBRTB (3.21)
In the rst period, banks adopt the strategy that leads to the highest expected payo¤ such
that shadow banking is preferred when
E

SB
  E TB   (3.22)
where E

SB

and E

TB

are the expected payo¤s associated with shadow and traditional
banking. Below, we solve the optimization problem under each strategy and attain an expression
for expected payo¤s by combining banksrst order conditions with those of households from
Section 3.3.1.3. In doing so, we take the secondary market price P2 as given.
79See Appendix C2 for the relevant proof.
80To simplify the exposition, we treat the commitment cost  as a utility cost, thereby omitting it from the
no-withdrawal and budget constraints. Since  is small relative to total bank assets, its inclusion would have a
negligible impact on the equilibrium outcome.
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Shadow banking
Shadow banks choose

ISB1 ;M
SB
1 ; D
SB
	
to maximize their expected prots
E

SB

= (1  q)  hISB1 +MSB1  DSBRSB (3.23)
subject to the budget constraint (3.17). Since limited liability binds after an early withdrawal,
shadow banks only internalize the payo¤ after good news. Lemma 3.1 provides the solution the
shadow banks problem. It shows that, even without a re-sale, shadow bank deposits are not
paid in full during an early withdrawal (SB < 1) and funding costs of shadow banks are above
the risk free rate (RSB > 1) as a consequence.
Lemma 3.1 Combining the solution to the shadow banks problem given by (C51) and (C52)
with the household rst order condition (3.14) yields the following expressions for
 
SB; RSB; E

SB

; ISB1

SB =
(1 + )P2
(1  q)h + q (1 + )P2 < 1 8  2 [0; 1]
RSB =
h
(1  q)h + q (1 + )P2 > 1 8  2 [0; 1]
E

SB

= (1  q) 
1 + 
hI
SB
1
ISB1 = (A
)
1
1 

(1  q) h
1 + 
+ qP2
 
1 
Proof. Provided in Appendix C3
Figure 3.6 provides a graphical representation of the shadow banking strategy. The red line
depicts banksdemand for deposits, which is inversely related to the asset price P1. As deposits
are used to purchase risky assets I1, its downward slope reects the positive relationship between
I1 and P1 given by the asset supply schedule (3.3). The blue line depicts the supply of deposits
by households. It is horizontal at the risk-free rate R = 1 when there is no early withdrawal or
 = 1, but becomes upward sloping when a rise in P1 reduces the liquidation value  and drives
households to require a higher interest rate in compensation as per (3.14). Under a shadow
banking strategy, banks optimally invest up to the intersection of these two curves where the
funding costs exceed the risk-free rate.
Traditional banking
Traditional banks choose

ITB1 ; I
TB
2 ;M
TB
1 ;M
TB
2 ; D
SB
	
to maximize their expected prots
E

TB

= (1  q)  hITB1 +MSB1 + q (1  p)  hITB2 +MTB2   (1  qp)DTBRTB
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Figure 3.6: Shadow banking strategy
Note: The deposit demand curve is attained by combining (3.3)
and (3.17). Deposit supply stems from (3.14) and (C51).
subject to the budget constraints (3.17), (3.19) and the no-withdrawal constraint (3.21).81
Lemma 3.2 provides the solution to the traditional banks problem.82 It shows that, following
bad news, traditional banks liquidate their risky asset holdings in the secondary market and
re-allocate their portfolio toward cash to satisfy the no-withdrawal constraint.83 Since the
terms of trade between risky assets and cash depend on the secondary market price P2, the
no-withdrawal constraint also reduces banksrisky asset purchases I1 in period 1 in line with P2.
Since the funding costs of traditional banks remain at the risk-free rate
 
RTB = 1

, this creates
an excess return that contributes to traditional bank prots (see Figure 3.7 for a graphical
representation).
Lemma 3.2 Under the restrictions   ,  > , the solution to the traditional banks problem
81Due to limited liability, traditional banks do not internalize the state with low payo¤ from assets.
82The indeterminacy of MTB1 is due to two reasons. First, it does not contribute towards the no-withdrawal
constraint, since each extra unit of cash corresponds to an extra unit of deposit. Second, the no-withdrawal
constraint also prevents banks from converting cash to risky assets after bad news such that bank prots are
not a¤ected by MTB1 .
83The complete liquidation of risky assets
 
ITB2 = 0

and the equivalence between rst and second period
asset prices
 
PTB1 = P2

are due to the simplifying restrictions we have made in the interest of tractability. In
Section 3.5, we show that the mechanism remains intact in a richer model which generates positive risky asset
holdings after the sell-o¤ and PTB1 > P2.
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Figure 3.7: Traditional banking strategy
Note: The deposit demand curve is attained by combining (3.3)
and (3.17). Deposit supply stems from (3.14) and (C51). The
no-withdrawal constraint is given by (3.21), (3.24), and (3.25).
is
ITB1 = (A
)
1
1  P

1 
2
ITB2 = 0 (3.24)
MTB2 = P2I
TB
1 +M
TB
1 (3.25)
E

TB

= (1  q) (h   P2) ITB1
where MTB1  0 is indeterminate,
 
RTB; V

are given by (3.16), and
@E

TB

@P2
< 0 8 P2 > h
Proof. Provided in Appendix C4.
3.3.2 Equilibrium
We solve for a rational expectations equilibrium such that all optimality conditions and con-
straints of banks, households, entrepreneurs and outside investors are satised, expectations
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are conrmed, and deposit and secondary markets clear such that
DSB = dSB
(1  )DTB = dTB
 = f
 
ISB1 + (1  )
 
ITB1   ITB2

where  2 [0; 1] is the share of banks that adopt a shadow banking strategy.
Furthermore, an equilibrium is characterized as interiorwhen traditional and shadow banks
coexist such that  falls within the range 0 <  < 1 . In an interior equilibrium, banks
are indi¤erent between shadow and traditional banking strategies such that (3.22) holds with
equality
E

SB

= E

TB
   (3.26)
and may be interpreted as a free entry condition that determines  in equilibrium.
We proceed as follows in our description of the equilibrium solution: Section 3.3.2.1 builds
up on the intuition provided about bank strategies above by discussing their interaction with
re-sales. We focus on re-sales due to their role in creating strategic substitutabilities in banks
decision to enter shadow banking, which is crucial for bringing about an interior equilibrium.
Section 3.3.2.2 then provides the conditions under which an interior equilibrium arises and
discusses the implications of a rise in the costs of commitment and a deepening of secondary
markets.
3.3.2.1 Fire-sales and bank strategies
There is a two-way interaction between re-sales and bank strategies. On the one hand, entry
into shadow banking increases the excess supply of assets in the secondary market and exac-
erbates re-sales.84 On the other hand, re-sales reduce the expected payo¤ from a shadow
banking strategy relative to traditional banking and deter entry into the shadow banking sector.
Figure 3.8 demonstrates the mechanism behind this. As shown in Panel A, a fall in the
secondary market price P2 reduces shadow banksliquidation value during an early withdrawal.
This leads to an upward pivot in the deposit supply curve, raising shadow banksfunding costs
and reducing the expected payo¤ from shadow banking.
In contrast, a fall in P2 leads to a rise in the expected payo¤ from traditional banking.85 This
is because it worsens the terms of trade between risky assets and cash after bad news, tightening
the no-withdrawal constraint. As shown in Panel B, an inward shift in the constraint forces
84We use the phrases adopting a shadow banking strategyand entry into shadow bankinginterchangably.
85Strictly speaking, Lemma 3.2 indicates that a rise in prots occurs only in the region P2 > h. This
reects two conicting e¤ects on traditional bank prots: a rise in the return from risky asset purchases in
period 1 versus a fall in the quantity purchased. For P2 > h, the former e¤ect dominates and prots rise.
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Figure 3.8: Fall in the secondary market price
Note: The deposit demand curve is attained by combining (3.3) and (3.17). Deposit supply stems from
(3.14) and (C51). The no-withdrawal constraint is given by (3.21), (3.24), and (3.25).
traditional banks to reduce investment I1 in risky assets in the rst period. Since traditional
banksfunding costs remain at the risk-free rate, this increases the excess return and expected
payo¤ from traditional banking.
These interactions constitute a re-sale externality since banks do not internalize the im-
pact of their entry into shadow banking on the protability of other banks. Moreover, since
protability a¤ects entry incentives, re-sale externalities create strategic substitutabilities in
banksdecisions to adopt a shadow banking strategy. As the shadow banking sector grows,
the re-sale discount on risky assets gets larger (i.e.  falls), reducing the payo¤ from shadow
banking relative to traditional banking until we reach an equilibrium sector size where banks
are indi¤erent between the two strategies.
3.3.2.2 Interior equilibrium
Proposition 3.2 provides the conditions for an interior equilibrium. It shows that there will be
an interior equilibrium when commitment costs fall within the range  2 ( ; ).
Proposition 3.2 There is an interior equilibrium under the parameter restrictions   ,
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 2  ; ,  < 0:5, p < 1   and  2 ( ; ) where
 
8>>>><>>>>:


h 1
q

1 (1 q)h
q
 
1    
1+
h

1  
1+
(1  q)h
 
1 

for  < (p q)(h 1)
qp(1 q)h (p q)(h 1)

 
h    [(1  p)h + pl]
  
 [(1  p)h + pl]
 
1 
  h
1+

(1  q) h
1+
+ q [(1  p)h + pl]
 
1  otherwise
 
8>><>>:
 (h)
1
1 

(1  ) 1    
1+

1 q
1+
+ q
 
1 

for h  11 qp(1 )


h 1
qp

1 (1 qp)h
pq
 
1    
1+
h

(1  q) h
1+
+ 1 (1 qp)h
p
 
1 

otherwise
such that   (1  q) (A) 11  ,  >  > 0.
Proof. Provided in Appendix C6
Finally, we briey discuss the properties of this equilibrium. In an interior equilibrium,
the free entry condition (3.26) pins down the size of the shadow banking sector  and re-sale
discount  through the interactions described in Section 3.3.2.1. Figure 3.9 illuminates the
mechanism behind this by demonstrating the comparative statics of a rise in the commitment
cost and a deepening of secondary markets under a numerical example.
Observe that the expected payo¤schedule for traditional (shadow) banking is upward (down-
ward) sloping in  in line with the intuition from Section 3.3.2.1. The equilibrium share of
shadow banks is at the point where these two schedules intersect as per (3.26). We also plot
this as a vertical bar along with the re-sale schedule in order to deduce the equilibrium re-sale
discount.
Panel A shows that a rise in the cost of commitment  causes a downward shift in the
expected payo¤ schedule for traditional banking. At a given sector size , this makes shadow
banking relatively protable and leads to further entry into the sector. This in turn increases
the excess supply of assets in the secondary market following bad news and exacerbates the
re-sale. Therefore, in equilibrium, a rise in the commitment cost increases the size of the
shadow banking sector and the vulnerability of the economy to re-sales.
Panel B shows the e¤ects of an increase in the liquidity available in the secondary market
due to a rise in the endowment of outside investors. At any given sector size , this reduces
the re-sale discount (i.e. a rise in ) bringing about an upward shift in the re-sale schedule.
Consequently, the expected payo¤ schedule for traditional (shadow) banking shifts down (up)
in line with Section 3.3.2.1, and there is entry into shadow banking until the new schedules
intersect at a larger sector size.
It is important to note that the re-sale discount returns to its initial value at the new equi-
librium. As such, a thicker secondary market for assets increases the size of the shadow banking
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Figure 3.9: Numerical example
Note: The numerical example correponds to the calibration A = 1;  = 1=3; q = p = l = 1=2;  = ; and
 = 0:0825. We parameterize the re-sale function f (:) according to Appendix C8 and calibrate eE to get
 as a lower bound and set  = 10 ((1  p)h + pl) 1. Panel A and B respectively display the e¤ects of
a small rise in  and eE.
sector but does not alleviate the re-sale. This nding stems from an essential property of the
interior equilibrium: the re-sale discount is implicitly determined by the free entry condition
(3.26). Note that these results also apply to policy interventions aimed at alleviating re-sales
such as asset purchases and bailouts of nancial institutions that would have contributed to
the excess supply of assets. We analyze policy interventions in greater detail in Section 3.6.
3.4 A model with liquidity risk
In this section, we extend the simple model to a setting with liquidity risk and a richer asset
space. We introduce liquidity risk by allowing for the possibility of bank-runs as in Diamond
and Dybvig (1983). Bank-runs are distinct from early withdrawals in that they are driven by
self-fullling expectations in the presence of a liquidity shortfall ( < 1) in bank balance sheets,
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rather than an optimal response to bad news.
We also expand the asset space to allow for three di¤erent asset types, liquid, safe, and
risky, which we respectively denote with (; s; r). The risky asset is identical to the (non-cash)
asset in the simple model. The safe and liquid assets both yield a unit payo¤ with certainty,
but they di¤er in that the safe asset matures in period 3 while the liquid asset yields its payo¤
in period 2.
The richer asset space serves two purposes. First, it allows us to consider the conditions
under which safe assets are endogenously liquid due to secondary markets. A priori, it is not
clear whether safe assets would be subject to a re-sale since purchases by traditional banks
(which re-allocate their portfolios towards safe assets) may o¤set sales by shadow banks.
Second, a richer asset space permits us to consider the interplay between re-sales, market
discipline, and liquidity risk. On the one hand, without a re-sale on safe assets, portfolio
re-allocation required to satisfy the no-withdrawal constraint increases traditional banksliq-
uidation values (TB = 1) and reduces their vulnerability to bank-runs. On the other hand,
when there is a re-sale on safe assets, liquidity risk leads to a rise in bank funding costs and
undermines market discipline such that traditional banks may also take on solvency risk.
In the interest of brevity, we only describe the aspects of the model that di¤er from Section
3.3.86 The remainder of the section is organized as follows: Section 3.4.1 provides further
details about bank-runs. Section 3.4.2 extends secondary markets and outside investors to a
framework with multiple assets. Finally, Section 3.4.3 presents analytical results pertaining to
the relationship between the re-sale on safe assets, market discipline, and liquidity risk.
3.4.1 Bank-runs
When a bank has a liquidity shortfall  < 1, sequential service in withdrawals leads to the
emergence of a bank-run equilibriumwhere households nd it optimal to withdraw their deposits
given that everyone else is withdrawing. We resolve this multiplicity with the use of sunspots.
Specically, we let " be be a random variable drawn from a uniform distribution on the unit
interval at the beginning of period 2 and  2 [0; 1] a constant threshold. When "  ,
household sentiments coordinate on a bank-run. Provided that there is a liquidity shortfall,
these sentiments become self-fullling and the bank su¤ers from a run. Since " is uniformly
distributed on a unit interval, the probability of a bank run is then simply given by
 =
8<: 0 for  = 1 for  < 1
86See Appendix C9 for a complete specication of the model.
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Only traditional banks are a¤ected by bank-runs as there is no liquidity shortfall after good
news and shadow banks face an early withdrawal after bad news.87 Moreover, we assume that
the sunspot realization is idiosyncratic to each bank such that  may be interpreted as the
share of traditional banks liquidated in a bank-run.88
Finally, note that it is straightforward to introduce a more sophisticated specication for
the bank-run probability. We adopt this simple framework as it permits us to isolate the role
of banksportfolio strategies and re-sales in bringing about a liquidity shortfall in the rst
place. In Appendix C10, we approximate the global games solution of Goldstein and Pauzner
(2005) by depicting  as a negative function of the liquidation value . The qualitative results
from our mechanism remain the same.
3.4.2 Secondary market
We extend the secondary market described in Section 3.3.1.2 to a framework with multiple
assets. Since the liquid asset yields its payo¤ in period 2, only safe and risky assets are traded
in the secondary market. The excess supply of each asset is given by the expressions
eI (i) = ISB1 (i) + (1  )  ITB1 (i)  (1  ) ITB2 (i)  0 8 i 2 fs; rg
and sold to a common set of risk neutral outside investors.
Outside investors allocate their endowment eE between purchases of safe and risky assets
and an outside project eK that yields a safe payo¤ g  eK where g0 (:) > 0, g00 (:) < 0. Their
rst order conditions indicate that there is a common re-sale discount  2 [0; 1] for the two
assets, and it is dened implicitly by the expression
 =
1
g0
 eE    [(1  p)h + pl] eI (r)  eI (s) (3.27)
which suggests that a rise in the total excess supply of safe and risky assets leads to a decrease
in . Crucially, however, an asset type is only subject to the re-sale discount when it is in
excess supply such that its marginal buyer is an outside investor. Therefore, secondary market
87To be precise, we assume that early withdrawals and bank-runs take place simultaneously so that there is
no need to consider the bank run equilibrium for shadow banks.
88This assumption streamlines the exposition by preventing the outcome in the second period from diverging
between bank-run and no bank-run. With an aggregate sunspot, uncertainty would immediately be resolved
in the bank-run equilibrium. The non-bank run equilibrium would only di¤er from the equilibrium considered
here in that the excess supply of assets in the secondary market would be somewhat lower.
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prices depend on an assets own excess supply such that
P2 (s) =
8<: 1 for eI (s) = 0 otherwise
P2 (r) =
8<: (1  p)h + pl for eI (i)  0 [(1  p)h + pl]] otherwise
3.4.3 Analytical results
Proposition 3.3 shows that the re-sale on safe assets plays a denitive role in shaping the
relationship between market discipline and liquidity risk.
Proposition 3.3 In equilibrium, traditional banks commit to a minimum recovery rate
V = 1  q
p

 
1  TB
1  q  1    1  TB (3.28)
and the interest rate on their deposits is given by
RTB = 1 +
q
1  q 
 
1  TB (3.29)
With P2 (s) = 1, traditional banks have a liquidation value 
TB = 1. This leads to  = 0 and
(3.28), (3.29) yield
V = RTB = 1
With su¢ ciently low P2 (s) < 1, traditional banks have a liquidity shortfall 
TB < 1 which leads
to  > 0. (3.28), (3.29) then yield
V < 1 < RTB
Proof. Provided in Appendix C7
When there is no re-sale on safe assets such that P2 (s) = 1, satisfying the no-withdrawal
constraint
lI
TB
2 (r) + I
TB
2 (s)  V RTBDTB (3.30)
leads to a liquidation value
TB = min

1;
P2 (r) I
TB
2 (r) + P2 (s) I
TB
2 (s)
DTB

= 1 (3.31)
since risky assets never trade at a price below their payo¤ under weak fundamentals (P2 (r) 
l). This in turn eliminates the possibility of bank-runs such that  = 0. Without liquidity
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risk, market discipline through the threat of an early withdrawal ensures that there is also no
solvency risk (V = 1) and traditional banks collect deposits at the risk-free rate as in Section
3.3.1.3.
With a su¢ ciently large re-sale on safe assets, on the other hand, traditional banks have
a liquidity shortfall (TB < 1) despite satisfying the no-withdrawal constraint. This leaves
traditional banks vulnerable to bank-runs and creates a vicious cycle between rising deposit
interest rates and solvency risk. Households anticipate that they may not be repaid fully in the
event of a bank run and demand higher deposit rates as compensation. The rise in deposit rates
in turn weakens the threat of early withdrawal as households stand to lose more in terms of
interest foregone. This leads to a decline in the minimum recovery rate V , allowing traditional
banks to take on solvency risk. Finally, the increase in solvency risk brings about a further rise
in deposit rates and completes the vicious cycle.
In the next section, we present numerical results that highlight the role of a large shadow
banking sector in causing a re-sale on safe assets, which leaves traditional banks illiquid and
undermines market discipline through the mechanism described above.
3.5 Numerical results
This section provides numerical results from the model with liquidity risk. It proceeds as
follows: Section 3.5.1 describes the calibration which targets the United States over the recent
nancial crisis. Section 3.5.2 presents and discusses the results from a numerical simulation.
3.5.1 Calibration
Table 3.2 reports the calibrated parameters. The payo¤of risky asset under weak fundamentals
is set to l = 0:21 in line with the average recovery rate from junior debt and h is backed
out using the normalization of expected payo¤s given in (3.1).89 The probabilities (q; p) are
calibrated to the frequency of recessions and deep recessions (conditional on a recession) in the
United States.90
Regarding the entrepreneurs, we calibrate the output elasticity of capital to the standard
Cobb-Douglas value  = 1=3 and normalize productivity to A = 1. For the mark-up, we adopt
a parameterization that approximates monopolistic competition
 = 
1  

89Security classes that have less seniority than 70% of total liabilities are dened as junior.
90We use business cycle data from the NBER which covers the period December 1854-June 2017 at a monthly
frequency. We label as deep recessionsthe contractionary episodes of 1873-79 (the Long Depression), 1929-33
(the Great Depression), and 2008-09 (the Great Recession).
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Table 3.2: Calibration
,
Parameter Value Description Source
l 0:21 Low payo¤ from risky assets Moodys Investors Service (2007)
q 0:41 Prob. of bad news NBER
p 0:22 Prob. of weak fundamentals NBER
 0:33 Cobb-Douglas parameter -
A 1:00 Productivity -
 0:18 Mark-up World BankeE 2:80 Outside investor endowment Moodys, Federal Reserve Board
z 10:0 Outside investment parameter Moodys, Federal Reserve Board
 0:15 Bank-run probability Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
 0:11 Commitment cost Financial Stability Board (2017)
where  2 [0; 1] represents banksmarket share. We then calibrate the mark-up to a value
consistent with the 5-bank asset concentration in the United States over 2007-2010.
In the secondary market, we parameterize the payo¤ function for outside investments to
g
 eK = z 1 ln eK where z is a constant such that (3.27) becomes
 =
z eE
1 + z
h
((1  p)h + pl) eI (r) + eI (s)i
Our calibration strategy for
 eE; z targets the rise in the yield spreads between AAA-rated
seasoned corporate bonds and the e¤ective Federal Funds Rate during the nancial crisis.
Specically, we back out a percentage decline in bond prices P^ =P^ from the di¤erence between
the peak spread in November 2008 and the average spread for the pre-crisis period between
January 2016 and June 2017. We then calibrate
 eE; z to generate an equilibrium re-sale
discount that matches the decline in the price of safe assets under bad news to P^ =P^ .91
Similarly, the calibration for the bank-run probability  targets TED spreads at the peak
of the nancial crisis. To do this, we construct a hypothetical interest rate for traditional bank
deposits collected after bad news but before the realization of bank-runs. With risk neutral
households, this is given by
RTB2 =
1
1  
1  TB
1  p  1  V  (3.32)
91Since P1 (s) is bank-specic and best interpreted as origination costs in the absence of rst period asset
trade, our measure for the decline in safe asset prices refers to P2 (s) relative to their expected payo¤ 1.
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and we calibrate  to match RTB2 to the average TED spread in the last quarter of 2008.
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Finally, the calibration for the commitment cost  targets the pre-crisis ratio of shadow
bank assets to total bank assets, which is approximately 63%. Accordingly, we set  = 0:11
which amounts to just below 7% of the value of a traditional banks assets in period 1.
3.5.2 Results
Figure 3.10 plots the numerical solution across a range  2 [0; 1] of shadow banking sector
sizes. The equilibrium sector size is denoted by the vertical bar labelled  where traditional
and shadow banking strategies yield the same expected payo¤. The rst panel of Figure 3.10
indicates that there is a unique and globally stable interior equilibrium where shadow and tra-
ditional banks coexist. This reects the strategic substitutabilities between banking strategies
described in Section 3.3.2.
Entry into shadow banking exacerbates the re-sale after bad news (see Panel 2). This
increases the interest rates on shadow bank deposits (see Panel 4) and reduces the expected
payo¤ from shadow banking. In contrast, traditional bank prots rise as the re-sale increases
the excess return from the binding no-withdrawal constraint. Therefore, the shadow banking
sector grows until banks are indi¤erent between the two strategies at the equilibrium sector
size .
The bar labelled  denotes the threshold sector size above which safe assets su¤er from a
re-sale. Under our calibration, high commitment costs lead to  >  such that there is a
re-sale on safe assets in equilibrium. Panel 3 shows that this reduces the liquidation value
of traditional banks, leaving them vulnerable to bank-runs. As explained in Section 3.4.3,
liquidity risk increases deposit rates RTB (see Panel 4) and undermines market discipline on
traditional banks. Accordingly, Panel 5 shows that the minimum recovery rate V declines below
full repayment for  >  such that traditional banks have insolvency risk in equilibrium.
Note that, with lower commitment costs, the expected payo¤ from traditional banking is
higher at all sector sizes such that we may have a smaller shadow banking sector    in
equilibrium and no re-sale on safe assets.93 Panel 3 shows that traditional banks would then
have no liquidity shortfall and hence no vulnerability to bank-runs. Without liquidity risk,
traditional banks borrow at the risk-free rate and the no-withdrawal constraint imposes market
discipline with V = 1 such that traditional banks have no solvency risk either.
Panel 6 shows the evolution of shadow and traditional bank deposits across . As  rises
and the re-sale deepens, shadow banks respond to the rise in their funding costs by reducing
92See Figure 3.4 for the evolution of TED spreads. We use TED spreads instead of spreads on deposit rates to
exclude the e¤ects of deposit insurance guarantees. Note also that (3.32) is conditional on a liquidity shortfall,
which is the case in equilibrium.
93See Figure 3.9 for the comparative statics of the commitment cost and re-sale discount in the simple model.
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Figure 3.10: Numerical results
Note: Expected payo¤s are inclusive of the commitment cost  . Total assets in period 1 and 2 are respec-
tively dened as I1 
P
i2f;s;rg I1 (i) and I2 
P
i2fs;rg P2 (i) I2 (i). Panel 7 plots
 
ITB2
 1
P2 (s) I
TB
2 (s)   
ITB1
 1P
i2f;sg I
TB
1 (i) for safe and liquid assets, and
 
ITB2
 1
P2 (r) I
TB
2 (r)  
 
ITB1
 1
ITB1 (r) for risky
assets. Panel 8 plots ITB1 (i) =I1 respectively for i = f; s; rg and Panel 9 does the same for shadow banks.
their deposits. Traditional banks, on the other hand, expand their balance sheets due to the
relaxation of the no-withdrawal constraint. This is consistent with observations in Fact 1 of
Section 2.2 which indicate that traditional bank balance sheets expanded at a faster rate in
2002-07 when the shadow banking sector was growing rapidly than in 2008-15 when the shadow
banking sector was stagnant.94
Panel 7 demonstrates portfolio re-allocation by traditional banks after bad news. When
the shadow banking sector is small and market discipline intact, traditional banks re-allocate
up to 18% of their portfolio from risky assets to safe and liquid assets in order to prevent an
early withdrawal. As the shadow banking sector grows and market discipline is undermined,
traditional banks reduce the extent of their re-allocation away from risky assets and eventually
the direction is reversed. In equilibrium, there is a re-allocation of approximately 4% away from
94Note that, although Panel 6 indicates that, in equilibrium, an individual traditional bank has a larger
balance sheet than an individual shadow bank, this does not contradict Figure 3.1, which is at the aggregate
level. In fact, we calibrate  to target the ratio of shadow bank assets to traditional bank assets in 2007.
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risky assets. Compared to the observations in Fact 4 of Section 3.2, this predicts the direction
of portfolio re-allocation correctly, but falls somewhat short of the observed amount of 6% to
8% (see Figure 3.4). It is possible that this discrepancy reects the impact of macroprudential
regulation and additional liquidity provided by the Federal Reserve.
Finally, Panels 8 and 9 display the investment strategies of traditional and shadow banks
in period 1. When there is no re-sale on safe assets ( < ), market discipline imposed by the
no-withdrawal constraint forces traditional banks to behave as if they internalize asset payo¤s
under weak fundamentals. Therefore, they devote an equal share of their investment to each
asset type. In response to a re-sale on safe assets, traditional banks increase their holdings
of liquid assets to prop up their liquidation value. While this increases the funds available to
them after bad news, their reaction is not strong enough to keep them solvent under weak
fundamentals because of the decline in the minimum recovery rate V (as shown in Panel 5).
Shadow banks, on the other hand, skew their investment towards risky assets since they
only internalize the states after good news due to limited liability. Without the ability to
commit, they also take their borrowing costs RSB as given and hence do not change their asset
composition in response to re-sales.
3.6 Policy analysis
This section considers policy interventions aimed at fostering nancial stability. The numerical
results in Section 3.5.2 demonstrate that, with su¢ ciently high commitment costs, the shadow
banking sector expands to a size that is systemically risky in the sense that its collapse gives
rise to both liquidity and solvency risk for traditional banks.
We consider four distinct interventions that aim to o¤set this. Section 3.6.1 considers asset
purchases in the secondary market. Section 3.6.2 proposes a tax on shadow bank prots.
Section 3.6.3 considers liquidity provision to traditional banks. Finally, Section 3.6.4 evaluates
proposals to ringfence the traditional banking sector with a combination of deposit insurance
guarantees and macroprudential regulation.
3.6.1 Asset purchases
The government can lean against re-sales by purchasing assets in the secondary market. For
the sake of simplicity, we only consider safe asset purchases such that their excess supply
becomes eI (s) = ISB1 (s) + (1  )  ITB1 (s)  (1  ) ITB2 (s)  IAP
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Figure 3.11: Asset purchases
Note: Expected payo¤s are inclusive of the commitment cost  . AP refers to the outcome
under asset purchases.
where IAP > 0 refers to asset purchases by the government.95 Figure 3.11 shows the outcome
of an intervention that aims to eliminate the re-sale on safe assets by setting IAP to absorb
their excess supply at the equilibrium sector size .
The outcome of this intervention is identical to the deepening of secondary markets consid-
ered in Section 3.3.2.2. It reduces the re-sale discount (i.e. increases ) at any given sector
size and is successful in eliminating the re-sale on safe assets at the initial equilibrium . In
other words, the intervention shifts the re-sale threshold  to  (see Panel B). However, by
alleviating the re-sale, the intervention also reduces the funding costs of shadow banks and
increases the expected payo¤ from shadow banking relative to traditional banking (see Panel
A). This leads to entry into the shadow banking sector until we reach the new equilibrium
sector size AP > 
.
It is not a coincidence that in the new equilibrium AP , the re-sale discount (and all
variables other than the sector size) takes the same value as in the initial equilibrium . This
is because, as explained in Section 3.3.2.1, the re-sale discount is implicitly determined by the
free entry condition (3.26).
Our analysis then leads to a crucial insight: policy interventions in secondary markets
are ine¤ective when there is free entry into shadow banking. This insight also applies in the
opposite direction. For example, a tax on secondary market transactions deepens the re-sale
and reduces shadow bank prots at a given sector size, but both of these e¤ects are reversed
by exit from the shadow banking sector.
Finally, is important to stress that entry into shadow banking is driven by the ex-ante
anticipation of asset purchases. In period 2, the size of the shadow banking sector is already
95Allowing for risky asset purchases leads to no discernible changes in the results.
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Figure 3.12: Tax on shadow bank prots
Note: Expected payo¤s are inclusive of the commitment cost  and
tax T .
determined and a surprise asset purchase scheme would be successful in alleviating the re-sale
on safe assets and reducing both liquidity and solvency risk. This creates the potential for
time inconsistency issues as policymakers would naturally nd it tempting to intervene once
the re-sale is underway.
3.6.2 Tax on shadow bank prots
The second policy intervention we consider is the taxation of shadow bank prots with the pur-
pose of deterring entry into the shadow banking sector. This can be considered as a Pigouvian
tax since entry into shadow banking imposes a negative externality on the remainder of the
nancial sector through its contribution to re-sales.
We consider a constant tax T such that the free entry condition becomes
E

SB
  T = E TB  
Figure 3.12 shows the outcome under a tax level 0 < T <  that reduces the equilibrium sector
size of shadow banks to the re-sale threshold . The tax e¤ectively shifts down the expected
payo¤ schedule from shadow banking and brings about an equilibrium without a re-sale on
safe assets. Since this is a tax on prots, the equilibrium allocation at any given sector size 
is identical to the numerical results in Figure 3.10. Therefore, reducing the equilibrium sector
size to  eliminates liquidity risk in the traditional banking sector, which strengthens market
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discipline such that there is also no solvency risk.
Note that the e¤ect of the tax is equivalent to a decrease in the commitment cost  . There-
fore, when taxing shadow bank prots is not feasible, the same outcome can also be achieved
with a transfer to traditional banks.96 Alternatively, shadow bank prots may be reduced in-
directly with a tax on their liabilities DSB. In a less stylized set up, this would correspond to
a tax on the funding instruments most widely used by shadow banks such as ABCPs.
3.6.3 Liquidity provision
Recall from Fact 4 in Section 3.2 that traditional bank liabilities sharply increased in the second
half of 2008. This increase was driven by Federal Reserve funding and a rise in deposits protected
by deposit insurance guarantees. In this section, we show that liquidity support of this form
may e¤ectively ringfence the traditional banking sector from the nancial instability caused by
shadow banks.
We consider a liquidity provision scheme that permits traditional banks to borrow L from
the central bank at the risk-free rate in the second period. The liquidation value of traditional
banks can then be written as
TB = min

1;
P2 (r) I
TB
1 (r) + P2 (s) I
TB
1 (s) + I1 () + L
DTB

and two conditions must be satised for liquidity provision to eliminate both solvency and
liquidity risk. First, the amount of liquidity provided should be su¢ cient to o¤set liquidity
shortfalls such that
L  L  DTB   P2 (r) ITB1 (r)  P2 (s) ITB1 (s)  I1 ()
This eliminates the possibility of bank-runs ( = 0) and liquidity risk.
Second, liquidity borrowed from the central bank should be fully collateralized.97 This rules
out default on the central bank and makes depositors e¤ectively junior to the central bank.
The no-withdrawal constraint then becomes
lI
TB
2 (r) + I
TB
2 (s)  L+ V DTBRTB
such that market discipline is not adversely a¤ected by liquidity provision. The results from
Proposition 3.3 then follow through: in the absence of liquidity risk, the threat of an early
96Quantitatively, our model indicates that the necessary transfer amounts to 9% of commitment costs, which
is equivalent to approximately 0:6% of the value of a traditional banks portfolio in period 1.
97This places an upper bound on the amount of liquidity provided L  L = lITB2 (r)+ ITB2 (s) where L  L.
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Figure 3.13: Liquidity Provision
Note: Expected payo¤s are inclusive of the commitment cost  .
withdrawal eliminates solvency risk (V = 1) and interest rates on traditional bank deposits fall
to the risk-free rate (RTB = 1).
Figure 3.13 shows the equilibrium outcome under liquidity provision in comparison to the
baseline results in Section 3.5.2. Panel B shows that, in addition to ringfencing the traditional
banking sector, liquidity provision eliminates the re-sale on safe assets. This is because, with
P2 (s) < 1, traditional banks take advantage of an arbitrage opportunity by borrowing from the
central bank at the risk-free rate and purchasing safe assets at a discount.98 They continue to
do this until there is no excess supply of safe assets such that P2 (s) = 1. Panel D shows that
these purchases also increase the extent of portfolio reallocation towards safe and liquid assets.
By alleviating the re-sale, liquidity provision indirectly reduces the funding costs of shadow
banks. This in turn increases the expected payo¤ from shadow banking, leading to further entry
into the sector (see Panel A). Therefore, liquidity provision leads to a rise in the equilibrium
size of the shadow banking sector, but this has no adverse e¤ects on traditional banks.
98This arbitrage opportunity is not present in the baseline model. Without liquidity provision or deposit
insurance guarantees, traditional banks may only collect funds in the second period by o¤ering interest rates
RTB2 > 1 given by (3.32). They nd it prohibitively costly to do so.
105
3.6.4 Deposit insurance and macroprudential regulation
The liquidity provision scheme described in the previous section is equivalent to the combination
of deposit insurance with regulation that imposes a minimum recovery rate V = 1. The two
policy interventions only di¤er with respect to the role of market discipline. As explained above,
liquidity provision is designed to take advantage of market discipline while securing traditional
banks from liquidity risk. In contrast, eliminating liquidity risk through deposit insurance also
removes the no-withdrawal constraint on traditional banks since depositors never stand to take
a loss. Market discipline then has to be replaced with macroprudential regulation.
3.7 Conclusion
We have presented a model of the nancial sector in which shadow banking emerges endoge-
nously as an alternative banking strategy. A key aspect of the model is that depositors re-
optimize in response to revisions in expectations about asset returns. To prevent early with-
drawals by their depositors, traditional banks optimally commit to a safe portfolio strategy,
while shadow banks combine high risk-taking with the prospect of an early liquidation after
bad news.
Two important insights emerge as a consequence. First, costly commitment and re-sale
externalities bring about an equilibrium where ex-ante identical banks optimally cluster into
shadow and traditional banking strategies. The size of the shadow banking sector increases
in the cost of commitment and the availability of liquidity in the secondary market. Second,
when the shadow banking sector is large, the liquidation of shadow banks leave traditional
banks susceptible to liquidity risk. This increases deposit rates o¤ered by traditional banks
and weakens market discipline on them, engendering greater risk-taking and a rise in solvency
risk.
The model naturally provides novel insights for policy design. Policy interventions have
signicantly di¤erent implications when the adjustment on the size of the shadow banking
sector is taken into account. Secondary market interventions, such as asset purchases by the
government, are e¤ective in alleviating the re-sale ex-post, but their ex-ante expectation fuels
further growth of the shadow banking sector in a manner that exactly o¤sets these gains. This
leads to time inconsistency issues for policymakers which may nd it tempting to intervene
once the re-sale is underway.
The ndings regarding the destabilizing consequences of a large shadow banking sector lend
support to taxation of shadow bank prots (or equivalently a transfer to traditional banks)
with the purpose of reducing the size of the shadow banking sector to a level compatible with
nancial stability. Alternatively, collateralized liquidity support or a combination of deposit
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insurance guarantees and macroprudential regulation are e¤ective in ringfencing the traditional
banking sector but bring about an expansion in shadow banking.
Finally, it is worth noting that the mechanism considered in this chapter is more general
than its application to shadow banking and the 2007-09 nancial crisis. In economies without
credible deposit insurance guarantees and strict enforcement of banking regulation, nancial
intermediation strategies that combine high risk-taking with an unstable funding structure
may exist within the commercial banking sector. One clear example of this is the United States
during the National Banking Era of 1863-1914. In this period, there was no central bank to
act as a regulator or a public backstop for the banking sector, and commercial banks were
subject to frequent bouts of early withdrawals (Gorton and Tallman, 2016). Another potential
application of this framework is emerging market economies in contemporary times.
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Appendix
A Appendix of Chapter 1
A1 Risk aversion
Under risk aversion, the deposit demand schedule is given by
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where uc (:) is marginal utility and (c; c) are respectively consumption in states with strong
and weak fundamentals. The marginal utility wedge uc(c)
uc(c)
exceeds unity and increases in d.
Compared to the case with risk neutrality, this leads to a small discontinuity in q (; d) around
the deposit threshold and increases the curvature of the schedule in the risky region d > d ().
This in turn raises the mark-up
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such that there is an interior solution g 2 (0; 1) under the gambling strategy.
A2 Deviation to the safe strategy
In the rst case, the bank has su¢ cient net worth to satisfy the rst order condition (1.26)
while remaining within the deposit threshold d
 
g

. Its deposits are thus valued on par with
safe assets qsjg = q and its valuation of loans is equivalent to the equilibrium counterpart
such that qlsjg = q
l
s. There are, however, two notable di¤erences. First, as with the deviation
to gambling, the quantity of lending lsjg is conditional on lending provided by the remaining
banks such that
lsjg =
 
qls
 
1  (A)
1
1    1  

lg (A33)
Second, the inward shift in the deposit threshold d
 
g

under bad sentiments increases the
boundary of net worth
nrjg 

qb   bq
qb

qlslsjg > nc (A34)
required for this case to be valid.
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Note also that the deviating banks expected payo¤ is given by the expression
vsjg =
 
1  P + Plllsjg + nq (A35)
which di¤ers from (1.39) only in terms of lsjg.99 This reects that a shift to bad sentiments has
no impact on the banks ability to borrow when its net worth lies above nrjg.
In the second case, bank net worth falls short of nrjg such that it is not possible to satisfy
(1.26) without breaching the deposit threshold d
 
g

. The optimal allocation leaves the bank
with a level of deposits dsjg > d
 
g

which is in the risky region of the deposit demand
schedule with qsjg < q, while the actual solvency constraint is slack. Proposition 1.2 indicates
that there are no risky asset purchases
 
bsjg = 0

in this case, while the price and quantity of
loans are pinned down by the rst order condition (1.26) as
qlsjg =
 
1  P + Pl (1  l) qb (A36)
lsjg =
 
qlsjg
 
1  (A)
1
1    1  

lg (A37)
Using the budget constraint, the price of deposits can also be written as
dsjg =
qlsjg
qb
lsjg   n
(1  P ) q
and the deviating banks expected payo¤ is given by the expression
vsjg =
 
1  P + Plllsjg + n(1  P ) q (A38)
which is lower than (A35) due to the increase in bank funding costs.
The solvency constraint binds in the third case. The quantity of loans is determined im-
plicitly by the expression0B@

lsjg +
1 

lg
 1
1 
(A)
1
a
  qbl
1CA lsjg = qb
1  P
n
q
attained by using (1.47) and (A37) to substitute for q
 
g; dsjg

and qlsjg in (1.48). The expression
for expected payo¤ in this case is identical to the constrained case of the safe equilibrium
vsjg = (1  P )
 
1  l lsjg (A39)
99As with the safe equilibrium, risky asset purchases bsjg and deposits dsjg are indeterminate in this case but
have no impact on expected payo¤.
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and this case is valid when net worth is below the boundary
n < ncjg 
 
qlsjg
qb
  l
!
(1  P ) qlsjg (A40)
where

qlsjg; lsjg

are dened according to (A36) and (A37).
Finally, the discontinuous jump in d
 
g; d

as deposits dsjg cross the threshold d
 
g

leads
to the possibility of a fourth case. In this case, net worth is below nrjg but the rst order
condition (A36) associated with the second case leads the bank to select a level of deposits
within the threshold dsjg  d
 
g

. The optimal behaviour of the deviating bank, and the
associated net worth boundaries can be then be determined by treating the deposit threshold
as a binding constraint such that
dsjg = d (s)
qsjg = q
and the level of deposits is determined implicitly by the expression

lsjg +
1 

lg
 1
1 
(A)
1
a
lsjg =
b
qb   bqn
The deviating banks expected payo¤ is then given by
vsjg =
 
1  P + Pl lsjg   b
qb   bqn
This case is valid in the region of net worth n 2 [ncsjg; nrjg) with ncsjg dened as
ncsjg 
 
1  l (1  P )
1  P + Pl q
l
sjglsjg
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A3 Proofs of propositions and lemmata
A3.1 Proof of Lemma 1.1
Suppose there is perfect transparency and limited liability binds such that the representative
banks optimization problem is given by
v = max
d;b;l
(1  P ) (b+ l   d)
s.t.
n+ qd = qbb+ qll
ql =

1
A
 1

(l + (1  )L) 1 
q = q

1  P + P 
bb+ ll
d

Combining the deposit demand schedule and the budget constraint yields
d =
qbb+ qll   n  Pq  bb+ ll
q (1  P )
By using this expression to substitute out d and applying positive monotonic transformations,
the objective function can be written as
v = max
b;l

q
 
1  P + Pb  qb b+ q  1  P + Pl  ql l + n
s.t.
ql =

1
A
 1

(l + (1  )L) 1 
which is identical to the optimization problem under a safe strategy.
A3.2 Proof of Lemma 1.2
Combining (1.25) with (1.1) yields
 
1  P + Pb ((1  d (~; d)) q   q)     1  P + Pb q   b (1  d (~; d)) q (A41)
When  = 0 and q = q, this reduces to
qb =
 
1  P + Pb q
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In contrast, when q > q, it is easy to show with the use of (1.18) that the LHS of (A41) is
strictly negative under the condition

b
qb
+ (1  ) 
l
ql

<
1
q
which is always satised under the parameter restrictions (1.15). Similarly, when  > 0, the
RHS is strictly positive under the condition
b < 1
when q = q. When q < q, the condition instead becomes
(1  P )  1  b+ 1  q

 
b
qb
+ (1  ) l
ql

1  qP

 
b
qb
+ (1  ) l
ql
Pb > 0
which is again satised at all times under the parameter restrictions (1.15). As such, (1.25)
holds with a strict inequality when either  > 0 or q < q. In this case, the banks valuation
of risky assets is below their market price and the bank optimally decides not to purchase any
such that
b = 0
A3.3 Proof of Lemma 1.3
Since the RHS of (1.40) increases in n and the only variable that is not pinned down in the
RHS is ls, ls will be positively related to n if the LHS is increasing in ls. If we dene the left
hand side as
f (ls) 

1

 1 


ls
A
 1

  qlls
the derivative with respect to ls is given by
f 0 (ls) =
1


1
A
 1


1

 1 

l
1 
a
s   ql
and is positive for the range of ls
ls >  ()
1+
1 

A
 
ql
 11 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Using (1.40), it is also possible to attain an explicit expression for ls when n = 0. This yields
ls = 

A
 
ql
 11 
which satises the condition immediately above since 0 <  < 1.
A3.4 Proof of Lemma 1.4
When the solvency constraint is slack such that n  nc, combining (1.43) with (1.39) and (1.46)
yields
vs  vgjs
! 1 +  P
1  P 
l 

1  P + Pb
1  P + Pl
 
1 
As l rises, LHS increases and RHS falls so a su¢ cient condition is attained by setting l to its
lower bound (1  l) b
1 +  (1  l)
P
1  P 
b 

1  P + Pb
1  P + P (1  l) b
 
1 
This condition holds with equality when  = 0. To show that it is satised for all  > 0,
consider the condition for the derivative of the LHS with respect to  to exceed that of the
RHS
1  P + 
 +  (1  )P
b > (1  P )1   1  P + Pb
which is satised for all  2 (0; 1] when  2 (0; 1).where

qlsjg; lsjg

are given by (A36) and
(A37).
A3.5 Proof of Proposition 1.1
Using (1.30) and (1.35), it is straight forward to show that
qls < q
l
g $ l < b
where the right hand side reects the unconstrained case. As (1.31) and (1.36) establish a
monotonic relationship between the price of loans ql and the amount of lending l in both
equilibria, this also implies that qlglg < q
l
sls when the solvency constraint is slack under the safe
strategy. When the solvency constraint is binding, on the other hand, (1.40) can be used to
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determine the level of net worth above which lg  ls as
n 

1

 1 


lg
A
 1

  qllg
where qlglg < q
l
sls again follows from monotonicity.
A3.6 Proof of Proposition 1.2
Proposition 1.4 shows that a safe equilibrium always exists when n  nc such that the boundary
n for a unique gambling equilibrium must lie within the region of net worth where the solvency
constraint is binding under the safe equilibrium. The condition to eliminate the safe equilibrium
can then be attained by combining (1.43) with (1.42) and (1.46) such that
(1  P )
 
1  l+ l 1  

ls < (1  P )l
 
qlg
 a
1 a (A)
1
1  +
n
q
where ls is given by (1.40). Proposition 1.3 then indicates that the safe equilibrium ceases to be
self-conrming when n < n where combining (1.40) with the above condition yields an implicit
expression for the boundary
n =

1

 1 

0@ 1
A
q (1  P )l
 
qlg
 
1  (A)
1
1  + n
q (1  P )
h
1  l + l 1 
i
1A 1 (A42)
 ql q
 (1  P )l
 
qlg
 
1  (A)
1
1  + n
q (1  P )
h 
1  l+ l 1  i
Second, consider the condition for the gambling equilibrium to be self-conrming. When
n  nrjg such the deposits are priced at the risk-free level qsjg = q under a deviation to the
safe strategy, the relevant condition is attained by combining (1.44) with (1.17) and (A35) such
that the gambling equilibrium is not self-conrming when
vg < vsjg
! 1  P
l
1  P + Pl <

1  P + Pl
1  P + Pb
 
1 
As l rises, LHS decreases and RHS falls so a su¢ cient condition is attained by setting l to its
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lower bound (1  l) b
1   (1  l)P
l
1  P + P (1  l) l
<

1  lP
l
1  P + Pl
 
1 
The two sides of the inequality are equal when  = 0. To show that the condition satised for
all  > 0, consider the condition for the derivative of LHS to be lower than that of RHS for all
 2 (0; 1]
1
1  P + P (1  l) l
"
1  

(1  P ) (1  l) 
1  P + P (1  l) b
   1#
<
1  l
1  P + Pb

1  lP
b
1  P + Pb
  1 2
1 
which is true since the LHS is negative and the RHS is positive. As such, the gambling
equilibrium is not self-conrming when net worth is above n  nrjg. Next, consider the case
when net worth is in the range n 2 [ncjg; nrjg) such that the deposits of the deviating bank are
priced at riskyregion of the deposit threshold qsjg < q but the solvency constraint remains
slack. The condition for the gambling equilibrium to be self-conrming in this case can be
attained by combining (1.44) with (1.17) and (A38) such that
 
1  P + Plllsjg + n(1  P ) q < (1  P )llg + nq
where lsjg is dened according to (A33). This can be re-written as a requirement that net worth
is below the boundary
n  (1  P ) q

P
h
(1  P ) + Pl (1  )   1  P + Pl 11  i  (1  l) qb 1  (A) 11  l
Finally, it is necessary to show that n > ncjg such that the boundary lies in the region where
the solvency constraint is slack. Using the above expression and (A40), the relevant condition
can be written as 
1
1  P + Pl
 
1 
> 1 +
P
 
1  l
 (1  ) + P  1  l (1  ) (A43)
Both sides of the inequality are decreasing in l, but the LHS decreases faster when

1
1  P + Pl
 1
1 
>
 
 (1  )

 
1    1  P + Pl+ P  1  l
!2
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which is true for all  2 (0; 1]. A su¢ cient condition can then be attained by substituting the
upper bound l = (1 P )(1 l)
1 P+Pl into (A43)
1 +
P
1  P l
 
1 
> 1 +
P (1  l)
1  P (1  l)
where the two sides are equal when  = 0. The inequality is satised for all  2 (0; 1] when the
LHS rises faster than RHS, which is true under the su¢ cient condition
0 <   1
2
0 <   1
2
A3.7 Proof of Proposition 1.3
First, consider the condition for the non-emptiness of the region n 2 (0; n] with a unique
gambling. When n = 0, (1.40) yields an explicit solution for bank lending
le =  (A)
1
1 
 
ql
 
1 
and using (1.43), (1.42) and (1.46), the condition to eliminate the safe equilibrium can be
written as

l
 
1  l+ 1   <  (1  l)  1  P + Pb
l
! 
1 
In the remainder of the proof, I show that there is a boundary l within the parameter restric-
tions given by (1.15) such that the safe equilibrium is not self-conrming for l < l. The above
expression can be used to dene the function
f
 
l
   (1  l)  1  P + Pb
l
! 
1 
  (1  )  
l
 
1  l (A44)
where f
 
l

< 0 conrms the safe equilibrium. The derivative
f 0
 
l

=

l
  
1  
 
(1  l)
 
1  P + Pb 1   l  11 
is strictly decreasing when l is in the region
(1  l) b < l < (1  l) (1  P + Ps) (A45)
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where the lower bound corresponds to that of the parameter restriction (1.15) and the upper
bound lies strictly within its counterpart there. It then follows from the intermediate value
theorem that there is a boundary l within (A45) and hence (1.15) where f
 
l

= 0 such that
the safe equilibrium ceases to be self-conrming for l < l. This boundary is implicitly dened
by equating (A44) to zero such that
(1  ) + 1  
l
l
=
 
(1  l)
 
1  P + Pb
l
! 
1 
To conrm that there is a non-empty region with a unique gambling equilibrium, it is also
necessary to show that n > 0 such that there is a region where the gambling equilibrium is
self-conrming. As the proof for Proposition 1.2 shows that n > ncjg, a su¢ cient condition is
given by
ncjg > 0
!  1  P + Pl (1  l) > l
which is true when l is below the upper bound of (1.15).
The second part of the proof establishes that there is a non-empty region with multiple
equilibria such that n > n. When l > l such that there is no unique gambling equilibrium
and n = 0, this follows directly from the above nding that n > 0. When a unique gambling
equilibrium exists, on the other hand, the proof is more involved as n is only implicitly dened
by (1.50). Using (1.50), let
 (n) 

1

 1 

0@ 1
A
q (1  P )l
 
qlg
 
1  (A)
1
1  + n
q (1  P )
h
1  l + l 1 
i
1A 1 l q (1  P )l  qlg 1  (A) 11  + n
(1  P )
h 
1  l+ l 1  i
such that  (n) = 0. It follows from Proposition 1.3 that  (:) is strictly decreasing within the
region n 2 [0; nc] such that n > n implies
 (n) <  (n) = 0
Using (1.50) and (1.51), this can be written as the condition
l

1 +  
1  l+ l 1  <

q
qlg

1  l + l
1  


(1  P ) 
1 + 
+ l
 
1 
(A46)
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where I have dened
  1
P
h
(1  P ) + Pl (1  )   1  P + Pl 11  i > 0
and  > 0 follows directly from the proof above for n > 0. The LHS of (A46) is less than one
for l < 1 such that a su¢ cient condition under which (A46) is satised is given by

 
1  P + Pb <  1  (a+ (1  )) l (1  P ) 
1 + 
+ l
Since  > 0, the rst term on the RHS can be eliminated to get a stricter su¢ cient condition
l > 
 
1  P + Pb
The RHS lies below the lower bound l = (1  l) b of the parameter restriction (1.15) when
the following condition is true
b
a+ (1  ) > 1  P + P
b
A3.8 Proof of Proposition 1.4
The gambling equilibrium becomes unique for all n when the expected payo¤ under a deviation
to gambling exceeds the expected payo¤ from the strategy given a slack solvency constraint.
The relevant inequality is
vs < vgjs
where
 
vs; vgjs

are respectively given by (1.39) and
vgjs = (1  P )llgjs + P dc
such that the inequality becomes
dc > ~dc  l
P
 
1  P + Pl ls   (1  P )llgjs
The expression given in the proposition can then be attained by substituting for
 
ls; lgjs; qls; q
l
g

using (1.30), (1.35), (1.36), (1.45).
The second part largely follows from the beginning of Appendix A3.6. The counterpart to
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(A42) under liquidity provision is
n =

1

 1 

0@ 1
A
q (1  P )l
 
qlg
 
1  (A)
1
1  + n+ q dc
q (1  P )
h
1  l + l 1 
i
1A 1
 l q
 (1  P )l
 
qlg
 
1  (A)
1
1  + n+ q dc
(1  P )
h 
1  l+ l 1  i
where the derivative with respect to dc is
@n
@ dc
=
dc
(1  P )
h 
1  l+ l 1  i 0@ 1


1
A
 1

 
q (1  P )l
 
qlg
 
1  (aA)
1
1 a + n+ qL
q (1  P )  1  l+ l
! 1 

  ql
1A
which is positive for n  0.
A3.9 Proof of Proposition 1.5
Using (1.55) and (1.57), we can write
qliq (~; d; x) d+ qx = q
1  P + P

~ 
b
qb
+ (1  ~) l
ql
  
n+qx
d

1  qP

~ 
b
qb
+ (1  ~) l
ql
 d+ qx
= q
(1  P ) d+ P

~ 
b
qb
+ (1  ~) l
ql

n+ x
1  qP

~ 
b
qb
+ (1  ~) l
ql

= qF (~; d; x) d
newcommandAA
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B Appendix of Chapter 2
B1 Liquidity Provision
In periods t  T , the model is characterized by
d (n;S) =

~ (n;S) 
b
qb(S)
+ (1  ~ (n;S)) l
ql(S)

(n+ qdct)
1  q

~ (n;S) 
b
qb(S)
+ (1  ~ (n;S)) l
ql(S)

q (d0; n;S) =
8>><>>:
q for d0  d (n;S)
q
1 P (S)+P (S) uc(c)
uc(c0)

g
b
qb(S)
+(1 g) 
l
ql(S)

n+qdct
d0
1 qP (S) uc(c)
uc(c0)

g
b
qb(S)
+(1 g) 
l
ql(S)
 for d0 > d (n;S)
 = l + b  d0   dct
 = max
 
ll + bb  d0   dct ; 0

d0 + dct  ll + bb
vbt (n; S) = max

vbs;t (n; S) ; v
b
g;t (n; S)
	
vbs;t (n; S) = max
d0;dct dct ;2[0;1]
8<: (1  P (S))
 
(1   )  +  ES

vbt+1 (n
0; S0)

+P (S)
 
(1   )  +  vb (n0; S)
9=;
vbg;t (n; S) = max
d0;dct dct ;2[0;1]

(1  P (S))  (1   )  +  ES vbt+1 (n0; S0)	
B2 Proofs of propositions and lemmata
B2.1 Proof of Lemma 2.1
Let an underbar denote variables in the period immediately after sovereign default and the
subscript ssdenote those that pertain to the steady state. The households problem can then
be written as
vh (D;D; S) = max
c;D;D

u (c) + vhss (D;D
)
	
vhss (D;D
) = max
css;Dss;Dss

u (css) + v
h
ss (Dss; D

ss)
	
s.t.
c+ qD + qD = D +D   T + w (S)
css + qssDss + q
Dss = D +D
   T + wss
c0ss + qssD
0
ss + q
D
0
ss = Dss +D

ss   T + wss
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where w (S) and wss are respectively given by
w (S) = (1  )AK
w = (1  )AK (B47)
and taxes remain constant after government default.
The rst order conditions of this problem are
quc (c) = uc (css)
quc (c) = uc (css)
qssuc (css) = uc (c
0
ss)
quc (css) = uc (c0ss)
which immediately indicates that q = qss = q. Furthermore, under the parameterization
q = , the FOCs lead to complete consumption smoothing such that
c = css = c
0
ss
Given that wages and taxes are constant in the steady state, this implies
c = css = (1  q) (D +D)  T + wss
vhss (D;D
) =
1
1  u (c)
vh (D;D; S) =

1  u (c)
Using the budget constraint immediately after default, I write c in terms of (D;D)
c = (1  q) (D +D + w (S)) + qwss   T
and use (2.4), (2.6) and (2.7) to write
w (S) =
1  

A
A
L (S)
and re-label wss as w with a slight abuse of notation.
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B2.2 Proof of Lemma 2.2
When the bank remains solvent with prots  after sovereign default, it continues into the
steady state with net worth
n =  (   !)
as per (2.15)
Let ssdenote variables that pertain to the steady state. The banks problem is solved by
the rst order condition (2.26) which implies prots
ss = lL+
n
q
where L is given by (2.27). The parameterization for ( ; !) given in Section 2.3.6 implies
ss = 
nss = n
The representative banks value then remains constant and is given by
vb (n; S) = (1   )  +  vb (n; S)
= 
B2.3 Proof of Proposition 2.1
Let q (d0; n;S) = q,  (n;S) = 0 for all (n; S) =2 G and guess that the value function takes the
form
vb (n; S) = A (n; S) +
n
q
,
A (S) =
8<: Ag (S) 8 (n; S) 2 gAs (S) 8 (n; S) =2 g
9=;
where A (S) does not depend on n since combining the guess with (2.17) implies
A (S) = max fAg (S) ; As (S)g
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For q (d0; n;S) = q,  (n;S) = 0, the rst order conditions (2.21) and (2.22) under the safe
strategy reduce to
qb (S) =
 
1  P (S) + P (S) b q
ql (l;S) = (1  l)
 
1  P (S) + P (S) l q
Combining these with the denitions for (; ) implies an expected prot
(1  P (S)) + P (S) =  1  P (S) + P (S) llL (S) + nq
under the safe strategy. Using the above guess to characterize ES

vb (n0; S0)

in (2.17) yields
vbs (n; S) = (1  P (S)) + P (S)  + (1  P (S)) ( ES [A (S0)]   !)
=
 
1  P (S) + P (S) llL (S) + (1  P (S)) (ES [A (S0)]  !) + nq
The rst order conditions (2.23) and (2.24) under the gambling strategy imply the expected
prot
(1  P (S)) = (1  P (S))lL (S) +
n
q
Using the guess to substitute for Es

vb (n0; S0)

in (2.17) yields
vbg (n; S) = (1  P (S)) ( +  (ES [A (S0)]  !))
= (1  P (S)) (lL (S) +  (ES [A (S0)]  !)) +
n
q
Matching coe¢ cients implies the following denitions for (Ag (S) ; As (S))
As (S) =
 
1  P (S) + P (S) llL (S) + (1  P (S)) (ES [A (S0)]  !)
Ag (S) = (1  P (S)) (lL (S) +  (ES [A (S0)]  !))
which conrm the initial guess. This implies
@ES

vb (n0;S0)

@n0
=
1
q
under the conditions stated above. Using  = q and (2.14), it is easy to show that
@ES

vb (n0;S0)

@0
=
 
q
= 1
It is straightforward to deduce that this derivative exceeds unity when the above conditions
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are not satised. When the solvency constraint binds, a marginal increase in future net worth n0
leads to a relaxation of the solvency constraint and reduces the associated multiplier  (n0;S0).
Similarly, when q (d0; n;S) < q, the bank can use the additional net worth to reduce its deposits
by 1=q (d0; n;S) > 1=q. In both cases, there is a rise in ES

vb (n0;S0)

in addition to the direct
impact shown above.
B3 Data and calibration
B3.1 Sovereign default risk
Monthly data on the yields of German and Portuguese government bonds with a remaining
maturity of 3 months is obtained from Bloomberg. The specic maturity is selected in order
to extract quarterly sovereign default probabilities in line with the calibration of the model at
a quarterly frequency. A time series for sovereign default probabilities P^t is extracted using
the calibration for b and (2.1). This is then converted to a series ^t of scal stress realizations
through (2.2).
In order to calibrate the scal stress parameters (ss; ; 
2
), I run the following OLS re-
gression
^t = 0 + 1^t 1 + "t
which ts the AR(1) process given by (2.3) to ^t. Note that the regression is conducted at
monthly frequency so as to maximize the number of observations, which stands at 81. The
mean and persistence of the monthly AR(1) process relate to the estimated coe¢ cients as
follows
mss =
^0
1  ^1
m = ^1
while the variance is that of the residuals (m )
2 = var ("^t). It is straightforward to convert
these into the parameters (ss; ; 
2
) associated with a quarterly AR(1) process
ss =
 
1 + m + (
m
 )
2 1  m
1  (m )3
mss
ss = (
m
 )
3
2 =
 
1 + m + (
m
 )
2 (m )2
which yields the calibration for these parameters.
For the matching exercise in Section 2.4.4, P^t is converted to a quarterly frequency and
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then (2.2), (2.3) and the calibrated parameters (ss; ; 
2
) are used to determine the series of
sovereign risk shocks "0 needed to exactly match these probabilities. These probabilities are
shown in the rst panel of Figure 2.10.
B3.2 Loan interest rates
Data on loan interest rates is obtained from the Total MFI Interest Rate Statisticsdatabase
in ECBs Statistical Data Warehouse. It includes loans by Portuguese banks other than re-
volving loans and overdrafts, convenience and extended credit card debt with collateral and/or
guarantees to counterparties which are classied as non-nancial corporations. The maximum
maturity of these loans is 3 months in line with the quarterly frequency of the model, and only
loans classied as new business are included. The data is obtained at monthly frequency and
converted to quarterly frequency by averaging.
B3.3 Bank funding costs
Deposit interest rates are used as a measure for bank funding costs. Deposit interest rate data
is obtained from the Total MFI Interest Rate Statistics database in the ECBs Statistical
Data Warehouse. It includes deposits (new business) of all amounts from households and non-
corporations with an agreed maturity of up to 1 year. The 1 year maturity is selected as it is
the lowest maturity classication available. The data series is obtained at monthly frequency
and converted to quarterly frequency by averaging.
B3.4 Leverage ratio
Data on leverage ratios is obtained from the Consolidated Banking Data database in the
ECBs Statistical Data Warehouse. The data series provides the leverage ratio of domestic
banking groups and stand-alone banks operating in Portugal and is available at semi-annual
frequency. It is converted to quarterly frequency through interpolation.
B3.5 Domestic sovereign bond exposure
In order to construct the domestic sovereign bond exposure series (^t), I collect data on the
sovereign bond holdings of Portuguese banks from stress tests conducted by the European
Banking Authority and the ECB between 2009-2016. This data is at bank level and includes
four Portuguese banks (Caixa Geral de Depositos, Banco Comercial Portuges, Espirito Santo
Financial Group and Banco BPI) classied as systemically importantby the above institutions.
Together, these banks account for approximately 60% of the total assets held by the Portuguese
banking sector. I refer to this data series as SOVt (j) where j indexes the specic bank.
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Figure B1 : Domestic sovereign bond exposure
Domestic sovereign bond exposure is dened as the share of bank funds spent on domestic
sovereign bonds in Section 2.3.4. This requires data also on bank funding, which consists of
liabilities and own funds. Accordingly, I compile data series for the total liabilities, TLt (j) and
Tier 1 capital, CAPt (j) by going through the balance sheets of these individual banks.
The data series are aggregated across banks and then used to construct the domestic sov-
ereign bond exposure according to the expression
^t =
P
j SOVt (j)P
j (TLt (j) + CAPt (j))
As there are only 8 observations through time provided by the stress tests, the constructed
series is interpolated to create a quarterly series. Figure B1 provides a scatter plot of the data
points on the interpolated line.
B4 Proofs for the numerical solution
In this section, I describe and prove two key lemmata which are used to reduce the computa-
tional burden.
Lemma B3 The optimal choices under a safe strategy are independent of

  (S) ; X (S) ; vb (n;S)
	
when ~ (n;S) = s
Proof. The dependence on X (S) is via the households risk aversion a¤ecting the deposit
demand schedule. When good sentiments ~ (n;S) = s coincide with a safe strategy, the bank
always stays on the safe region of the deposit demand schedule such its borrowing costs are at
q. The deposit threshold itself does not depend on the marginal utility wedge such that X (S)
has no impact on the outcome.
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The dependence on

  (S) ; vb (n;S)
	
, on the other hand, stems from the derivative term
@ES[vb(n0;S0)]
@
in the FOCs associated with the safe strategy. To see why this is not an issue under
~ (n;S) = s, consider the three alternative cases that the bank may be facing. First, consider
the case where the solvency constraint is slack. The rst order conditions from the safe strategy
must then be
qb (S)
q
= (1  P (S))
 
1   +  @ES

vb (n0;S0)

@
!
+ P (S) b
ql (l;S)
(1  l) q
= (1  P (S))
 
1   +  @ES

vb (n0;S0)

@
!
+ P (S) l
Combining the rst FOC with (2.1) and using the parameterization  = q yields
@ES

vb (n0;S0)

@
= 1
Therefore, this case is only valid under the conditions listed in Proposition 2.1. With the
derivative term equal to unity, the FOCs become
qb (S)
q
= (1  P (S)) + P (S) b
ql (l;S)
(1  l) q
= 1  P (S) + P (S) l (B48)
leading to the same outcome as the safe equilibrium (with a slack solvency constraint) in the
two period environment.
Second, consider a second case where
@ES

vb (n0;S0)

@
> 1
due to expectations of becoming constrained in the future. This drives banks to borrow the
maximum amount they can while remaining solvent such that the solvency constraint binds
with a positive amount of sovereign bonds purchases b > 0
d0 = ll + bb
The rst order condition for lending then become
ql (l;S) =
1  l
1  b

qb (S)
 
1  l+ q  l   b
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Note that the derivative
@ES[vb(n0;S0)]
@
is absent from the rst order condition as the bank is
already attempting to maximize its payo¤ in the state without sovereign default within the
constraints imposed by solvency. Substituting in for qb (S) using (2.1) yields the same expression
as (B48) such that the outcome under the second case is identical to that of the rst case.
Finally, when net worth is below
n <
 
1  P (S) + P (S) l (1  l)  l qls
where ls is consistent with (B48), the solvency constraint binds even in the absence of sovereign
bond purchases such that  (n;S) > 0 and the outcome is identical to the safe equilibrium with
a binding solvency constraint in the two period model. The derivative term has no impact
here as the bank does not make any active choices other than borrowing as much as it can and
investing it in loans, which is given by the implicit expression
ql (l;S) l   qll = n
Therefore, in all cases associated with a safe strategy and ~ (n;S) = s, the outcome is
independent of

  (S) ; X (S) ; vb (n;S)
	
.
Lemma B4 The optimal choices under a safe strategy are independent of

  (S) ; vb (n;S)
	
when  (n;S) > 0
Proof. For the case with good sentiments ~ (n;S) = s, the nal part of the proof for Lemma
B3 shows that the outcome is independent of

  (S) ; X (S) ; vb (n;S)
	
. Under bad sentiments
~ (n;S) = g,  (n;S) > 0 again indicates that the bank does not make any active choices other
than borrowing as much as it can and investing it in loans. The amount of lending is given
implicitly by the expression  
ql (l;S)  q (d0; n;S) l l = n
where the deposit demand schedule q (d0; n;S) depends on the households policy functionX (S).
Therefore, the outcome is independent of

  (S) ; vb (n;S)
	
.
dBB
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C Appendix of Chapter 3
C1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
First, we take the early withdrawal of shadow bank deposits as given and derive the no-
withdrawal condition. Expected consumption is given by
(1  P ) cbh + pcbl = M1 + SBdSB +
 
1  p  1  V  dTBRTB
when households do not withdraw their deposits early from traditional banks, and
cwb = M1 + 
SBdSB + dTB
when they do.100 It is optimal for households not to withdraw their deposits when
(1  P ) cbh + pcbl  cwb
) V  V  1
p

1
RTB
  (1  p)

Jointly solving this with (3.13) yields V = 1, RTB = 1.
Next, we conrm that the early withdrawal from shadow banks is optimal. As shadow banks
do not pay the commitment cost, they cannot commit to satisfying a no-withdrawal constraint.
In equilibrium, it is optimal for households to withdraw their deposits early from shadow banks
when
(1  p)RSB + pV SBRSB < 1
where V SB is dened according to (3.20). Using (3.14), (C51) and (C52), we can write
V SB = (1 + )
l
h
RSB =
h
(1  q)h + q (1 + )P2
and the condition becomes
(1  p)h + p (1 + )l
(1  q)h + q (1 + )P2 < 1
Consider the condition when p = q. It will then be satised for any P2 > l which must be
true under (3.6). The necessary restriction on p depends on the mark-up . Specically, when
h < (1 + )l we will need the restriction p  q and vice versa with h < (1 + )l.
100Since households are atomistic, they do not internalize that their decision to withdraw deposits reduces the
liquidation value of traditional banks.
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C2 Limited liability
Let bl refer to the state with low asset payo¤s. When the no-withdrawal constraint binds,
the minimum recovery rate is limited to V  1 so that limited liability must also bind in bl.
Therefore, we consider a scenario where both the no-withdrawal constraint and limited liability
are slack. Since banks are always solvent, they borrow at the risk-free rate R = 1 and prots
in bl are given by
bl = lI2 +M2  D
and the banks problem to maximize expected prots
max
I1;I2;M1;M2
(1  q) [hI1 +M1] + q ([(1  p)h + pl] I2 +M2) D
subject to (3.17) and (3.19). Since P2  (1  p)h + pl given   1, assets are priced at or
below their expected payo¤ after bad news. Therefore banks weakly prefer investing in I2 over
M2 such that we can set
I2 = I1 +
M1
P2
M2 = 0
This reduces the banks problem to
max
I1;M1
I1 +

1  q + q


M1   (P1I1 +M1)
and the rst order conditions for (I1;M1) are respectively
I1 : P1 =
1
(1 + )
(C49)
M1 :  = 1 (C50)
where the inequality in (C50) due to the possibility of a binding no-short-sale constraint. The
banks payo¤ in bl can then be written as
bl =

l   1
1 + 

I1 +

l
(1  p)h + pl   1

M1
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and limited liability binds under the conditions
l   1
1 + 
< 0
l
(1  p)h + pl   1 < 0
which are satised under (3.4). Therefore, we prove by contradiction that it is not possible for
limited liability to be slack when assets yield a low payo¤.
C3 Proof of Lemma 3.1
The rst order conditions to this problem indicate that shadow banks do not nd it optimal to
hold any cash
 
MSB1 = 0

when RSB > 1.101 Therefore, their liquidation value can be written
as
SB =
P2
P SB1
(C51)
where P SB1 is pinned down by the rst order condition for the risky asset
P SB1 =
h
1 + 
1
RSB
(C52)
Combining (C52) and (3.14) yields
P SB1 = (1  q)
h
1 + 
+ qP2 (C53)
and by substituting this into (C51) we attain
SB =
(1 + )P2
(1  q)h + q (1 + )P2 (C54)
There will be a liquidity shortfall when SB < 1. Since SB is increasing in P2 =  [(1  p)h + pl],
setting  = 1 provides a su¢ cient condition for this. With some algebra, we can write this
condition as
(1 + ) [(1  p)h + pl] < h
A further su¢ cient condition can be attained by setting the mark-up to its maximum value
 = . The condition then becomes h > 1 which must be true.
101There is a no-short-sale constraint (I1;M1) = 0 which is only binding for cash.
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To get an expression for interest rates, we combine (C54) with (3.14) such that
RSB =
1
1  q + q P2
h
(1 + )
and RSB > 1 follows from SB < 1.
Finally, substituting (3.17) and (C52) into (3.23) gives an expression for the expected payo¤
E

SB

= (1  q) 
1 + 
hI
SB
1
where ISB1 is attained by combining (C53) with the asset supply schedule (3.3) such that
ISB1 = (A
)
1
1 

(1  q) h
1 + 
+ qP2
 
1 
Observe that ISB1 , P
SB
1 and E

SB

are all positive related to P2.
C4 Proof of Lemma 3.2
After substituting for
 
RTB; V

as per (3.16) and dropping the label TB to simplify the
exposition, the traditional banks problem can be written in as
 = (1  q) (hI1 +M1) + q (1  p) (hI2 +M2)  (1  qp)D (C55)
s.t.
P1I1 +M1 = D
P2I2 +M2 = P2I1 +M1 (C56)
lI2 +M2  D (C57)
(I1; I2;M1;M2) = 0
where the last line represents no-short-sale constraints. There are three alternative cases de-
pending on whether the no-withdrawal and no-short-sale constraint on I2 bind. We rst describe
the case in Lemma 3.2, and then consider the remaining cases and prove that they may not be
valid under the restrictions   ,  > 
C4.1 Case 1
Lemma 3.2 describes the case where the no-withdrawal constraint (C57) and the no-short-
sale constraint on I2 bind. With I2 = 0, the second period budget constraint (C56) and the
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no-withdrawal constraint can respectively be written as
M2 = P2I1 +M1
M2 = P1I1 +M1
Therefore, the no-withdrawal constraint may only be satised with I1 > 0 when
P1 = P2
which pins down P1 and also corresponds to
I1 = (A
)
1
1  P

1 
2
as per (3.3).102
Note also that the no-withdrawal constraint prevents the bank from converting M1 to risky
assets in the second period as long as  > . As such, the bank may not prot from holding
cash in the rst period andM1 is indeterminate. Therefore, the expected payo¤ can be written
as
E

TB

= (1  q) (h   P2) I1
= (1  q) (h   P2) (A)
1
1  P

1 
2
and its derivative with respect to P2 is
@E

TB

@P2
= (A)
1
1 
1  q
1  

h
P2
  1

P

1 
2
such that
@E

TB

@P2
< 0 8 P2 > h
C4.2 Case 2
In the second case, the no-withdrawal constraint binds but the no-short-sale constraint is slack.
By combining (C56) and (C57), we can write
I2 =
P2   P1
P2   l I1 (C58)
M2 = P2

P1   l
P2   l

I1 +M1
102Any solution with I1 = 0 is sub-optimal as (3.3) indicates that P1 would approach zero.
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where P2 > l follows from  >  and M1 is indeterminate as in Case 1. Substituting these
into (C55) yields the following rst order condition for I1
P1 =
1
1 + 
(1  q)h (P2   l) + q (1  p) (h   l)P2
q (1  p) (h   P2) + (1  qp) (P2   l) (C59)
and the expected payo¤ is
 =

(1  q)h + q (1  p) (h   l) P2
P2   l


1 + 
I1 (C60)
Finally, we derive a condition to eliminate this case by considering the no-short-sale con-
straint I2  0. Since P2 > l, I1 > 0, (C58) indicates that I2  0 will bind when
P2 < P1
Using (C59), we can write this as
P2 <
1
1 + 
(1  q)h (P2   l) + q (1  p) (h   l)P2
(1  qp) (P2   l) + q (1  p) (h   P2) (C61)
which implicitly establishes a boundary re-sale discount ^ above which the no-short-sale con-
straint is slack.103 Case 2 is eliminated for all  2 [0; 1] when ^ > 1. The relevant condition
can then be attained by combining (C61) with  = 1 such that
(1  p)h + pl < 1
1 + 
)  < 
which indicates that the mark-up restriction (3.4) eliminates Case 2.
Note also that even in the absence of the restriction (3.4), the equilibrium re-sale never
occurs under this case since the expected payo¤(C60) is decreasing in . Without the restriction
(3.4), the size of the shadow banking sector simply continues to expand until  < ^ and the
equilibrium occurs under Case 1.
  (1  q)
h
1+
+ ql
(1  p)h + pl
103With l = 0, we can get an explicit expression ^ = 11 q

1
1+
1 qp
1 p   q

.
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C4.3 Case 3
In the third case, the no-withdrawal constraint is slack. Due to limited liability, banks strictly
prefer to convert their cash to risky assets I2 following bad news to prot from the decline in
P2. Therefore, we can write
I2 = I1 +
M1
P2
M2 = 0
and the rst order conditions for (M1; P1) are respectively written as
P1 =
h
1 + 
P2 < h
Since P2 < h even without a re-sale under bad news, banks optimally hold M1 ! 1.
In other words, with the no-withdrawal constrain slack, banks nd it protable to hold as
much cash as possible in the rst period and then convert all of it into risky assets after bad
news. Since each unit ofM1 requires a unit of deposits, and risky assets contribute to low state
revenues by l < 1, it is impossible for the no-withdrawal constraint to remain slack under this
investment strategy. Therefore, Case 3 is also eliminated.
C5 Solution under  = 
Suppose  <  and hence P2 < l such that traditional banks benet from buying risky assets
both in terms of prots and in terms of the no-withdrawal constraint. Therefore, they nd it
optimal to hold risky assets until the secondary market price returns to P2 = l (i.e.  = ).
Let ~I2 indicate the level of assets that achieve this, implicitly dened by the expression104
l
(1  p)h + pl = f

ISB1 + (1  )

I1   ~I2

Once the secondary market price reaches P2 = l, the no-withdrawal constraint binds
and traditional banks behave as described in Section 3.2. Therefore, I1 is set according to
P1 = P2 = l and traditional banksholdings of safe assets in period 2 is given by
M2 = P2I1   P2 ~I2
= l

I1   ~I2

104We drop the label TBto simplify the exposition
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where we have taken advantage of the indeterminacy ofM1  0 to setM1 = 0. Finally, expected
prots are given by
E [] = (h   l)
h
(1  q) I1 + q (1  p) ~I2
i
= (h   l)
h
(1  q)A 11  (l)

1  + q (1  p) ~I2
i
So far, we have assumed that traditional banks remain net-sellers with ~I2  I1. When
the excess supply of assets is particularly large, we may have P2 < l even when traditional
banks hold on to their risky assets such that ~I2 = I1. In this case, they will nd it optimal to
increase D and M1 use this to purchase risky assets in period 2 until P2 = l. As before, the
no-withdrawal constraint will bind at P2 = l and the complete solution is
P1 = P2
I2 = I1 +
1
l
~M1
M2 = 0
D = P1I1 + ~M1 = lI1 + ~M1
where ~M1 takes on the role of ensuring P2 = l and is implicitly dened by
l
(1  p)h + pl = f

ISB1   (1  )
1
l
~M1

and the expected payo¤ is
E [] = (h   l)

(1  qp)A 11  (l)

1  + q (1  p) 1
l
~M1

= (h   1)
 
1  qp
qp
A
1
1 


1  (1  qp)h
qp
 
1 
+
q (1  p)
1  (1  qp)h
~M1
!
There are two notable implications. First, the secondary market price cannot go below l.
Second, a rise in the shadow banking sector size  rst leads to a rise in ~I2, and then ~M1. The
above solution shows that ~M1 and E [] rises in this case while everything else stays constant.
As we move to a limiting case with only shadow banks, safe asset holdings and traditional bank
prots both approach innity
lim
!1
E

TB

= lim
!1
~M1 =1
which guarantees an inferior equilibrium for a su¢ ciently high commitment cost  >  .
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C6 Proof for Proposition 3.2
For the purposes of the proof, it is convenient to introduce some additional notation. Let 
denote the equilibrium re-sale discount and the functions
 
SB (:) , TB (:)

map from the
re-sale discount to expected payo¤s from shadow and traditional banking such that
SB () = (1  q) 
1 + 
h (A
)
1
1 

(1  q) h
1 + 
+ q [(1  p)h + pl]
 
1 
TB () = (1  q) (h    [(1  p)h + pl]) (A)
1
1  ( [(1  p)h + pl])

1 
as per Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.2. There is an interior equilibrium when the following su¢ cient
conditions are satised
SB
 


> TB
 

   (C62)
SB
 


> TB
 

   (C63)
@SB ()
@
>
@TB ()
@
8  2 (; 1) (C64)
@
@
< 0 8  2 [0; 1] (C65)
where  > 0. In the sections below, we show that these conditions will be satised within a
range of commitment costs  2 ( ; ) and also show that this range is non-empty.
C6.1 Proof for condition (C62)
The condition depends on the e¤ective value taken by
  min
"
1;
(1  q) h
1+
+ ql
(1  p)h + pl
#
When we have
 <
(p  q) (h   1)
qp (1  q)h   (p  q) (h   1) (C66)
such that  = 1, the relevant condition is
SB (1) > TB (1)  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Using the denitions for
 
SB (:) , TB (:)

, we can write this condition as a minimum commit-
ment cost
    (1  q) (A) 11  (h   1)

1
q
 1
1 
(1  (1  q)h)

1 
  (1  q) (A) 11  
1 + 
h

1  
1 + 
(1  q)h
 
1 
> 0
As an aside, we also show that  > 0 such that a commitment cost is necessary for an
interior equilibrium. To do this, note that the expected payo¤ under Case 1 and Case 2 of the
traditional banks problem in Appendix C4 are equivalent when  = 1,  = . For any  < ,
prots under Case 1 are higher. Therefore, we can write a su¢ cient condition
(A)
1
1 

1 + 

1
1 + 
 
1 
> (A)
1
1 

1 + 
(1  q)h

1  
1 + 
(1  q)h
 
1 
) 1 > (1  q)h (1 +  (1  (1  q)h))

1 
Since 
1  < 1 for  <
1
2
, we can eliminate the power and substitute for  = (1 q)(h 1)
1 (1 q)h to get
a su¢ cient condition
(1  q)h [(1  q)h + q] < 1
Note that the RHS is increasing in h. A further su¢ cient condition is then to set l = 0 which
maximizes h. We can then see that the above condition is true for all p < 1. Therefore, we
can show that  > 0 under the two conditions
 <
1
2
  
When (C66) is not satised such that  < 1, the relevant condition for (C62) is
SB
 


> TB
 

  
which leads to a higher minimum commitment cost
 = (1  q) (A) 11   h    [(1  p)h + pl]   [(1  p)h + pl] 1   
(1  q) (A) 11  
1 + 
h

(1  q) h
1 + 
+ q [(1  p)h + pl]
 
1 
where the aside on  > 0 is still valid.
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C6.2 Proof for condition (C63)
It follows from Appendix C5 that (C63) will be satised when the lower bound restriction on
 is violated such that
 > f
 
(A)
1
1 

(1  q) h
1 + 
+ ql
 
1 
!
for any  < 1. Therefore, we do not necessarily need an upper bound on the commitment
cost for an interior equilibrium. However, the interior equilibrium has di¤erent properties in the
region  <  (as described in Appendix C5) and we impose an upper bound on the commitment
cost to prevent this.
Let e  h
(1 p)h+pl denote the re-sale discount that maximizes traditional bank prots.
The upper bound depends on where e stands relative to  . When the following condition is
true
h  1
1  qp (1  ) (C67)
such that e > , the upper bound for commitment costs  must satisfy
SB
e < TB e  
which yields the upper bound
   = (1  q) (hA)
1
1 
"
(1  ) 1    
1 + 

1  q
1 + 
+ q
 
1 
#
When (C67) is not satised, the re-sale discount hits  =  before traditional bank prots
peak and the upper bound is given by
   = (1  q) (A) 11 
"
(h   l)

1 
l  

1 + 
h

(1  q) h
1 + 
+ ql
 
1 
#
Note that, regardless of the value taken by ( ; ), it follows from (C64) that  >  .
C6.3 Proof for condition (C64)
This follows directly from Lemma 3.1, which shows that
@SB ()
@
> 0 8  2 (0; 1)
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and Lemma 3.2 which shows that
@TB ()
@
< 0 8  2
e; 
where  > e since the latter is the peak of traditional bank prots in the range above .
C6.4 Proof for condition (C65)
Recall that the excess supply of assets is given by
eI = ISB1 + (1  )  ITB1   ITB2  > 0
where
 
ISB1 ; I
TB
1

depend on  and ITB2 = 0. Given that f (:) is continuous and decreasing, to
satisfy (C65) we require that
@eI
@
= ISB1   ITB1 > 0 8  2 [0; 1]
which is equivalent to
ISB1 > I
TB
1 8 2 (; ]
At any given , we have ISB1 > I
TB
1 when the following condition is satised
qh > (1 + ) [1  (1  q)h]
Since the RHS is increasing in  and , a su¢ cient condition is to set  = 1,  = , which will
be satised for h > 1.
Since
 
ISB1 ; I
TB
1

both decrease in  at di¤erent rates, we also need to show that ISB1 at 
is lower than ITB1 at . This will be true with  = 1 when (C66) is satised. Otherwise,  will
need to satisfy
 =
(1  q) h
1+
+ ql
(1  p)h + pl
which is precisely how we dene the upper bound restriction on the re-sale discount.
C6.5 Proof for the non-emptiness of ( ; )
Finally, we prove that  >  such that there is a non-empty set of commitment costs that
bring about an interior equilibrium. Since there are two alternatives values for both  and  ,
we consider each in turn. First suppose that (C66) is satised so that  is in line with  = 1.
Then it follows from Lemma 3.2 that  >  regardless of which value  takes. Second, suppose
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(C66) is not satised so that  is in line with  < 1. When (C67) is also not satised such that
traditional bank prots do not peak until ,  >  follows from  > .
The only case where we need impose an additional condition corresponds to (C67) being
satised so that  is in line with the peak  = h
(1 p)h+pl while (C66) is not satised such that
 < 1. The condition for non-emptiness is then equivalent to
e < 
) h
(1  p)h + pl <
(1  q) h
1+
+ ql
(1  p)h + pl
A su¢ cient condition is
 < 1  p
which should be satised when  < 0:5, p  0:5.
C7 Proof for Proposition 3.4.3
We rst solve the households problem to attain the expressions (3.28), (3.29). Allowing for
liquidity risk, the households problem can be written as
max
dSB ;dTB ;M1;M2
(1  q)Cgh + q (1  p)Cbh + qpCbl
s.t.
dSB + dTB +M1 = E
M2 = M1 + 
SBdSB
Cgh = M1 + d
TBRTB + dSBRSB
Cbh = M2 +

(1  )RTB + TB dTB
Cbl = M2 +

(1  ) V RTB + TB dTB
with the rst order conditions (3.14) for deposits in shadow banks and
RTB = 1 +
q
 
1  TB+ qp (1  )  1  V 
1  q   + (1  ) p  1  V  (C68)
for deposits in traditional banks.105
105Under the sequential service constraint, a portion TB of depositors are able to withdraw all of their funds
during a bank-run while the remainder receive no payment. We assume that the outcome of an attempted
withdrawal is idiosyncratic to the household-bank pairing and that households diversify their holdings across a
large number of traditional banks. This does not a¤ect our results but streamlines the exposition by preventing
households from becoming heterogenous in whether they have been repaid.
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Early withdrawal decision and market discipline
We assume that the bank-run and the early withdrawal decision take place simultaneously
such that, realistically, households may not secure themselves from bank-runs with an early
withdrawal. Expected consumption without and with an early withdrawal are then respectively
given by
(1  P ) cbh + pcbl = M1 + SBdSB +
 
1  p  1  V  (1  )RTB + TB dTB
cwb = M1 + 
SBdSB +
 
1   1  TB  dTB
where the latter expression indicates that a household that decides to withdraw its deposit
early may receive an incomplete repayment due to a bank-run. Under this set up, all terms
that relate to the bank-run probability cancel out and the minimum repayment rate schedule
is given by
(1  P ) cbh + pcbd  cwb
) V  V  1
p

1
RTB
  (1  p)

(C69)
which remains identical to the simple model. Combining (C68) and (C69) then yields
V = 1  q
p

 
1  TB
1  q  1    1  TB
RTB = 1 +
q
1  q 
 
1  TB
With  = 0, these expressions simplify to V = RTB = 1. Note that V is decreasing in  and
RTB is increasing. Therefore a rise in  leads to
V < 1 < RTB
Fire-sale on the safe asset and liquidity shortfall
Finally, we show that the re-sale on the safe asset is a crucial determinant of liquidity risk.
Consider the liquidation value given by (3.31). There will be no liquidity shortfall such that
TB = 1 under the condition
P2 (r) I
TB
2 (r) + P2 (s) I
TB
2 (s)  DTB
150
First, consider the case without a re-sale on safe assets such that P2 (s) = 1. The condition
becomes
ITB2 (r) + I
TB
2 (s)  DTB
and will be true under any investment strategy that satises the no-withdrawal constraint (3.30)
as long as
P2 (r)  l
To see that this must be true, consider what would happen otherwise. Since traditional banks
are protected by limited liability, they do not internalize the state with weak fundamentals.
Therefore, given P2 (s) = 1  P2 (r), traditional banks always prefer to purchase risky assets
which yield a higher return in the state where they remain solvent. Ordinarily, traditional banks
risky asset purchases are limited by the no-withdrawal constraint. However, with P2 (r) < l
and P2 (s) = 1; the strategy of selling a safe asset and purchasing risky assets with the funds
increases the recovery rate V . Consequently, traditional banks increase their purchases of risky
assets until their price rises to P2 (r) = l.
Second, consider the case with a re-sale on safe assets such that P2 (s) = . Since shadow
banks are liquidated after bad news, and traditional banks re-allocate their portfolio from risky
to safe assets, there is an excess supply of risky assets at all times such that P2 (r) = . We
can then write the condition for TB = 1 as

 
ITB2 (r) + I
TB
2 (s)
  DTB (C70)
Note that the no-withdrawal constraint is not tightened by a decline in  when both safe and
risky assets are in excess supply, since the terms of trade between the two assets do not change,
while the value of liquid asset holdings increase. Therefore, for su¢ ciently low , (C70) fails
and there is a liquidity shortfall TB < 1.
C8 Example re-sale function
To attain a simple re-sale function from the outsider investors problem, we can simply para-
meterize the payo¤ function from the outside investment to
g
 eK = z 1 ln eK
where z > 0. The re-sale function then becomes
f
eI = z eE
1 + z [(1  p)h + pl] eI
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To satisfy the lower bound condition exactly, we need to set eE at a level that yields f  ISB1  =
 at  = 0, which is
eE = "1
z
+ (A)
1
1 

(1  q) h
1 + 
+
1  (1  qp)h
p
 
1 
#
and the upper bound will approach but never exceed  as z rises.
C9 Full description of the model with liquidity risk
We describe banks and entrepreneurs below. Outside investors are described in Section 3.4.2
while households are described under Appendix C7.
C9.1 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs only di¤er from those described in Section 3.3.1.1 in that they may produce all
three asset types i 2 f; s; rg. We assume that they have a Cobb-Douglas production function
that is additively separable in the asset type such that
I1 (i) = AK (i)
 8i 2 f; s; rg
where K (i) is an investment in capital specic to the asset type. This yields the set of rst
order conditions
P1 (i) =
1
A
1

I1 (i)
1 
 8i 2 f; s; rg (C71)
where we impose a constant markup  across assets for simplicity.
C9.2 Banks
With a richer asset space, the rst period budget constraint becomesX
i2f;s;rg
P1 (i) I1 (i) = D
where I1 (i) is the amount purchased of an asset i and P1 (i) is the corresponding asset price.
As in the simple model, assets are priced at their expected payo¤ in the secondary market after
good news and trade is inconsequential. Bank prots (in the third period) are then given by
gh = hI1 (r) + I1 (s) + I1 () DR (C72)
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Following bad news, banks face the second period budget constraintX
i2fs;rg
(P2 (i)  P1 (i)) I1 (i) = I1 () (C73)
and have a liquidation value
 = min

1;
P2 (r) I2 (r) + P2 (s) I2 (s)
D

(C74)
When risky assets yield a high payo¤ h in the third period, banks make a prot
gh = hI2 (r) + I2 (s) DR
while limited liability binds under a low asset payo¤ l. Under limited liability, banks make
zero prots and deposits pay a recovery rate
V = min

1;
lI2 (r) + I2 (s)
DR

which is proportional to the shortfall of funds. We can use this expression to write the no-
withdrawal constraint for traditional banks as
lI
TB
2 (r) + I
TB
2 (s)  V DTBRTB (C75)
Next, we evaluate the optimal behaviour of banks under the two alternative strategies of shadow
and traditional banking. The free entry condition is given by (3.26) as in the simple model.
Shadow banking
Shadow banks choose

ISB1 (i) ; D
SB; i 2 f; s; rg	 to maximize their expected prots
E

SB

= (1  q)  hISB1 (r) + ISB1 (s) + ISB1 () DSBRSB
subject to (C72). The optimal portfolio allocation is then determined by the set of rst order
conditions
P1 (r) =
h
(1 + )RSB
P1 (s) = P1 () =
1
(1 + )RSB
which allow us to back out the asset holdings in period 1 using (C71).
153
Traditional banking
Traditional banks choose

ITB1 (i) ; I
TB
2 (r) ; I
TB
2 (s) ;M
TB
1 ;M
TB
2 ; D
TB; i 2 f; s; rg	 to maxi-
mize their expected prots
E

TB

= (1  q)  hITB1 (r) + ITB1 (s) + ITB1 ()
+q (1  p) (1  )  hITB2 (r) + ITB2 (s)
  (1  q + q (1  p) (1  ))DTBRTB
subject to (C72), (C73) and (C75). Due to their ability to commit, traditional banks also
internalize the relationship between their liquidation value TB given by (C74) and the minimum
recovery rate V and RTB as per the expressions in Proposition 3.3.
We focus on the case with a slack no-short-sale constraint
ITB1 (r) > 0
which is the case presented in our results. By combining (C73) and (C75), we can write the
following expressions for second period asset holdings
ITB2 (s) =
P TB2 (r)
V RTBDTB   l
 
P TB2 (s) I
TB
1 (s) + P
TB
2 (r) I
TB
1 (r) + I
TB
1 ()

P TB2 (r)  lP TB2 (s)
ITB2 (r) =
P TB2 (s)
 
ITB1 (s)  V RTBDTB

+ P TB2 (r) I
TB
1 (r) + I
TB
1 ()
P TB2 (r)  lP TB2 (s)
When there is a liquidity shortfall TB < 1, we can use the expressions in Proposition 3.3
and (C74) to write the problem as
E

TB

= (1  q)  hITB1 (r) + ITB1 (s) + ITB1 ()
+

P TB2 (s) I
TB
1 (s) + P
TB
2 (r) I
TB
1 (r) + I
TB
1 ()
  q 1  q + q (1  p) (1  )
1  q
+q
(1  p) (1  )
P TB2 (r)  lP TB2 (s)

(h   l)   q (1  p)
p (1  q)
 
hP
TB
2 (s)  P TB2 (r)

  (1  q + q (1  p) (1  ))

1 +
q
1  q 

DTB
 q (1  p) (1  )

1   q (1  p)
p (1  q)

hP
TB
2 (s)  P TB2 (r)
P TB2 (r)  lP TB2 (s)

DTB
s.t.
P TB1 () I
TB
1 () + P
TB
1 (s) I
TB
1 (s) + P
TB
1 (r) I
TB
1 (r) = D
TB
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which yields the rst order conditions
P TB1 (r) =
1
1 + 
(1  q)h + Z1P TB2 (r)
Z2
P TB1 (s) =
1
1 + 
1  q + Z1P TB2 (s)
Z2
P TB1 () =
1
1 + 
1  q + q Z
Z2
where
Z1  q  (1  q + q (1  p) (1  ))
1  q
+
q (1  p) (1  )
P TB2 (r)  lP TB2 (s)

(h   l)   q (1  p)
p (1  q)
 
hP
TB
2 (s)  P TB2 (r)

Z2  (1  q + q (1  p) (1  ))

1 +
q
1  q 

+q (1  p) (1  )

1   q (1  p)
p (1  q)

hP
TB
2 (s)  P TB2 (r)
P TB2 (r)  lP TB2 (s)

When there is no liquidity shortfall TB = 1, we can use RTB = V = 1 from Proposition
3.3 to write the problem as
E

TB

= (1  q)  hITB1 (r) + ITB1 (s) + ITB1 ()
+q (1  p) (h   l) P
TB
2 (s) I
TB
1 (s) + P
TB
2 (r) I
TB
1 (r) + I
TB
1 ()
P TB2 (r)  lP TB2 (s)
 

q (1  p)

hP
TB
2 (s)  P TB2 (r)
P TB2 (r)  lP TB2 (s)

+ (1  qp)

DTB
s.t.
P TB1 () I
TB
1 () + P
TB
1 (s) I
TB
1 (s) + P
TB
1 (r) I
TB
1 (r) = D
TB
The rst order conditions FOCs then become
P TB1 (r) =
1
1 + 
(1  q)h
 
P TB2 (r)  lP TB2 (s)

+ q (1  p) (h   l)P TB2 (r)
(1  q)P TB2 (r) + (q (1  p)h   (1  qp)l)P TB2 (s)
P TB1 (s) =
1
1 + 
(1  q)  P TB2 (r)  lP TB2 (s)+ q (1  p) (h   l)P TB2 (s)
(1  q)P TB2 (r) + (q (1  p)h   (1  qp)l)P TB2 (s)
P TB1 () =
1
1 + 
(1  q)  P TB2 (r)  lP TB2 (s)+ q (1  p) (h   l)
(1  q)P TB2 (r) + (q (1  p)h   (1  qp)l)P TB2 (s)
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Figure C1 : Results under alternative bank-run specication
Note: Expected payo¤s are inclusive of the commitment cost  . Total assets in period 1 and 2 are respec-
tively dened as I1 
P
i2f;s;rg I1 (i) and I2 
P
i2fs;rg P2 (i) I2 (i). Panel 7 plots
 
ITB2
 1
P2 (s) I
TB
2 (s)   
ITB1
 1P
i2f;sg I
TB
1 (i) for safe and liquid assets, and
 
ITB2
 1
P2 (r) I
TB
2 (r)  
 
ITB1
 1
ITB1 (r) for risky
assets. Panel 8 plots ITB1 (i) =I1 respectively for i = f; s; rg and Panel 9 does the same for shadow banks.
C10 Alternative specication for bank-runs
Following the global games solution of Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), we postulate that banks
with a shortfall of liquidity are more vulnerable to bank-runs. Specically, we depict the
probability  that a bank faces a self-fullling run as a negative function  (:) of its liquidation
value  such that
 =  () ;
 0 (:)  0;  () 2 [0; 1] 8 
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where  (1) = 0 ensures that banks without a liquidity shortfall are not vulnerable to self-
fullling runs.106 We parameterize  (:) simply as
 () = max
n
0;min
n
1;e (1  )oo
with e = 1:64 calibrated in line with the calibration strategy described in Section 3.5.1. Figure
C1 provides the numerical results under a set up and calibration that are otherwise identical to
those presented in Section 3.5.2. In equilibrium, the two bank run specications yield exactly
the same outcome. At above equilibrium sizes of shadow banking ( > ), the alternative bank
run specication implies further increases in  in line with the decrease in liquidity. This leads
to lower traditional bank prots and a sharper decline in minimum recovery rate V compared
to the baseline case.
106We also impose  () 2 [0; 1] 8  since  is a probability.
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